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ABSTRACT 
By setting the writings of Etel Adnan, Annie Dillard, Marilynne Robinson and Rebecca 
Solnit into dialogue with those of the New England Transcendentalists, this thesis proposes a 
New Transcendentalism that both reinvigorates and reimagines Transcendentalist thought for 
our increasingly intersectional and deterritorialized contemporary context. Drawing on key 
re-readings by Stanley Cavell, George Kateb and Branka Arsić, the project contributes 
towards the twenty-first-century shift in Transcendentalist scholarship which seeks to 
challenge the popular image of New England Transcendentalism as uncompromisingly 
individualist, abstract and ultimately the preserve of white male privilege. Moreover, in its 
identification and examination of an interrelated poetics and politics of liminality across these 
old and new Transcendentalist writings, the project also extends the scope of a more recent 
strain of Transcendentalist scholarship which emphasises the dialogical underpinnings of the 
nineteenth-century movement.  
The project comprises three central chapters, each of which situates New 
Transcendentalism within a series of vertical and lateral dialogues. The trajectory of my 
chapters follows the logic of Emerson’s ‘ever-widening circles’, in that each takes a wider 
critical lens through which to explore the dialogical relationship between my four writers and 
the New England Transcendentalists. In Chapter 1 the focus is upon anthropological theories 
of liminality; in Chapter 2 upon feminist interventions within psychoanalysis; and in Chapter 
3 upon the revisionary work of Post-West criticism. In keeping with the dialogical analogies 
that inform this project throughout, the relationship examined within this thesis between 
Adnan, Dillard, Robinson and Solnit and the nineteenth-century Transcendentalists is 
understood as itself reciprocal, in that it not only demonstrates how my four contemporary 
writers may be read productively in the light of their New England forebears, but also how 
those readings in turn invite us to reconsider our understanding of those earlier thinkers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In April 2015, I found myself in a government building on Market Street, San Francisco, 
sharing a lift with Rebecca Solnit. I introduced myself – having just listened to her forcefully 
address a board of officials regarding what she saw as their tardy and ineffectual 
environmental policies – and explained that she was the focus of my doctoral thesis, 
alongside Etel Adnan, Annie Dillard, and Marilynne Robinson. How, Solnit asked, did I 
intend to bring together such a disparate group of thinkers? We walked through the market, 
Solnit on the lookout for the fresh cherries that were just then becoming available, and I 
explained that my premise was to examine the influence of New England Transcendentalism 
on their writings. We chatted briefly about Thoreau and Eadweard Muybridge before parting 
ways – me to a conference, and Solnit to the library where she was working on her latest 
book. 
While only a very short conversation, Solnit’s initial reaction to being aligned with 
Adnan, Dillard and Robinson was particularly fitting, given Laura Maria Child’s response 
when asked to define Transcendentalism in 1844: ‘It is a question difficult, nay, impossible to 
answer; for the minds so classified are incongruous individuals.’1 Many have acknowledged 
the elusive nature of the nineteenth-century movement, as was most concisely expressed by 
Ralph Waldo Emerson’s close friend, Almira Burrows, who famously described 
Transcendentalism as ‘A little beyond’.2 Contemporary critics have been inclined to agree, 
with Joel Myerson asserting that ‘the longer one studies Transcendentalism, the more one 
realizes that the looser the definition, the more appropriate it is’.3 For this reason, Myerson 
posits, Burrows’ enigmatic definition ‘is ultimately more successful than a hard-and-fast 
                                                          
1 Lydia Maria Child, ‘Letter 13’, in Letters from New York: Second Series (New York: C. S. Francis, 1845), pp. 
125-30 (p. 125).  
2 Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Journals and Miscellaneous Notebooks of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. by Merton 
M. Sealts Jr, 16 vols (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960-82), V (1965), p. 218. 
3 Joel Myerson (ed.), Transcendentalism: A Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. xxv. 
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description that is supposed to fit all the people considered to be Transcendentalists’.4 In 
1998, Charles Capper discussed the implications of the movement’s seemingly disparate 
nature for scholars of American Transcendentalism, asserting that while Myerson’s 1984 
review of the field identifies more than four thousand publications written on the New 
England Transcendentalists, relatively few of these works offer ‘a sense of the movement’s 
contours, phases, and significance as a past, multiform, collective entity, interacting with 
other entities in various “times”’.5  
Capper’s article goes some way to addressing this lack, surveying a century of 
shifting responses to New England Transcendentalism, ranging from the writings of Alexis 
de Tocqueville, George Santayana and Lewis Mumford through to the later critical 
interpretations of Perry Miller and F. O. Matthiessen. Within the article’s closing sections, 
Capper recognises that ‘certain methodologies will continue to be essential to any 
Transcendentalism project’ including, he suggests, the centrality of ‘discursive intellectual 
history’, the imperative to ‘blend the empirical and contextualist methods of history and the 
linguistic and intrapsychic ones of literary studies’, and an inclination towards ‘getting a fix 
on what exactly was the movement in the movement’ (532). In this vein, Capper identifies 
several key lines of enquiry that he deems ‘ripe for radical revision’ (535). These include the 
question of Transcendentalism’s contribution to ‘romantic modernity’ for, he contends, 
 if modernity means, as postmodernist philosophers tell us, a self-reflexive 
engagement in a world seemingly without fixed “foundations”, the leading 
Transcendentalists, although idealists to the core, pushed closer to that leap than did 
any other American intellectual circle before the twentieth century (534). 
 
                                                          
4 Transcendentalism: A Reader, p. xxv. 
5 Joel Myerson, The Transcendentalists: A Review of Research and Criticism (New York: Modern Language 
Association of America, 1984); Charles Capper, ‘“A little beyond”: The Problem of the Transcendentalist 
Movement in American History’, Journal of American History, 85 (1998), 502-39 (p. 502). Subsequent 
references will be given in parentheses for all texts throughout this thesis where clear. 
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Capper also acknowledges ‘the surprisingly still underdeveloped subject of generational 
culture’ as integral to the Transcendentalist movement, despite the fact that these thinkers 
were ‘the first intellectual group in American history to make liberation from the “sepulchres 
of the fathers” […] the exhilarating (and covertly anxious) center of their social world view’ 
(534). In this regard, Capper continues, ‘it is hard to imagine a better venue for exploring 
such private cultures as friendship, family life, work […] than with the Transcendentalists’ 
(534).  
Tracing more than a century of shifting responses to Transcendentalism and 
highlighting numerous underdeveloped and pertinent avenues for Transcendentalist 
scholarship, Capper’s article posits that what is most striking about the Transcendentalists is 
the extent to which they have become ‘luminous screens on which successive generations 
have projected some of their deepest ideological fears and desires’ (538). He thus concludes 
that ‘it seems not too utopian to suppose that, not a further vanishing, but a shock of 
recognition in Transcendentalism studies is in order’ (539). Indeed, if Transcendentalism is, 
as Emerson himself famously declared in 1842, ‘the very oldest of thoughts, cast into the 
mould of these new times […]; Idealism, as it appears in 1842’, then it may be said that the 
scholarship it provokes is equally bound by and reflective of its historical moment.6 This is 
particularly true of responses to Transcendentalism, for its cultural ubiquity is such that the 
waxing and waning of scholarly enthusiasm for the movement and its contemporary 
relevance is a particularly keen indicator of prevailing ideologies in the United States.  
While Capper’s article is compelling in its evaluation of historical trends in 
Transcendentalist scholarship and its recognition of those aspects of the movement that 
remain (or are becoming increasingly) apposite within our contemporary context, this thesis 
                                                          
6 Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘The Transcendentalist’, in Nature; Address, and Lectures (Boston and Cambridge: 
James Munroe, 1850), pp. 319-48 (p. 319). 
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contests Capper’s suggestion that ‘as a historical movement, Transcendentalism would seem 
to have entered a long eclipse […] roughly since the 1970s’ (502-3). The chapters that follow 
extend a strain of Transcendentalist scholarship that emerged drawing exactly this period, 
most notably within the writings of Stanley Cavell, and which gained momentum around the 
time of Capper’s article through studies by Judith Shklar, George Kateb and Sharon 
Cameron, before being further developed throughout the last decade by scholars including 
Branka Arsic, Cary Wolfe and Adam Levine. The central focus of this critical strain is a re-
evaluation of the philosophical and political contribution of Transcendentalism’s most 
prominent proponent, Ralph Waldo Emerson. While each of these scholars emphasises a 
different aspect of Emerson’s philosophical, ethical and/or political approach, all share a 
desire to challenge long-held misconceptions about his writings, and particularly those 
pertaining to their central tenet of self-reliance, which has for so long been reduced to a 
byword for an intrinsically American mode of hyperindividualism. That the sum of these 
writings signals a fundamental rupture in the field of Transcendentalist studies is most 
explicitly stated in Adam Levine and Daniel S. Malachuck’s introduction to The Political 
Companion to Ralph Waldo Emerson (2011), where it is asserted that the recovery work 
undertaken by these writers and those who followed them ultimately constitutes ‘The New 
History’ of Emerson’s writings. 7  Taking these revisionary re-readings of Ralph Waldo 
Emerson as a point of departure, this thesis explores how this revisionary turn allows us to 
reconsider the enduring influence of American (and specifically Emersonian) 
Transcendentalism within contemporary American literature. While this specific aspect of 
Emersonian Transcendentalism is the project’s central focus, the analysis also recognises and 
explores related texts and practices by those who formed Emerson’s immediate circle, 
                                                          
7 Alan M. Levine and Daniel S. Malachuk, A Political Companion to Ralph Waldo Emerson (Lexington, KY: 
The University Press of Kentucky, 2011), p. 1. 
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including Mary Moody Emerson, Margaret Fuller, and particularly Henry David Thoreau.8  
By exploring both the key similarities and fundamental differences between Etel Adnan, 
Annie Dillard, Marilynne Robinson and Rebecca Solnit, and their nineteenth-century 
antecedents, the analysis contends that each of these four contemporary writers may be 
understood as contributing towards a mode of New Transcendentalism that reinvigorates and 
repurposes American Transcendentalism in light of and in response to major cultural and 
critical developments which took root in the early 1970s. Drawing together several recent 
critical trends, the discussion develops two interrelated strands. The first extends the premise 
of recent studies that provide a more sustained consideration of the dialogical, often 
dialectical thinking that lies at the heart of New England Transcendentalist (and particularly 
Emersonian) writings. With reference to key studies by Jonathan Levin (The Poetics of 
Transition, 1999) and Joan Wry (‘The Art of the Threshold’, 2010), I explore how this 
dialogical perspective contributes towards a wider poetics of liminality within these texts, the 
legacy and influence of which may be traced in the work of Adnan, Dillard, Robinson and 
Solnit. The second recognises an integral interplay between this liminal poetics and a more 
materialist politics of liminality, presenting the relationship between these two elements as 
mutually informative and thus in itself dialogical. 
Rather than directing our attentions a little beyond, then, the New Transcendentalism 
proposed throughout this thesis draws our focus toward what Victor Turner describes as the 
‘betwixt and between’, exploring the liminal practices, spaces, temporalities and experiences 
                                                          
8 There are, of course, other nineteenth-century writers – Emily Dickinson and Walt Whitman, for example – 
who are often aligned with New England Transcendentalism and who could provide a fruitful line of enquiry in 
relation to the writings of my four contemporary writers. However, given that their own relationship with New 
England Transcendentalism is itself complex (Whitman) and even contested (Dickinson) this is a line of thought 
that must be saved for future projects. For a discussion of Dickinson’s antithetical relationship with Emersonian 
Transcendentalism see Helen McNeil, Emily Dickinson (London: Virago, 1986), pp. 82-5. 
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which pervade Transcendentalist writings both old and new.9 The analysis focuses on three 
theoretical frameworks in particular: anthropological theories of liminality, feminist 
interventions within psychoanalysis, and the revisionary work of New and Post-West 
criticism. Setting the writings of Adnan, Dillard, Robinson and Solnit into dialogue with both 
their nineteenth-century antecedents and these contemporary critical discourses, the analysis 
addresses Capper and Myerson’s concerns regarding both Transcendentalism’s resistance to 
definition and its enduring legacy. Considered within the context of a specifically 
Transcendentalist mode of liminality, the elusive nature of Transcendentalist philosophy is 
presented here as an extension of its liminal poetics and of the productive ambivalence that 
such a poetics engenders. Moreover, by recognising how its underlying principles readily 
lend themselves to the interrogation of peripheral or marginal experiences that ‘elude or slip 
through the network of classifications’, American Transcendentalism is here presented as just 
that ‘multiform, collective entity, interacting with other entities in various “times”’ that 
Capper identifies.10 
 
*** 
 
Given the prevalence of revisionist movements in the latter half of the twentieth century – 
New Historicism and Neo-Victorianism, for example, not to mention this ‘New History’ and 
the New Americanists alluded to above – it is surprising how few scholars have given any 
sustained attention to establishing New Transcendentalism as a critical term, despite so many 
acknowledging the far-reaching and enduring impact of the nineteenth-century movement. 
The most notable exception is a 1972 article by preeminent Emerson scholar, Harold Bloom, 
                                                          
9 Victor W. Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1969), p. 95. 
10 The Ritual Process, p. 95. 
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entitled ‘The New Transcendentalism: The Visionary Strain in Merwin, Ashbery and 
Ammons’. Admitting that his choice of authors is ‘affected by the limitations of personal 
taste [and that] it could be argued that the true continuators of the Emersonian strain are to be 
located elsewhere’, Bloom builds his case upon a definition of American Transcendentalism 
that ‘centers upon Emerson’s stance of Self-Reliance, which is primarily a denial of the 
anxiety of influence’.11 While Bloom’s readings allude to themes that will be integral to the 
analysis that follows – his sense of Merwin’s ‘lust for discontinuity’ (28), his description of 
Ashbery as ‘a bearer of an influx of the Newness that he cannot know himself’ (35), and his 
acknowledgement of Ammons’ preoccupation with ‘the bleak [often littoral] periphery of 
possibility’ (39) – there are at least two important ways in which Bloom’s New 
Transcendentalism runs directly counter to my own. 
The most obvious distinction relates to the gender of the authors considered. While 
Bloom acknowledges other possible candidates for the New Transcendentalist cohort beyond 
Merwin, Ashbery and Ammons, it is striking that – as is characteristic of his model of literary 
influence more generally – those he aligns or even considers aligning with a 
Transcendentalist (particularly Emersonian) legacy are almost exclusively white men: Henry 
David Thoreau, Walt Whitman, Wallace Stevens, Robert Frost, William Carlos Williams, 
Ezra Pound, Robinson Jeffers, Allen Tate, Hart Crane, James L. Dickey, Robert Penn 
Warren, Charles Olson, Robert Duncan, Allen Ginsberg, Gary Snyder, Theodore Roethke, 
Conrad Aiken. . . in such a list the inclusion of the idiosyncratic Emily Dickinson reads as 
somewhat of a token gesture. Indeed, the fact that this is such an extensive and relatively 
eclectic mix of writers renders the omission of any twentieth or twenty-first century female 
suggestions all the more conspicuous. In focusing specifically on female writers, then, my 
                                                          
11 Harold Bloom, ‘The New Transcendentalism: The Visionary Strain in Merwin, Ashbery and Ammons’, 
Chicago Review, 27 (1972), 25-47 (pp. 25, 32). 
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own project redresses an imbalance within the current criticism which so often sees the 
legacy of American Transcendentalism played out as a passing of the mantle from renowned 
white male writer to renowned white male writer. In doing so, I extend a line of enquiry set in 
motion by Jana L. Argersinger and Phyllis Cole, whose 2014 essay collection directs us 
Toward a Female Genealogy of Transcendentalism. Describing their project as one in 
‘archaeology and reinterpretation’, the collection excavates the foundations of the 
Transcendentalist movement, tracing its origins back to (Waldo’s aunt) Mary Moody 
Emerson, through key female Transcendentalists including Margaret Fuller, Elizabeth 
Peabody and Caroline Healey Dall, ending with Laura Dassow Wall’s essay on ‘The 
Cosmopolitan Project of Louisa May Alcott’.12 The collection’s overarching themes include a 
belief in ‘mutual self-cultivation’ through conversation and dialogue, the coexistence of 
vertical and lateral genealogies, and ‘the double dynamics of selfhood and group 
identification’. 13  Taken together, these themes problematise Bloom’s vision of a New 
Transcendentalism that reiterates both the overdetermined trope of uncompromising self-
reliance and an agonistic patrilineal genealogy. As such, Argersinger and Cole’s study, like 
my own, serves to reimagine the trajectory and legacy of a movement which has all too often 
been devalued by feminist critics as ‘only a discourse of male egotism and privilege’.14 
This leads us to the second, intrinsically related distinction between Bloom’s New 
Transcendentalism and that which is proposed throughout this thesis. Anticipating his own 
‘anxiety of influence’ model – his exposition of which, though all but completed by 1967, 
would not be published until a year after his article on New Transcendentalism – Bloom 
presents Emerson’s central tenet of self-reliance in the hyperindividualist terms that this 
                                                          
12 Laura Dassow Wall, ‘The Cosmopolitan Project of Louisa May Alcott’, in Toward a Female Genealogy of 
Transcendentalism, ed. by Jana L. Argersinger and Phyllis Cole (Athens, GA and London: University of 
Georgia Press, 2014), pp. 423-45. 
13 Toward a Female Genealogy, pp. 7, 21. 
14 Toward a Female Genealogy, p. 21. 
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project resists. As such, Bloom considers the legacy of ‘only one side of a dialectic’ that more 
recent scholarship has suggested cannot be considered in isolation, and should instead be 
positioned as having ‘a structural counterpoint’ to its seemingly uncompromising 
individualism.15 In this vein, Capper’s article recognises how Transcendentalist scholars have 
historically oscillated between two apparently opposing perspectives: those who highlight 
‘Emerson’s original paradigm of a hyper-individualist Transcendental ethos’ (513) on the one 
hand, and those who prefer to position the movement as a ‘local social phenomenon’ on the 
other, given its advocacy of radical social, political and cultural reform (531). Writing in 
1998, Capper’s conclusion anticipates the twenty-first-century shift which emphasises the 
interaction between these two perspectives, asserting that the enduring methodologies of 
Transcendentalist scholarship ‘will need to be revitalized and revised’ going forward, in order 
to reflect the fact that ‘no other intellectual circle in early America thought more than the 
Transcendentalists so self-consciously of itself […] as at once individualistic, nationalist and 
cosmopolitan’ (532). This thesis, akin to Capper, positions this interrelated ‘trinity’ as central 
to New England Transcendentalism’s enduring relevance in the twenty-first century, given 
that, as Capper asserts, ‘our considerably more purely anxious civic present and future seem 
increasingly to hang on getting this trinity right’ (539). 
In the same year as Capper’s article, Sharon Cameron published her seminal essay, 
‘The Way of Life by Abandonment: Emerson's Impersonal’. Though she takes a more 
philosophical approach than Capper’s, she too seeks to debunk the reductive interpretation of 
Emersonian self-reliance as an uncompromising and self-aggrandising stance at odds with a 
sense of social obligation. Instead, Cameron argues that ‘what self-reliance turns out to mean 
for Emerson is a strong recognition of the inadequacy of any person: other persons or this 
                                                          
15 Wai Chee Dimock, Through Other Continents: American Literature Across Deep Time (Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 53. 
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person. And what the preacher and the American Scholar know how to do is break out of the 
tyranny of egotistical self-enclosure.’16  In her note to this section, Cameron identifies Bloom 
alongside Richard Poirier and Barbara Packer as three of the major critics who ‘have 
understood that if one threat to self-reliance is conformity, the other is petty self-interest or 
self-cherishing’ (7). Yet she positions her own concept of the impersonal as being ‘related to, 
but not identical with, Poirier’s genius, Bloom’s energy, Packer’s powers’, on account of the 
fact that all three of these readings ‘rely on a Neoplatonic, upward, sublimatory movement 
away from material particularity’ (7). By contrast, resisting such hierarchical and hegemonic 
notions of power and genius, Cameron asserts that ‘in acceding to the impersonal, one is […] 
beyond the idea that identity is fixed. But not beyond the social or recognizable’ (11). While I 
would contest Cameron’s suggestion that Emerson ultimately demonstrates a ‘strong 
recognition of the inadequacy of any person’, given that it seems to apply a dualistic logic 
that, as we shall see, Emerson so strenuously resists, this thesis recognises similarly mutable 
notions of power, knowledge and identity in the work of my four writers. In doing so, I 
present their renegotiations of the hegemonic and hierarchical rhetoric so often associated 
with their nineteenth-century forebears as a key element of their New Transcendentalist 
perspective. 
Cameron’s essay extends and combines elements of Stanley Cavell’s call to explore 
‘Emerson’s own philosophicality’ and George Kateb’s exploration of Emerson’s politics.17  
In a 1993 talk entitled ‘What Is the Emersonian Event?: A Comment on Kateb’s Emerson’, 
Cavell responds to (at that point unpublished) passages of Kateb’s seminal work of 1995, 
Emerson and Self-Reliance. In the course of his response, Cavell recalls a challenge once 
posed to him by Judith Shklar: ‘“My dear Stanley, […] let us say that everything you have 
                                                          
16 Sharon Cameron, ‘The Way of Life by Abandonment: Emerson’s Impersonal’, Critical Inquiry, 25 (1998), 1-
31 (p. 6). 
17 Stanley Cavell, Emerson’s Transcendental Etudes, ed. by David Justin Hodge (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2003), p. 2. 
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said about Emerson is true. You will still not have told the story unless you can tell the 
politics of this writing.”’18 Shklar’s claim is again indicative of the shift in Transcendentalist 
scholarship that challenges the previously accepted view of Emerson’s ‘supposed 
contradiction or inconsistency’ in favour of recognising the dialogical relationship between 
Emerson’s philosophy and his politics. 19  Cavell’s work has taken on particular critical 
currency in recent years, with William Rossi’s 2010 review of the field acknowledging 
Cavell’s influence on several major studies of that year, including Barry Tharaud’s Emerson 
for the Twenty-First Century and The Other Emerson, edited by Branka Arsić and Cary 
Wolfe, to which Cavell even ‘contributes an affectionate afterword’.20  
Rossi’s review also gives special mention to Branka Arsić’s individual study of the 
same year, On Leaving: A Reading in Emerson. Heavily influenced by Cavell (Rossi even 
quips that the book ‘could’ve been subtitled “A Tribute to Stanley Cavell”’), Arsić considers 
Emerson’s ostensible inconsistencies, which she sees as being borne out of his desire ‘to 
achieve a contradictory demand: to live our lives in an ordinary way yet to make them 
beautiful to the point of strangeness’.21 Responding to Cameron, Arsić asserts: ‘I don’t read 
Emerson’s impersonal as a negation of the person, but rather as an assemblage of forces and 
powers (of perceptions and sensations, emotions and thoughts) that work within the 
personal.’22 While her discussion is not explicitly framed in relation to theories of liminality, 
Arsić’s contention of ‘a personal identity contrived of tensions, divides, and gaps, that make 
it permanently “tremble”’ resonates strongly with Turner’s description (alluded to above) of 
‘liminal personae’ as those who ‘elude or slip through the network of classifications [and are] 
                                                          
18 Stanley Cavell, ‘What Is the Emersonian Event?: A Comment on Kateb’s Emerson’, in Emerson’s 
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(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), pp. 3-35 (p. 8). 
21 Branka Arsić, On Leaving: A Reading in Emerson (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 
2010), p. 13. 
22 On Leaving, p. 14. 
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neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between’.23 As will be borne out in the chapters 
that follow, many thematic parallels can be drawn between Arsić’s study and my own; its 
recognition of water as a primary metaphor, its exploration of Transcendentalist notions of 
love, and particularly its preoccupation with the paradox of perpetual becoming. Moreover, 
as detailed later in this introduction, her study’s discussion of the significance of leaving in 
Emerson informs the specifically Transcendentalist mode of liminality examined throughout 
this thesis. 
 
*** 
 
How, then, do these recent critical developments shape the New Transcendentalism proposed 
here? Drawing back, we have already seen how Bloom’s 1972 study perpetuates the 
historically held view of New England Transcendentalism as, at best, a ‘constant attempt at 
self-reliance’ and, at worst, a group of predominantly white male writers for whom 
‘divination […] means primarily an apprehension of their own possible sublimity, the gods 
they are in the process of becoming’ (28, 33). Of course, the publication date of Bloom’s 
article is significant. For not only does it predate both the literary careers of all four of the 
writers considered within this thesis but also ‘the New History’ of Emerson’s writings 
alluded to above. While Capper overstates his case when claiming that this scholarly decline 
is a result of ‘all the corroding acids applied […] by postliberal and postmodernist critiques 
since the 1960s’, the suggestion that the cultural upheaval of this period marked a pivotal 
moment in Transcendentalist scholarship carries weight (532) For, in this light, Bloom’s 
proposal of a literary genealogy that foregrounds the egocentric power struggles between 
generations of white men reads less like a ‘New’ critical movement and more like the last 
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hurrah of an outdated and unashamedly patriarchal mode. It is surprising, however, that so 
few critics have sought to extend or revise the line of enquiry opened by Bloom’s study. 
Indeed, the fact that the notion of a New Transcendentalism drew almost no scholarly 
attention until the turn of the millennium corroborates Capper’s sense of a post-1970 waning 
in scholarship considering Transcendentalism as a specifically historical movement. Since 
then, however, several attempts to define the term have surfaced. Disparate and often 
speculative, these more recent instances cannot be said to constitute an established field of 
study at this point. Yet by drawing them together here we can identify several key lines of 
interest to take forward into my own development of the term.   
In 2003, the Prairie Group – which brings together Unitarian Universalist ministers 
from across the U.S. with the aim of ‘[studying] thought as it affects religion’ – held a two-
day conference on ‘Neo-Transcendentalism’.24 Reverend Roger Bertschausen’s talk was one 
of five delivered at the event, and was the only one to be subsequently posted on their 
website, under the title: ‘“There are hundreds of ways to kneel and kiss the ground”: A New 
Transcendentalism’.25 While employed in an entirely different context, Bertschausen’s vision 
of a New Transcendentalism shares several themes with my own. Reflecting the broader 
trend outlined above, Bertschausen states the importance of ‘finding balance in the paradox 
between oneness and manyness’, asserting that any notion of New Transcendentalism 
‘founded in genuine pluralism needs to achieve a balance between the individual and the 
community’.26 In 2006, Matthew W. Hughey ventured a similarly theologically-informed 
model of New Transcendentalism in ‘Moving beyond “Liberation Theory”: “New 
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Transcendentalism” as Critique of Positivist-Binary Cultural Logic’. Taking Michel 
Foucault’s work as his point of departure, Hughey posits that ‘the dualistic version of looking 
at conflict is the predominate form of logic in the West. […] The nature of division along 
binaries has effectively captured the social imagination of everyday life, almost removing the 
ability to critique the existence of the binary as a repressive discourse itself.’27 Arguing that 
‘the ideology of transcendentalism depends on the culture in which it is born’, Hughey 
proposes a New Transcendentalism that challenges the ‘culture wars’ discourse, contending 
that ‘by using an ideology that transcends the binary of political distinctions and places itself 
under an umbrella of faith, we are left with the implications to wonder where that faith will 
lead us’. 28  Hughey identifies ‘five major implications’ of his ‘new transcendentalist’ 
perspective, all of which serve to provide ‘a direct critique of dualistic epistemology’.29 In 
doing so, Hughey promotes a model of New Transcendentalism that allows ‘leeway for 
connection and cooperation between concepts to show a more accurate view of the social 
world’ and thus narrows ‘the gap of us vs. them thinking’.30 As such, Hughey’s model – 
much like Turner’s understanding of liminality – recognises the double-bind of dualist 
thinking through which dissenting voices both within and outside ‘the linear model’ are 
marginalised. 31  Moreover, the broader desire to balance paradox and to recognise the 
repressive nature of binary logic expressed by both Bertschausen and Hughey supports my 
own sense of a New Transcendentalism that consistently seeks to establish a mediating third 
term between opposing positions. 
Ten years after Hughey’s article, Robert S. Corrington published the first book-length 
attempt to establish New Transcendentalism as a critical term. A rather dizzying combination 
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of theory, philosophy and theology, Deep Pantheism: Towards a New Transcendentalism 
(2016) emphasises the tension between ‘nature naturing’ (the perpetual becoming of nature) 
and ‘nature natured’ (nature as it presents itself to human consciousness). 32 This dialectic, 
Corrington suggests, is most compellingly articulated in Emerson’s idea that nature 
‘publishes itself […] arriving at consummate results without shock or a leap’. 33  For 
Corrington, the interaction between these two aspects of nature has significant implications 
for ‘the Selving process’, which, he asserts, ‘unfolds most fulfillingly when it maintains the 
perennial tension between its own place(s) within nature natured, always shifting, and the 
potencies of nature naturing’. 34  Corrington describes his speculative vision of a New 
Transcendentalism as representing ‘an “emancipatory re-enactment” of nineteenth-century 
New England Transcendentalism’ which will be ‘open to the liberating potency of what Ernst 
Bloch calls “the Not Yet Being” […] that clears away the psychic debris that blocks the fitful 
evolution of consciousness in its quest for encompassment under the stringent conditions of 
finitude.35 
Revisiting his notion of ‘new transcendentalism’ in his postscript, Corrington asks: 
‘How do we make the transition from early-nineteenth-century thought to twenty-first-
century thinking partly based on the principles of the older New England 
Transcendentalism?’36 While we may expect such a question to have been the focus of the 
main discussion, Corrington’s postscript calls for a new Transcendentalism whose 
perspective is ‘both joyous and sober’, knowing as it does ‘the limits of Wisdom [and the] 
deafening silence coming from the Wisdom that can baffle human understanding’ (98). These 
points are reiterated within the book’s concluding remarks, where Corrington ‘affirms the 
                                                          
 
33 Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘Nature’, in Essays: Second Series (Boston: James Monroe, 1844), pp. 183-216 (p. 
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ambiguous powers’ of betweenness, wisdom and the arts (among a list of no less than twelve 
key elements of his model), and describes his ‘new Transcendentalism’ as one which 
recognises ‘the sense of the tragic’ but that is equally ‘sensitive to the innumerable ecstasies 
that do come out of nature’.37 While it takes a much more densely theoretical perspective than 
my own, then, this ability to recognise and account for the interdependence of beauty and 
horror, of good and evil is fundamental, as will be shown, to my own model of New 
Transcendentalism. Moreover, Corrington’s emphasis on an anti-teleological mode and his 
preoccupation with ideas of betweenness, wisdom and the arts echo aspects of both 
Bertschausen and Hughey’s studies, and also reflect several key elements central to the New 
Transcendentalism outlined within this thesis. 
One question which remains unexplored by the above instances, then, is who, if 
anyone, may be considered to be working within this revisionary movement? Elsewhere, a 
handful of names have been ventured. Ross Hair, for example, opens his 2010 study of 
Ronald Johnson’s Modernist Collage Poetry, with a chapter discussing ‘Johnson’s New 
Transcendentalism’, a premise borne out of the fact that Johnson described himself as a ‘New 
Transcendentalist’ in a letter sent to Dirk Stratton in 1991.38 Other less developed suggestions 
include John Taylor’s allusion to ‘the neo-Transcendentalism at the heart of [Booth’s] 
project’ in his review of Peter Booth’s poetry collection Lifelines (1999), and Jan Garden 
Castro’s acknowledgement of sculptor Stephen Schaum’s intention to ‘elaborate his vision of 
a new transcendentalism’ in an online article of 2012.39 It is in such contexts, then, that my 
own group of writers begins to emerge. Annie Dillard is described in Peggy Rosenthal’s 
review of For the Time Being (1999) as a writer who she ‘can imagine literary history, down 
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the road, naming the chief of a movement called Neo-Transcendentalism’.40 Likewise, in her 
review of When I Was a Child I Read Books, Susan Salter Reynolds describes Marilynne 
Robinson as ‘a member of a merry band [she calls] the New Transcendentalists’, a merry 
band in which Salter Reynolds includes Wendell Berry, Thomas Merton, Mary Oliver and, 
significantly given the premise of this project, Rebecca Solnit.41 Unlike the more considered 
(if speculative) expositions outlined above, however, all of these more anecdotal examples 
seem to present New Transcendentalism as a simple derivative of the nineteenth-century 
mode. ‘Johnson’s New Transcendentalism’, like Bloom’s, once again foregrounds an 
‘emphasis on individualism and self-reliance’, and constructs the Transcendentalist canon as 
‘comprising Emerson and Thoreau, with Whitman on the periphery’, and Salter Reynolds 
offers a rather vague sense of New Transcendentalism as ‘a belief in the human spirit and its 
capacity for community, generosity, and stewardship; in what Walt Whitman called “radical 
uniqueness”, and in the vital connection to nature as a source of creativity and innovation’.42 
There seems to be a divide, therefore, between those critics who aim to develop New 
Transcendentalism as a philosophical or theoretical concept, and those who attempt to 
identify New Transcendentalism as an artistic mode. Furthermore, while current attempts to 
define the term share several thematic trends, none convincingly situates these themes in 
relation to the more recent scholarly developments in Transcendentalist studies. My 
suggestion of a New Transcendentalism that is underpinned by an interrelating poetics and 
politics of liminality is positioned at the intersection of these critical strands, interrogating as 
it does their various theoretical, historical and literary perspectives.  
 
*** 
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Having situated the project within its various critical contexts, then, we return to the question 
posed by Solnit at the outset of this introduction: what is it that unites Etel Adnan, Annie 
Dillard, Marilynne Robinson and Rebecca Solnit in particular, such that they may be 
considered a coherent grouping worth studying alongside one another?  
Described by Edward Abbey as ‘Thoreau’s true heir’, Annie Dillard has frequently 
been aligned with the New England Transcendentalists throughout her literary career. 43 
Indeed, the presence of Henry David Thoreau looms large in Dillard’s life in a number of 
ways. In the late 1960s, she took up a place on the renowned women’s writing programme at 
Hollins College in Virginia, graduating with a Master’s degree in 1968 having written her 
dissertation on Walden, Henry David Thoreau’s seminal work of 1854. Dillard’s first major 
publication was the Pulitzer-Prize-winning Pilgrim at Tinker Creek (1974). The text recounts 
the two months she spent living close to Tinker Creek in Virginia, and is described by Dillard 
within its opening pages as ‘what Thoreau called “a meteorological journal of the mind”’.44 
As will be drawn out in the opening chapter of this thesis, Pilgrim at Tinker Creek is the most 
explicitly Transcendentalist of Dillard’s writings, and also establishes many of the central 
themes that recur throughout her work, particularly in terms of its theological ambivalence 
and exploration of the intrinsic connection between human consciousness and the natural 
environment. The text is also indicative of Dillard’s resistance to formal and generic 
categorisation, as Margaret Loewen Reimer has acknowledged in describing it as one which 
‘falls between several categories or disciplines’.45 Dillard’s body of work shifts between 
poetry and prose, fiction and journalism, essay and memoir, and while often compared to the 
nineteenth-century Transcendentalists, Dillard’s influences are vast and diverse; her elusive 
style frequently draws unexpected connections between seemingly incongruous subjects. The 
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geographical coordinates of her work are equally expansive, shifting from the banks of 
Tinker Creek in Virginia (Pilgrim at Tinker Creek, 1974), to the sand dunes of Provincetown, 
Massachusetts (The Maytrees, 2007), via the mudflats of the Pacific Northwest (Holy the 
Firm, 1977; The Living, 1994). By considering the liminal poetics and politics at play within 
her writings, then, this thesis extends and unites several related lines of enquiry established 
by critics including Margaret Loewen Reimer (‘The Dialectical Vision of Annie Dillard’s 
Pilgrim at Tinker Creek, 1983), Sandra Humble Johnson (The Space Between: Literary 
Epiphany in the Work of Annie Dillard, 1992), and Colleen Warren (Annie Dillard and the 
Word Made Flesh: An Incarnational Theory of Language, 2010).46 Rather than focusing 
solely on those texts which demonstrate the most obvious affinity between Dillard and her 
nineteenth-century antecedents, however, my analyses move beyond the established 
Thoreauvian and Emersonian readings of individual texts such as Pilgrim at Tinker Creek, so 
as to develop a more holistic understanding of how her liminal aesthetic evolves throughout 
her wider body of work. 
If Dillard has often been labelled by her peers as a literary descendant of the New 
England Transcendentalists, Marilynne Robinson is keen to acknowledge their influence on 
her work in her own terms. In 1984, The New York Times led a symposium in which sixteen 
young writers were asked to discuss their literary influences. Robinson wrote: ‘If to admire 
and to be influenced are more or less the same thing, I must be influenced most deeply by the 
19th-century Americans – Dickinson, Melville, Thoreau, Whitman, Emerson and Poe. […] I 
happen to have read these old aunts and uncles at an impressionable age, and so I will always 
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answer to them in my mind.’47  In another piece for the New York Times in 1987, she 
unequivocally states ‘I am an Emersonian’, and in a 2012 interview for The Guardian, she 
asserts: ‘I am supersaturated in nineteenth-century American literature. The affinity I feel for 
it is off the charts, but I don’t consciously model anything I do on anything.’48 While the 
reference to ‘aunts and uncles’ here perhaps suggests a refracted rather than a direct 
genealogy (as Chapter One will explore), critics have been inevitably keen to examine these 
connections within her work. Most focus on Robinson’s debut novel, Housekeeping (1980), 
which depicts an adolescent girl who ‘went to the woods for the woods’ own sake’ – a phrase 
which may easily be read as an allusion to Thoreau’s much-quoted assertion ‘I went to the 
woods as I wished to live deliberately’.49 Much is also made of the fact that Ruth lives, much 
like Thoreau in Walden, on the edge of Fingerbone Lake which looms large throughout the 
novel. While this scholarship is compelling and fruitful, my own project – as is the case for 
all four writers considered throughout this thesis – positions these readings as the foundations 
upon which to build and explore a much wider framework of dialogical themes and practices 
within and across Robinson’s works. This extends not only to Robinson’s three later novels, 
referred to collectively – for now at least – as the Gilead trilogy (Gilead, 2004; Home, 2008, 
and Lila, 2014 – with a fourth novel set within the same narrative world rumoured to be 
imminent), but also to her five non-fiction works, three of which were written in the two-and-
a-half decades between Housekeeping and Gilead. 50  Like Dillard, Robinson’s faith and 
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theological perspective is key to understanding her work. While not as intensely ambivalent 
as Dillard – Robinson is clear and consistent in defining herself as a ‘liberal Calvinist’ – the 
interrelation between Robinson’s literary and theological perspectives is ever present within 
both her fiction and non-fiction works, as will be borne out in my analyses.51 Similarly to 
Dillard, Adnan and Solnit, Robinson’s texts are consciously positioned within their 
landscapes, whether it be the Idaho setting of Housekeeping and Robinson’s own childhood 
(she was born in Sandpoint, Idaho in 1943), the Midwest (or Middle West, as Robinson 
prefers) locales of the Gilead novels and Robinson’s later life, or even the Cumbrian 
countryside which provides the setting for Robinson’s rather anomalous 1989 study, Mother 
Country: Britain, the Welfare State, and Nuclear Pollution. Despite Robinson’s almost 
unprecedentedly positive reception (each of her novels has been awarded a prestigious 
literary award including the Pulitzer Prize for Gilead, and she was also presented with the 
National Humanities Medal in 2012 by Barack Obama), it is striking how few extended 
studies focus on her work – the first essay collection on Robinson was published as recently 
as 2016.52 This may be due at least in part to the fact that Robinson is often viewed within the 
current criticism – and, indeed, actively presents herself – as a relatively solitary writer; she 
rarely positions herself in relation to her contemporaries and neither do her critics. By 
positioning her writings alongside Dillard, Solnit and Adnan, however, and in establishing 
New Transcendentalism as a recognised literary mode, we are able to explore not only 
Robinson’s professed connection with her nineteenth-century ‘aunts and uncles’, but also to 
situate her work within a wider network of contemporary American (women) writers. 
 The youngest of the four writers considered here by almost two decades, Rebecca 
Solnit is the author of more than twenty books, ranging from the widely-quoted Men Explain 
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Things to Me (2014), to her lesser-known biography of the nineteenth-century photographer, 
Eadweard Muybridge, Motion Studies (2004). As has already been suggested of Dillard’s 
work, Solnit’s writing is equally difficult to categorise, incorporating elements of the critical 
essay, memoir, journalism, and cultural history. More so than either Dillard or Robinson, 
however, (and as I witnessed first-hand that day in San Francisco) Solnit is keen to make 
known her active engagement with the literary, political and cultural milieu surrounding her, 
particularly in her immediate locale of California and specifically the San Francisco Bay 
Area. The American West provides the backdrop for much of her writing, and the intrinsic 
connection between politics and place is an integral theme running throughout her oeuvre, as 
evidenced within her 2007 essay collection, Storming the Gates of Paradise: Landscapes for 
Politics. The influence of the New England Transcendentalists has been acknowledged – not 
least by Solnit herself – on texts such as A Field Guide to Getting Lost (2006) and 
Wanderlust: A History of Walking (2001). The latter study is easily paralleled with Thoreau’s 
1851 essay, ‘Walking’, and Thoreau is explicitly evoked within the opening chapter of Field 
Guide as a writer, much like Solnit herself, ‘for whom navigating life and wilderness and 
meaning are the same art, and who slips subtly from one to the other in the course of a 
sentence’.53 Again, though, while these texts point directly to an affinity between Solnit, 
Thoreau, and New England Transcendentalist thinking here, they are but the point of 
departure for exploring the broader influence of these writers on her work, considering not 
only how she aligns with but also how she deviates from their tropes, and thus re-examines 
the significance and potential of Transcendentalist thinking within contemporary culture. 
Unlike Dillard and Robinson, Solnit is more inclined to take a political than a theological 
perspective. This is not to say that Solnit doesn’t recognise the significance of religious 
discourses, and religious contexts often provide framing for her texts – the opening passages 
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of Field Guide, for example, recall one Passover in Solnit’s childhood, when she first drank 
wine in the company of her disappointed mother (‘a lapsed Catholic’), another woman (‘a 
former Protestant’), and ‘their husbands [who] were Jews’.54 As in this instance, however, 
such references tend to evoke more local familial or social concerns, rather than the broader 
theological questions that are so often posed in Dillard and Robinson’s works. Yet despite her 
prominent position within both political and literary circles, it is striking how few scholarly 
responses there are to Solnit’s work. A handful of studies have begun to emerge in recent 
years, however, including Neil Campbell’s 2016 study, Affective, Critical Regionality, which 
includes a chapter entitled, ‘A New Atlas of Emotion: Rebecca Solnit’s West’.55 By setting 
Solnit’s writing into dialogue with not only the works of Dillard, Robinson and Adnan, but 
also those of the New England Transcendentalists and key critical and theoretical movements 
of the twentieth- and twenty-first centuries, this thesis recognises Solnit’s significant 
contribution to contemporary U.S. literary and political culture, particularly in terms of 
positioning America’s New England traditions in the context of the increasingly 
deterritorialized American West. 
 Almost forty years Solnit’s senior, and two decades older than both Dillard and 
Robinson, Arab American writer and painter Etel Adnan is perhaps not the most obvious 
choice to be considered alongside Dillard, Robinson and Solnit. Born in Beirut in 1925, 
Adnan went on to study philosophy at the Sorbonne University in Paris, before emigrating to 
the United States in the early 1950s, settling – like Solnit – in the Bay Area of San Francisco. 
Splitting her time between these three locales for over fifty years – Beirut, Paris, and 
Sausalito – the interactions and intersections between these places are a constant point of 
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reference within Adnan’s work. When asked in a 2012 interview how her cosmopolitan 
outlook influences her work, Adnan remarked: 
I could’ve decided to forget and be an American. Or I could have decided to hate 
America and be an Arab. I could have decided not to be an Arab. But personally, I 
don't ask myself too many questions about national belonging; identity is like a tree, 
one day it is happy, one day it loses its leaves, but there is continuity. […] Beirut 
becomes my home when it has problems. It is not my only home. I have spent more 
time in California than in Beirut. I am pretty much American. And I grew up in 
French schools. […] To be honest, I feel alright in the world. There are certain places 
that I like best, but I cannot be in both places at the same time: northern California, 
near San Francisco, and Beirut. Those are my two true homes.56 
 
Yet while Adnan is content to remain fluid in her understanding of her own national identity 
– though, as we shall see, her assertion here that she doesn’t ask ‘too many questions about 
national belonging’ is contestable given the preoccupation with this subject throughout her 
oeuvre – current scholarship on Adnan’s work is somewhat less expansive. As Lisa Suhair 
Majaj and Amal Amireh discuss in their collection of essays on Adnan’s work: 
Despite her growing prominence in the English-speaking context, there is little critical 
assessment of Adnan’s artistic and literary oeuvre, and almost no discussion of the 
role of her work in the context of American and European literature and art. 
Meanwhile, within the Arab world her work is often overlooked because she writes in 
English and French, and as a result tends to be excluded from discussion about Arabic 
literature. This occurs despite the fact that Adnan considers herself an Arab, is attuned 
to political and cultural events in the Middle East, and writes about topics of crucial 
importance to the Arab world.57 
 
A decade and a half since the publication of their collection, the outlook is much the same, 
with Majaj and Amireh’s volume remaining one of very few attempts to bring together 
critical responses on Adnan’s work. However, in the last decade or so, Adnan has begun to 
gain recognition in the United States, in light of an increasing interest in Arab American 
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literature apparent over this period. In 2010, her short story collection, Master of the Eclipse 
was awarded the Arab American Book Award, established by the Arab American National 
Museum in 2007. The collection also received the 2010 PEN Oakland/Josephine Miles 
Literary Award, which aims ‘to honor writers of exceptional works often not acknowledged 
by the mainstream literary community’. 58  Even so, as Ammiel Alcalay acknowledges, 
‘[although] she has lived in America for more than thirty years, the pleasure and power of 
Etel Adnan’s writing remain the privilege of far too few readers in this country’.59  
Without underestimating the significance of Arabic and Middle Eastern influences 
upon her work, then, this thesis redresses the lack of scholarship focusing on Adnan’s 
relationship with her American literary antecedents. As will be discussed in the opening 
chapter of this thesis, the enduring influence of her early years in the Bay Area of Sausalito is 
reflected upon in Adnan’s 1986 poetic essay, Journey to Mount Tamalpais, where she muses 
upon her intimate connection to the natural landscape, and explores how this relationship 
continues to shape her artistic perception and perspective. As has been said of both Dillard 
and Solnit, Adnan’s work actively resists formal and generic definition. Many of her texts 
combine poetry, essay, and memoir, while others draw together textual and visual practice. 
Examples include The Arab Apocalypse (1989), which incorporates both standard text and 
symbols, and also her ‘folding books’, in which long lines of Arabic text (a language which 
Adnan cannot actually read but reproduced for these texts) are presented across many 
concertinaed pages. 
While Journey allows us to explore the clear affinities between Adnan and her 
American literary antecedents, my analyses set the liminal poetics identifiable within that 
earlier text into a broader nexus of dialogical relationships developed across Adnan’s wider 
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body of work. To an even greater extent than the other writers considered here, Adnan’s 
writing exemplifies and emphasises the intersectional experience of contemporary U.S. 
culture, such that what may be read as a derivative Romantic aesthetic in her earlier work 
evolves within her later writings into a much more complex mode of negotiating the 
contradictions and ambivalences she experiences as an Arab American writer. In positioning 
Adnan’s work within the context of a New Transcendentalism, my analyses go beyond 
simply recognising the transnational shift in American Studies as a thematic trend to be 
accounted for within the criticism, instead recognising how this transnational shift is itself 
embedded at the heart of this new phase in Transcendentalist thought. 
Overall, then, this thesis provides a more comprehensive account of the influence of 
New England Transcendentalism on Dillard, Robinson, Solnit and Adnan, each of whom, 
with the exception of Adnan, has previously been situated (if primarily anecdotally) in 
relation to the nineteenth-century movement. I argue that critics’ attention is usually focused 
on this relationship in its most obvious sense, primarily in terms of their preoccupation with 
nature and its use as a central metaphor throughout their work. This project posits that there is 
a more fundamental affinity between these writers which positions this preoccupation with 
nature as forming one (albeit integral) aspect of a much larger dialogical framework that 
underpins these writings – a framework which I argue here constitutes both a poetics and 
politics of liminality. 
 
*** 
 
Having acknowledged at the outset of this introduction the difficulties associated with 
defining Transcendentalism, and with an awareness that this project’s other key term, 
liminality, is equally prone to manifold applications, this final section outlines the specifically 
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Transcendentalist mode of liminality that I identify and examine throughout this project. In 
doing so, it leads to a discussion of the affinities as well as the key point of divergence 
between Emersonian Transcendentalism and New Transcendentalism as understood and 
examined throughout this thesis. 
Formulated by Arnold van Gennep in The Rites of Passage (1909), the concept of 
liminality refers specifically to the unsettled middle phase of a three-part process – 
separation, transition, reintegration.  Through this model, van Gennep seeks to ‘construct a 
definitive classification of rites’, in order to categorise the culturally-defined customs, rituals 
and processes ‘whose essential purpose is to enable the individual to pass from one defined 
position to another which is equally well defined’.60 ‘Whoever passes from one to the other’, 
van Gennep suggests, ‘finds himself […] in a special situation for a certain length of time: he 
wavers between two worlds’.61 It is in relation to this original anthropological definition of 
liminality that we find a model for understanding the underlying principle of the 
Transcendentalist mode of liminality examined throughout this thesis. To draw this out, we 
turn to Branka Arsić’s 2010 study, On Leaving, in which she recognises the Christian 
foundations of what she describes as Emerson’s ‘ethics of leaving’.62 She cites a sermon that 
Emerson preached fourteen times in a four-year period, in which he draws on Hebrews 6:1 in 
order to ‘make an argument for the realm of ordinary life analogous to that which Paul 
advanced in respect of religious rituals.’63 ‘Paul’s idea of leaving ritual in order to reach 
something more religious’, Arsić suggests, ‘is translated by Emerson into the necessity of 
leaving our habits in order to set ourselves on the path of self-perfecting’ (27). It is from this 
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basic principle, Arsić asserts, that Emerson ultimately develops the concept of self-reliance. 
She elaborates: 
The self possesses the counterpower to refresh life by breaking with habit, thus 
putting itself in tension with itself in a different way. Similar to Paul’s injunction to 
perfect Christianity by annulling the very essence of Christian doctrine, Emerson 
proposes that we set ourselves on the path of bettering the self by annulling its very 
identity. For if stepping over the threshold of the self is performed by our own 
thinking, it is through thinking that the self will hollow itself out, as if cancelling out 
its “I” in order for a new self to be formed (31). 
 
Arsić recognises this as the essential argument of Emerson’s 1841 essay, ‘Self-Reliance’, as 
is most succinctly borne out by Emerson’s claim that: ‘Society everywhere is in conspiracy 
against the manhood of every one of its members. […] The virtue in most request is 
conformity. Self-reliance is its aversion. It loves not realities and creators, but names and 
customs.’64 This concept of aversion, this perpetual turning away from the self and all other 
(ostensibly) fixed values, is, I would argue, the fundamental principle of Emersonian 
Transcendentalism, and is integral to both the Transcendentalist poetics and politics of 
liminality presented throughout this thesis. Indeed, the relationship between van Gennep’s 
model and Emerson’s concept of aversion is further evidenced by Arsić’s exposition of the 
term: 
[Aversion] is not only the act of detaching the self from the customs of the 
community, but also, no less importantly, the act of turning the self against the ways 
of its own thinking, which are the habits of the mind. […] As the power of turning 
away, aversion places the self in a nonconformist position against itself. Aversion 
therefore produces a self that doesn’t conform to its own identity, but rather functions 
as an internal discrepancy or disjunction – the interval of self-distancing – that 
enables the self to leave for another self. As the power of depositioning the self that 
operates within it, aversion is, in fact, figured in Emerson as otherness within the self 
(31-2). 
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Articulated through the lens of van Gennep’s model, Emerson’s aversive turn may be 
understood – and is understood throughout this project – as the continual initiation of a rite of 
passage whereby one actively turns away from a settled identity. For Emerson, however, 
unlike van Gennep, this is not a culturally-defined teleological process which culminates in 
reintegration. Rather, the Transcendentalist self is one who perpetually – returning to van 
Gennep’s terms – ‘wavers between two worlds’; who constantly seeks the ‘self-perfecting’ 
potential of the liminal phase. For, as Emerson asserts, ‘power resides in the moment of 
transition.’ 65  This aversive process, which continually seeks to situate the self between 
definitive positions, is the underpinning principle of the specifically Transcendentalist mode 
of liminality that informs this thesis. The chapters that follow examine how the ramifications 
of this mode are borne out on a textual, interpersonal and national scale. 
 The first chapter takes as its point of departure Emerson’s suggestion that ‘the 
experience of poetic creativeness […] is not found in staying at home, nor yet in travelling, 
but in transitions from one to the other, which must therefore be adroitly managed to present 
as much transitional surface as possible.’66 With reference to Stanley Cavell’s readings of 
Emerson’s writing mode, the chapter begins by considering how this Emersonian proposition 
relates to the aversive principle outlined above. Drawing on key studies by Jonathan Levin 
(The Poetics of Transition, 1999) and Joan Wry (‘The Art of the Threshold’, 2010), and with 
reference to the anthropological theories of liminality proposed by Arnold van Gennep and 
later Victor Turner, the chapter distinguishes between transition on the one hand and 
liminality on the other, arguing that the latter articulates more readily the Emersonian 
imperative of ‘residing in a moment of transition’.67 Having outlined this key distinction, the 
chapter goes on to offer a series of close readings which examine the thematic, formal and 
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stylistic means by which both Old and New Transcendentalist works ‘present as much 
transitional surface as possible’ within their writings. The readings are underpinned by 
anthropological theories of liminality proposed by Arnold van Gennep and later Victor 
Turner, demonstrating how themes including pilgrimage and communitas further elucidate 
the relationships between my writers and their Transcendentalist antecedents. Focusing on the 
texts identified above that exhibit the most explicit parallels to those earlier New England 
Transcendentalist works (Dillard’s Pilgrim at Tinker Creek; Solnit’s A Field Guide to Getting 
Lost; Adnan’s Journey to Mount Tamalpais), the discussion recognises how these texts 
employ many of the established Transcendentalist tropes of liminal experience. Extending 
these readings, the discussion also considers the more materialist practices – which 
significantly influenced Emerson – identified by Argersinger and Cole in the work of Moody 
Emerson, Fuller and other female Transcendentalists. My analysis focuses specifically on 
conversation and dialogue as key to their intellectual endeavour. The analysis examines what 
I refer to as the ‘dialogical tactics’ employed across both the texts acknowledged above and 
also Robinson’s Gilead novels. It argues that these textual strategies effect a series of 
thematic, stylistic and structural ‘transitional surfaces’ which resist definitive responses and 
thus provide a means of negotiating the limits of knowledge, understanding and power. The 
opening chapter thus lays the foundations for the subsequent chapters by demonstrating how 
the Transcendentalist mode of liminality outlined above manifests itself as a series of textual 
practices, the cumulative effect of which, I argue, may be read as a specifically 
Transcendentalist poetics of liminality. 
In line with Emerson’s assertion that ‘around every circle another can be drawn’, each 
of the subsequent chapters emanates from the textual concerns of the opening chapter, taking 
an ever-widening theoretical lens through which to explore the lived political implications of 
35 
 
this liminal perspective.68 Taking up key readings by George Kateb, Johannes Voelz and 
Branka Arsić that explore the themes of love and friendship in Emerson’s writings, the 
second chapter moves on to consider the implications of this Transcendentalist mode of 
liminality (which, as defined above, is predicated upon a perpetual turning towards and 
turning away from the self) for the interaction between self and other. The opening sections 
establish several parallels between Emerson’s thinking on love and friendship and the 
respective intersubjective models proposed by feminist psychoanalysts, Luce Irigaray and 
Jessica Benjamin. My analysis traces movements between these various texts in order to 
explore not only how feminist interventions in psychoanalysis provide a framework through 
which to understand the relationship between Solnit, Dillard, Robinson, Adnan and the New 
England Transcendentalists, but also how the New England Transcendentalists prefigure 
many of the formal and stylistic ‘innovations’ proposed by Irigaray and Benjamin. It argues 
that my contemporary writers may be read as intermediaries between these seemingly 
disparate cultural movements, such that the Transcendentalist liminal poetics identified in the 
opening chapter becomes a means by which they negotiate the interpersonal throughout their 
writings. 
The analysis engages with concepts advanced by Irigaray and Benjamin including 
intersubjectivity, thirdness and the sensible transcendental, setting them into dialogue with 
readings by Kateb, Voelz and Arsić. The chapter recognises the liminal perspective that lies 
at the heart of both Irigaray and Benjamin’s work, and their sense – similar to the 
Transcendentalist  mode of liminality outlined above – that ‘the theoretic equivalent of that 
ability to face mystery and uncertainty […] would be the effort to understand the 
contradictions of fact and reason without any irritable reaching after one side at the expense 
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of the other’.69 The analysis explores how Irigaray and Benjamin’s respective theories of 
intersubjectivity are borne out through close readings of texts by Solnit, Robinson and 
Dillard. The first offers an Irigarayan reading of the fraught mother-daughter relationship 
identified in Solnit’s The Faraway Nearby. The second explores Robinson’s debut novel, 
Housekeeping, in light of Benjamin’s model of intersubjectivity and particularly her notion of 
the ‘potential space of thirdness’. The final reading draws upon readings of marital love by 
both Emerson and Irigaray in an examination of Dillard’s most recent novel, The Maytrees.  
By acknowledging how both theorists develop their revisionary models from the 
inside in a manner which both problematises and reimagines ideas established by Sigmund 
Freud and Jacques Lacan, the chapter recognises a similar dynamic operating between 
Irigaray, Benjamin and their psychoanalytic forefathers to that which this thesis establishes 
between my four writers and their Transcendentalist predecessors. As such, in line with the 
overarching argument of this thesis, I argue that New Transcendentalism constitutes what 
Benjamin terms a ‘redemptive critique’: a mode which recognises the problematic elements 
that have shaped the perception of Transcendentalist thought in the critical and popular 
imagination, but that also unearths the progressive potential of its original principles.70 
The final chapter turns to a consideration of the wider national implications of this 
Transcendentalist mode of liminality. The analysis identifies a tension between the anti-
teleological perspective that the Transcendentalist mode of liminality is predicated upon and 
the unavoidably future-oriented – and inevitably hegemonic – rhetoric of Manifest Destiny 
with which those earlier writings are so often inflected. Particularly pertinent here is 
Thoreau’s 1851 essay, ‘Walking’ in which he remarks that:  
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The Atlantic is a Lethean stream, in our passage over which we have had an 
opportunity to forget the Old World and its institutions. If we do not succeed this time 
there is perhaps one more chance for the race left before it arrives on the banks of the 
Styx; and that is in the Lethe of the Pacific.71  
 
Within this analogy, Thoreau sets the temporal and geographical coordinates of America’s 
intellectual endeavours. A century and a half later, this chapter explores how the 
Transcendentalist movement has fared in its westward journey across the United States. It 
considers why the movement was destined to remain wedded to its East-coast origins in its 
own time, recognising the tension between the idealised West of New England 
Transcendentalist texts and the lived reality encountered by attempts to take the movement 
westward. In light of more recent theoretical interventions by New and Post-West critics 
including Jane Tompkins (West of Everything, 1992) and Neil Campbell (The Rhizomatic 
West, 2011), the analysis considers how Adnan, Dillard, Robinson and Solnit repurpose a 
Transcendentalist liminal poetics in order to explore both the enduring myths of the 
American West, and their own lived experiences of these landscapes. The first half of the 
chapter offers a comparative reading of Dillard’s The Living (1992) and Robinson’s Lila 
(2014), considering how the two novels both appropriate and subvert many of the common 
tropes associated with the Western genre so as to complicate the hegemonic imperatives of 
the genre. The latter half of the chapter moves to a consideration of Solnit’s lived experience 
of the American West, exploring how her writings negotiate the private and public histories 
of the region. It also considers her 2003 biography of Eadweard Muybridge, Motion Studies. I 
explore how the text is not only, as Edward Rothstein has acknowledged, ‘the biography of 
an era; not a man’, but also in many ways a biography of the American West.72 My reading 
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explores how the text opens a dialogue between our moment and the nineteenth century, and, 
moreover, presents Muybridge as the liminal figure par excellence; as ‘a doorway, a pivot 
between that old world and ours’.73 As such, I argue that the text explores the reciprocal 
dynamic between the nineteenth century and our own contemporary moment that underpins 
this thesis. The final reading turns to Adnan’s In the Heart of the Heart of Another Country 
(2005). A response to William H. Gass’s In the Heart of the Heart of the Country (1968), 
Adnan’s is a text of shifting geographies, raising questions about national belonging, arbitrary 
cartographic boundaries, and – to use Edward Said’s term – the ‘contrapuntal’ experience of 
exile.74 My analysis proposes that Emerson’s concept of ‘transitional surfaces’ can provide its 
own framework for the exilic experience that moves beyond the binary connotations of the 
contrapuntal, in its ability to incorporate seemingly oppositional aspects of both lived 
experience and literary practice. 
 In addition to providing the foundations for the Transcendentalist mode of liminality 
examined throughout this thesis, the parallel drawn here between Emerson’s aversive 
principle and van Gennep’s rite of passage model also highlights an underlying tension 
which, I argue, lies at the heart of Emersonian Transcendentalism and which I have alluded to 
in part in my summary of the third chapter. For it strikes me as a significant limitation of 
Emerson’s aversive mode that for all its resistance to teleological constructs it remains bound 
in an imperative to ‘onwardness’; to the suggestion that the self must progress in one, future-
oriented, ‘self-perfecting’ direction. This sentiment is articulated in ‘Circles’: ‘I unsettle all 
things. No facts are to me sacred; none are profane; I simply experiment, an endless seeker, 
with no Past at my back.’75 An earlier rendering of this premise is found in an 1838 journal 
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entry in which Emerson implores: ‘Be not the slave of your own past. […] But dare rather to 
quit the platform, plunge into the sublime seas, dive deep, & swim far, so shall you come 
back with self-respect, with new power, with an advanced experience, that shall explain & 
overlook the old.’76 
 It is in relation to this desire to ‘overlook the old’, this assumption that the new will 
necessarily be ‘advanced’, that I identify the central divergence between nineteenth-century 
Transcendentalism and the New Transcendentalism proposed throughout this thesis. Indeed, 
my claim regarding the ‘newness’ of the New Transcendentalism relates in large part to how 
Adnan, Dillard, Robinson and Solnit orientate themselves towards the past. For while 
Emerson’s conception of progress (both personal and cultural) is predicated upon supplanting 
what has come before, I argue that my four writers conceive of progress as a more reciprocal 
dynamic whereby the progressive principles of the past are recovered as a means of 
navigating the future. In the readings that follow, I contend that Adnan, Dillard, Robinson 
and Solnit’s writings challenge the logic by which Emerson equates aversion with perpetual 
leaving. To unpack my thinking here, let us consider the closing lines of Arsić’s introduction 
to On Leaving: 
To leave, therefore, is not to betray or abandon those who we don’t love, but to depart 
from people still loveable and places still liveable. […] Because those we left guide 
our departures, we are still looking at them as we walk away from them. That is why 
our existences tremble with restlessness: we cannot stay, and so we walk, but we 
remember and mourn. […] Only thus, through such a restlessness, do we acquire 
some truth. […] Our existences amount to a double dealing: we can stay, repose, and 
live a lie, or we can depart, gaining truth only by experiencing the restlessness of 
living in the oppositions and aporias that make our being swing (17 – emphases 
added). 
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Within this passage, Arsić simultaneously laments and accepts the imperative to leave. This 
seems to me, however, to reinforce the very ‘oppositions and aporias’ that the aversive 
principle attempts to navigate. If aversion is indeed a simultaneous turning away and turning 
toward; if ‘the experience of poetic creativeness is not found in staying at home nor yet in 
travelling but in transitions from one to the other’, then why must ‘people still lovable, places 
still livable’ be so unequivocally effaced? What might we gain from staying or, indeed, 
turning back? How might we live in such a way that satisfies both the imperative to leave and 
the desire to stay? At what point does leaving itself become conformity? It is questions such 
as these, I suggest, that characterise the New Transcendentalism proposed throughout this 
thesis.  
 I see this tension in Emerson – between a professedly antiteleological mode on the 
one hand and a perpetual future-oriented leaving off on the other – as the inevitable extension 
of the cultural imperatives of his time. Yet it is important to acknowledge the extent to which 
Emerson was aware of his own historical limitations. This may be gleaned within the final 
lines of ‘The Transcendentalist’ (1842), where Emerson asserts: 
Soon these improvements and mechanical inventions will be superseded; these modes 
of living lost out of memory; these cities rotted, ruined by war, by new inventions, by 
new seats of trade, or the geologic changes: — all gone, like the shells which sprinkle 
the seabeach with a white colony to-day, forever renewed to be forever destroyed. But 
the thoughts which these few hermits strove to proclaim by silence, as well as by 
speech, not only by what they did, but by what they forbore to do, shall abide in 
beauty and strength, to reorganize themselves in nature, to invest themselves anew in 
other, perhaps higher endowed and happier mixed clay than ours, in fuller union with 
the surrounding system. (348) 
 
This passage exemplifies a tendency in nineteenth-century Transcendentalist writings to defer 
to a future cultural context in which it will be possible for their principles to be more fully 
realised. This is true of not only Emerson but also Thoreau, as is most famously declared in 
the final lines of Walden: ‘I do not say that John or Jonathan will realize all this; but such is 
the character of the morrow which mere lapse of time can never make to dawn. […] Only the 
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day dawns to which we are awake. There is more day to dawn. The sun is but a morning 
star.’ 77  Stanley Cavell explores this constant sense of deferral in reference to Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s concept of ‘a man for tomorrow and the day after tomorrow’, recognising how 
both the Emersonian and Nietzschean text is ‘evidently […] written in order to create, or 
hasten the creation of, the one for which it is written.’78 Particularly pertinent given the 
premise of this thesis is Emerson’s claim that ‘[s]o many things are unsettled which it is of 
the first importance to settle, – and, pending their settlement, we will do as we do’.79 
Considered in light of van Gennep’s model, Emerson’s comment may be read as an 
acknowledgement of not only the rite of passage in which his nation was at that point 
intensely engaged, but also his sense of the limitations that this process inevitably imposed 
upon the realisation of his own philosophical principles. I argue that one of the primary 
limitations imposed by this cultural rite of passage manifests itself as the imperative to 
‘onwardness’ described above. That is to say, I understand this passage in particular but also 
the sense of deferral found in Transcendentalist writings more generally as an 
acknowledgement of the paradox between adhering to a philosophical principle which 
necessitates a constant throwing off of any stable notion of identity on the one hand and on 
the other remaining committed to the national project of establishing a specifically American 
culture.  
This thesis proposes that the cultural and political upheavals since the mid-twentieth 
century have created that not-yet-realised future context so often alluded to in 
Transcendentalist writings. In the chapters that follow, I explore the ways in which this is 
borne out within the respective writings of Annie Dillard, Etel Adnan, Marilynne Robinson 
and Rebecca Solnit. Loosed from the cultural imperative to perpetual ‘onwardness’, these 
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four writers invite us to draw back to those founding principles upon which U.S. culture over 
the last two centuries has largely been built. Now from a cultural vantage point in which they 
are able to evaluate the historical trajectory that those early principles have (sometimes 
problematically) taken, I read my writers as establishing an alternative trajectory for these 
principles and the overdetermined tropes with which they are commonly associated. It is this 
alternative trajectory that I position throughout this thesis as a New Transcendentalism.  
To summarise: this thesis recognises a series of shared thematic, formal and stylistic 
elements through which we may align Annie Dillard, Etel Adnan, Marilynne Robinson and 
Rebecca Solnit with the nineteenth-century New England Transcendentalist movement. 
These include: an integral relation between self and nature that underpins many of their 
writings and which provides a key site for exploring the simultaneous potentiality and 
existential jeopardy of liminal experiences; a shared mode of antiteleological thinking which 
manifests itself within the form, style and structure of Transcendentalist texts; the 
conspicuous and self-reflexive foregrounding of the writer/artist’s liminal perspective as a 
figure who occupies a representative (in both senses) middle ground; a reverence for the 
common and everyday; and a general tendency towards what is referred to throughout the 
analysis as ‘productive ambivalence’. My analysis takes as its primary focus Emersonian 
Transcendentalism, particularly as presented within revisionary readings of recent decades, 
and which is understood here to refer specifically to a mode of Transcendentalist thought 
which is predicated upon the principle of aversion – the constant turning towards and turning 
away from fixed principles so as to remain in a state of perpetual becoming. Considered 
within the context of Arnold van Gennep’s rite of passage model, this aversive mode 
becomes the underpinning principle of the specifically Transcendentalist mode of liminality 
examined throughout this thesis. Ultimately, I argue that while, in theory, Emerson’s writings 
advocate an ability to account for the simultaneity of oppositions as central to intellectual 
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endeavour, this principle manifests itself in practice as a constant and often fraught oscillation 
between extremes: from sentence to sentence, essay to essay, past to future, self to other. In 
contrast, Adnan, Dillard, Robinson and Solnit deploy the tropes commonly associated with 
nineteenth-century Transcendentalism in such a way that are able to hold contradictory 
elements in productive tension without attempting to reconcile – even provisionally – 
between one side and the other. In doing so, the underlying principles of Emersonian 
Transcendentalism become a means of articulating and negotiating the always-already liminal 
intersectional experiences that these four writers bring to bear on that earlier tradition, in such 
a way that both recovers and reimagines American Transcendentalism for our contemporary 
moment. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
‘TO PRESENT AS MUCH TRANSITIONAL SURFACE AS POSSIBLE’: NEW TRANSCENDENTALISM 
AND THE POETICS OF LIMINALITY 
In ‘Thinking of Emerson’, Stanley Cavell considers the relationship between Emerson’s 
theory of self-reliance and his idiosyncratic writing style. He describes Emerson’s prose as ‘a 
battle specifically to remain in conversation with itself, answerable to itself.’1 He continues: 
‘[s]uch writing takes the same mode of relating to itself as reading and thinking do, the mode 
of the self’s relation to the self, call it self-reliance. Then whatever is required in possessing a 
self will be required in thinking and reading and writing.’2 Cavell thus articulates how the 
Transcendentalist mode of liminality outlined in the introduction to this thesis, that process of 
situating oneself in a perpetually liminal state between fixed principles, manifests itself 
within Emerson’s writings. Much of Cavell’s work on Emerson is devoted to unpacking this 
process. In ‘Hope against Hope’, for instance, he describes Emerson’s writing as ‘the 
expression of his self-reliance’, going on to posit that  
Emerson’s writing and his society are in an unending argument with one another – 
that is to say, he is writing in such a way as to place his writing in his unending 
argument […] an unending turning away from one another, hence endlessly turning 
toward one another. […] His prose not only takes sides in this aversive conversation, 
but it also enacts the conversation, continuously creating readings of individual 
assertion that mutually turn from and toward one another. […] This is what most 
immediately gives to Emerson’s prose its sometimes maddening quality of seeming 
never to come to a point.3 
 
It is this tendency, then, this resistance to fixity that is always palpable in Emerson’s writings, 
that I understand as the underlying element of the Transcendentalist poetics of liminality 
                                                          
1  Stanley Cavell, ‘Thinking of Emerson’, in Emerson’s Transcendental Etudes (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2003), pp. 10-19 (p. 17). 
2 ‘Thinking of Emerson’, p. 17. 
3 Stanley Cavell, ‘Hope Against Hope’, in Emerson’s Transcendental Etudes, pp. 171-82 (p. 181). 
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identified and developed throughout this thesis. In the following passage from ‘Plato; Or, The 
Philosopher’, Emerson describes the act of writing as follows: 
Every great artist has been such by synthesis. Our strength is transitional, alternating; 
or shall I say, a thread of two strands. The sea-shore, sea seen from shore, shore seen 
from sea; […] the experience of poetic creativeness, which is not found in staying at 
home, nor yet in travelling, but in transitions from one to the other, which must 
therefore be adroitly managed to present as much transitional surface as possible.4 
 
The dialogical relationship Emerson sets up here between neither staying nor travelling bears 
out Cavell’s sense of the relationship that Emerson’s central tenet of aversive self-reliance 
informs his writing process, and that the aversive principle is constantly at play and at stake 
on the page. 
This chapter examines how Emerson’s notion of ‘[presenting] as much transitional 
surface as possible’ manifests itself thematically, formally and stylistically in both Old and 
New Transcendentalist writings. It argues that the various dialogical strategies deployed 
across these texts bear out a poetics of liminality that underpins Transcendentalist thinking, 
and which is integral to the New Transcendentalism proposed throughout this thesis. In light 
of the Transcendentalist mode of liminality outlined within the introduction, this opening 
chapter sets key studies by Jonathan Levin and Joan Wry into dialogue with anthropological 
definitions of liminality established by Arnold van Gennep and Victor Turner, in order to 
further elucidate the fruitfulness of the liminal frameworks considered throughout this 
project. The analysis identifies how Annie Dillard, Marilynne Robinson, Etel Adnan and 
Rebecca Solnit often employ many of the established Transcendentalist tropes of liminal 
experience: the woods as wilderness, the mountain as stability, the sea as flux, and – as the 
above extract suggests – the shoreline as the transitional surface par excellence. Moving 
beyond these recognised affinities, the discussion also recognises – in line with Cavell’s 
                                                          
4 Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘Plato; Or, The Philosopher’, in Selected Prose and Poetry, ed. by Reginald L. Cook 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), pp. 174-93 (pp. 181-2). 
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descriptions above – conversation, defined in its broadest sense, as a liminal textual practice 
that is integral to the Transcendentalist liminal poetics examined throughout this thesis. My 
analysis recognises the influence of thinkers including Mary Moody Emerson and Margaret 
Fuller on Transcendentalism’s dialogical mode, and acknowledges conversation as a fruitful 
analogy for the formal and stylistic strategies employed by my four contemporary writers. 
The chapter thus lays the foundations for the arguments ventured within the subsequent 
chapters, in which it is demonstrated how Dillard, Adnan, Solnit and Robinson extend this 
Transcendentalist poetics of liminality as a means of negotiating their lived intersectional 
experiences of contemporary U.S. culture. 
 
BETWEEN TRANSITION AND LIMINALITY: A QUESTION OF TERMINOLOGY 
In The Poetics of Transition (1999), Jonathan Levin traces the legacy of Emerson’s 
transitional poetics through pragmatism and American literary modernism. Following the 
well-established trajectory from Emerson to William James and later Wallace Stevens 
(among others), Levin positions the poetics of transition as ‘a distinct American intellectual 
and literary inheritance’, describing it as ‘not a set of ideas or concepts but rather a general 
attitude towards ideas and concepts […] often manifest as a pervasive formal or stylistic 
restlessness [and] stimulated by a core dissatisfaction with all definite, definitive 
formulations, be they concepts, metaphors or larger formal structures’.5 Levin’s study also 
identifies several paradoxes that lie at the heart of Emerson’s philosophy, and, in particular, 
the sense that ‘the poetics of transition requires the very forms it ceaselessly attempts to 
overcome’ (x). Having recognised that ‘Emerson values processes but not necessarily their 
end products, which are in any event only instruments of further processes’, Levin’s project 
                                                          
5 Jonathan Levin, The Poetics of Transition: Emerson, Pragmatism, & American Literary Modernism (Durham, 
NC and London: Duke University Press, 1999), p. x. Subsequent references to texts throughout this chapter will 
again be given in parentheses.  
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traces Emerson’s legacy through a Jamesian pragmatism which conversely asserts that ‘the 
important thing about a train of thought is its conclusion’ (2). Thus, Levin develops a poetics 
of transition that becomes increasingly distanced from its anti-teleological origins (50). 
  While Levin’s text positions the poetics of transition as a particularly Emersonian 
legacy, Joan Wry traces a poetics of liminality that she sees as underpinning the writings of 
Emerson, Henry David Thoreau and Walt Whitman. Wry’s analysis takes Arnold van 
Gennep’s Rites de Passage (1909) and Victor Turner’s subsequent expansion of van 
Gennep’s framework as its point of departure, focusing on Emerson’s preoccupation with 
‘the endlessly unfolding potential of the aesthetic ideal in “the space between”’.6 Similarly to 
this project, Wry contends that the fruitfulness of the term liminality lies in its mutability, and 
specifically its capacity to simultaneously articulate ‘both essence and process: it addresses 
and values the physical space that is a borderline or threshold between things, as well as the 
passage or movement across whatever that threshold space or borderline demarcates from one 
level to another’ (15). By placing Levin and Wry’s studies alongside one another, then, we 
draw attention to a key distinction between transition on the one hand and liminality on the 
other – a distinction which, given the premise of this chapter, warrants closer scrutiny. For 
although his work predates van Gennep’s coining of ‘liminality’ as a critical term by over 
half a century, liminal states, experiences and spaces proliferate throughout Emerson’s 
writings to such an extent, Wry suggests, that Emerson’s work ‘likely helped to shape aspects 
of these twentieth-century visions’ (2).  
In ‘Self-Reliance’, for example, Emerson asserts that ‘[p]ower ceases in the instant of 
repose; it resides in the moment of transition from a past to a new state.’7 While phrases such 
as ‘the instant of repose’ and ‘the moment of transition’ emphasise a temporal dimension, the 
                                                          
6 Joan Wry, ‘The Art of the Threshold: A Poetics of Liminality in Emerson, Thoreau and Whitman’ 
(unpublished doctoral thesis, McGill University, Montreal, 2010), p. 2. 
7 Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘Self-Reliance’, in Selected Prose and Poetry, pp. 72-93 (p. 84). 
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fact that Emerson describes power as residing in these moments (or ‘states’, as he later 
describes them) foregrounds his emphasis on the spatial dimension of transitional experience. 
Levin himself draws attention to this paradox – ‘What, after all, could it possibly mean to 
reside in a moment of transition?’ (ix). He posits that ‘residence carries that same negative 
connotation Emerson already associates with repose’, before going on to draw a parallel here 
to Emerson’s later assertion that ‘every spirit makes its house; but afterwards the house 
confines the spirit’ (ix). Levin himself recognises the inadequacy of the term ‘transition’, 
acknowledging that it ‘remains a slippery term in Emerson’s prose’ and explaining that ‘this 
is due, in part, to the way in which the term is used to stand for a process or event, not a 
thing’ (2). This inadequacy is drawn out in (and by) Levin’s own discussion, particularly in 
his contention that ‘Emerson’s effort to make the transition from repose to a state of unsettled 
possibility is compromised, in advance, by language in which that effort is destined to be 
realised’ (ix). While this may be true of Emerson’s original text, I would argue that Levin 
exacerbates this paradox through his failure to engage with discourses of liminality. For, by 
definition, transition must always point to its two extremes and is always suggestive of a shift 
from one state – temporal, spatial, psychological – to another. Such binary logic, however, is 
often problematised within Emerson’s writing, as is demonstrated in the following remark:  
Oneness and otherness. It is impossible to speak or to think without embracing both. 
[…] These strictly-blended elements it is the problem of thought to separate and to 
reconcile. Their existence is mutually contradictory and exclusive; and each so fast 
slides into the other that we can never say what is one, and what it is not.8  
 
As Wry acknowledges, the ‘intrinsic relational quality’ of liminal frameworks enable us to 
negotiate this paradox, ‘because their interstitial nature allows for the possibility of literally 
being in two places at once, or aesthetically perceiving the dynamics of change and 
transformation from within the very processes themselves’ (7). In this way, the concept of 
                                                          
8 Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘Plato; Or, The Philosopher’, p. 178. 
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liminality is able not only to articulate transition as process, but it also allows us to 
simultaneously locate that experience in physical space; to understand it as, in van Gennep’s 
own terms, ‘an independent state’ in and of itself.9  
Victor Turner would later extend the significance of Arnold van Gennep’s original 
rites of passage model, placing particular emphasis on the liminal phase. Drawing on the 
Hegelian ‘dialectical triad’ which asserts that ‘In Yea and Nay all things consist’, Turner 
recognises that ‘liminality may perhaps be regarded as the Nay to all positive structural 
assertions, but as in some sense the source of them all, and, more than that, as the realm of 
pure possibility whence novel configurations of ideas and relations may arise’. 10  Turner 
developed this concept further in his 1969 monograph, The Ritual Process: Structure and 
Anti-Structure, most notably within following passage: 
The attributes of liminality or liminal personae (“threshold people”) are necessarily 
ambiguous, since this condition and these persons elude or slip through the network of 
classifications that normally locate states and positions in cultural space. Liminal 
entities are neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between the positions assigned 
by law, custom, convention, and ceremonial. […] Thus liminality is frequently 
likened to death, to being in the womb, to invisibility, to darkness, to bisexuality, to 
the wilderness, and to an eclipse of the sun or moon.11 
 
In light of its multiple conceptual and thematic resonances, this thesis adopts and extends the 
significance of Joan Wry’s phrase, ‘a poetics of liminality’ rather than Levin’s ‘poetics of 
transition’. For the concept of liminality incorporates a spectrum of ‘betweenness’: interstitial 
spaces, intersectional identities, temporal margins, geographical borders, cultural boundaries, 
dialogical practices and dialectical perspectives. Thus it provides a theoretical framework 
through which to explore the ambivalent nature of being ‘betwixt and between’ in its 
                                                          
9 Arnold van Gennep, The Rites of Passage, trans. by Monika B. Vizedom and Gabrielle L. Caffee (London and 
Henley: Routledge, 1977), p. 11.  
10 Victor W. Turner, ‘Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period of Rites de Passage’, The Proceedings of the 
American Ethnological Society (1964), Symposium on New Approaches to the Study of Religion, pp. 4-20 (p. 
6). 
11 Victor W. Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1969), p. 95. 
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multifarious senses, enabling us to negotiate these various conditions as simultaneously 
existentially fraught and sites of ‘pure possibility’. 
 
‘GLAD TO THE BRINK OF FEAR’: LIMINAL NATURE IN NEW ENGLAND 
TRANSCENDENTALISM  
The coexistence of existential jeopardy and potentiality is nowhere more apparent than within 
Emerson’s famous ‘transparent eye-ball’ episode, which appears in the opening chapter of 
Nature; Addresses and Lectures (1849): 
Crossing a bare common, in snow puddles, at twilight, under a clouded sky, without 
having in my thoughts any occurrence of special good fortune, I have enjoyed a 
perfect exhilaration. I am glad to the brink of fear. In the woods too, a man casts off 
his years, as the snake his slough, and at what period soever of life, is always a child. 
In the woods, is perpetual youth. […] There I feel that nothing can befall me in life – 
no disgrace, no calamity (leaving me my eyes), which nature cannot repair. Standing 
on the bare ground, - my head bathed by the blithe air, and uplifted into infinite space, 
- all mean egotism vanishes. I become a transparent eye-ball; I am nothing; I see all; 
the currents of the Universal Being circulate through me; I am part or particle of God. 
The name of the nearest friend sounds then foreign and accidental: to be brothers, to 
be acquaintances, -- master or servant, is then a trifle and a disturbance.12 
 
Through references to crossing, melting snow, twilight, the snake casting off his slough, 
perpetual youth, and the notion of being ‘glad to the brink of fear’, the opening lines here 
highlight the various liminal contexts – spatial, temporal, existential – of the passage, 
culminating in a seemingly paradoxical assertion: ‘I am nothing; I see all.’ The significance 
of the ambivalences and shifting power dynamics of this passage will be drawn out 
throughout this chapter, as the episode is set into dialogue with key passages from texts by 
my writers. Here, it serves as an exemplar of the liminal experiences in nature that are so 
characteristic of New England Transcendentalist writings, and which form the basis of the 
poetics of liminality presented within Wry’s study. Despite spending some time unpacking 
                                                          
12 Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘Nature’, in The Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson, 12 vols (Boston and New York: 
Fireside, 1909), I, pp. 13-80 (p. 16). 
51 
 
the transparent eyeball passage, however, Wry contends that Emerson’s liminal poetics is 
primarily articulated through abstract concepts including transition, polarity and 
compensation, and that the liminal aesthetic he develops is more tangibly realised in the 
subsequent works of Thoreau and Whitman, where she identifies the prevalence of ‘liminal 
set-pieces’, which ‘[move] the indeterminate potential of Emersonian idealism firmly into the 
definitive topos of the natural landscape’ (19). Wry returns to this point later in the study, 
arguing that while Thoreau ‘rarely makes use of the keywords themselves as abstract 
references in his own writing’, one of the primary elements he takes forward from Emerson is 
his sense of ‘both the power and the indeterminacy of continual regeneration and renewal’ 
(73). 
As will be borne out throughout this chapter, I would argue that both Levin and Wry’s 
studies are limited by their reluctance to offer any sustained interrogation of the tensions that 
arise from this concurrence of power and indeterminacy in Transcendentalist writings; 
between their professed commitment to a progressive anti-teleological mode and the 
hegemonic forms, structures and discourses through which this commitment is articulated. 
This is evidenced within Wry’s reading of Emerson’s ubiquitous figure of ‘The Poet’, a 
hypothetical figure who ‘stands among partial men for the complete man […] in virtue of 
being the largest power to receive and impart. […] The poet is the sayer, the namer, and 
represents beauty. He is a sovereign and stands on the centre.’ 13  In her reading of this 
passage, Wry contends that ‘here “the centre” represents not the status of authority but a 
liminal positioning that allows the poet to filter impressions from the natural world and then 
translate them for the “partial” individuals who do not yet share his higher form of seeing’ 
(63). Yet how can we ignore the hegemonic rhetoric here? How do we understand this figure, 
this ‘emperor in his own right’, if not as one with ‘the status of authority’? This point is not 
                                                          
13 Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘The Poet’, Selected Prose and Poetry, pp. 121-40 (p. 123). 
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addressed by Wry; despite acknowledging that Harold Bloom names Emerson as ‘the 
American theoretician of power’, the observation serves only as a segue into her discussion 
of Thoreau.  
In line with Wry’s argument, it is indeed the case that Thoreau’s work takes the 
Transcendentalist sensibility more ‘firmly into the definitive topos of the natural landscape’. 
Yet he also takes with him those compromising hegemonic tensions we find in Emerson’s 
writings. This is particularly apparent in The Maine Woods (1864). The most famous section 
of this text, ‘Ktaadn’, may be read as an exemplar of the Transcendentalist liminal experience 
in nature. Here we follow Thoreau as he ventures alone to the summit of Mount Ktaadn 
where he finds himself ‘deep within the hostile ranks of clouds, and all objects were obscured 
by them’.14 There, in stark contrast and perhaps even direct response to Emerson’s sense that 
‘in the woods […] nothing can befall me in life’, that there he becomes ‘part or particle of 
God’ and one who can ‘know all’, Thoreau’s overwhelming sense is one of threat:  
Some part of the beholder, even some vital part, seems to escape through the loose 
grating of his ribs as he ascends. He is more lone than you can imagine. There is less 
of substantial thought and fair understanding in him, than in the plains where men 
inhabit. His reason is dispersed and shadowy, more thin and subtile, like the air. Vast, 
Titanic, inhuman Nature has got him at disadvantage, caught him alone, and pilfers 
him of some of his divine faculty. She does not smile on him as in the plains. She 
seems to say sternly, why came ye here before your time? This ground is not prepared 
for you. […] Why seek me where I have not called thee, and then complain because 
you find me but a stepmother? Shouldst thou freeze or starve, or shudder thy life 
away, here is no shrine, nor altar, nor any access to my ear. (64) 
 
Quite unlike the Thoreau of Walden – who famously proclaims, following William Cowper, 
‘I am monarch of all I survey’ – the overriding sentiment of this passage is one of hostility 
and fear.15 While we may read this as due reverence and an undercutting of the archetypal 
image of the dominant male conquering the natural landscape (the female pronouns and 
allusions to motherhood are significant in this regard), this deference is all the more striking 
                                                          
14 Henry David Thoreau, The Maine Woods, (Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1864), p. 63. 
15 Henry David Thoreau, Walden and Civil Disobedience (New York and Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983), p. 
126. 
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when juxtaposed with the rest of the narrative. Wry cites Thoreau’s remark in Walden, 
‘[e]njoy the land, but own it not’ as evidence that he ‘denounces the notion of property [and] 
challenges Emerson’s abstract idea of ownership’. 16  Yet Thoreau acknowledges that his 
primary reason for heading out to ‘the backwoods of Maine’ in this later narrative is not to 
seek wild adventure, but ‘to accompany a relative […] engaged in the lumber trade in 
Bangor, as far as a dam on the West Branch of the Penobscot, in which property he was 
interested’ (1). Indeed, the entire narrative bespeaks this surveyor’s perspective. As he travels 
through the landscape, Thoreau painstakingly details the coordinates of each location, 
relaying ‘names and distances […] for the benefit of future tourists’, often depicting the 
landscape in terms of its potential for settlement and profit (45). An orchard is described as ‘a 
good speculation […] for a Massachusetts boy to go down there with a trunk full of choice 
scions, and his grafting apparatus, in the spring’ (7); he acknowledges that ‘the beauty of the 
road itself was remarkable’ (9), and elsewhere admits that ‘it was easy to see that driving logs 
must be an exciting as well as arduous and dangerous business’ (41). Particularly at odds with 
Wry’s suggestion that Thoreau ‘challenges Emerson’s abstract idea of ownership’ is the 
moment he recalls the group finding ‘a whole brick’ along their journey, which he and others 
later regretted not taking ‘to the top of the mountain, to be left there for our mark. It would 
certainly have been a simple evidence of civilized man.’17 The often ambivalent relationship 
between Emersonian and Thoreauvian principles of self-reliance and individualism and the 
exponential rise of market capitalism has been much debated. As Philip F. Gura asserts, from 
the later decades of the nineteenth century onwards,  
the uneasy balance between the self and society that had characterized the antebellum 
phase of the Transcendental movement tipped irrevocably in the direction of the self. 
The intellectual power of Transcendentalists was directed toward individual rights 
and, implicitly, market capitalism, not humanitarian reform. Emerson’s admittedly 
                                                          
16 ‘The Art of the Threshold’, p. 77. 
17 The Maine Woods, p. 45. 
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demanding philosophy of self-reliance, an artifact of the early 1840s, was simplified 
and adopted as a chief principle. More and more, people identified Transcendentalism 
with the idea of individualism alone, rather than with the ethic of brotherhood that 
was supposed to accompany it.18 
 
While the original texts are undoubtedly more nuanced than these later interpretations allow, 
Gura’s claim here is indicative of the extent to which the Transcendentalist movement has 
been reductively reappropriated within the cultural imagination to provide the ideological 
foundations for America’s cult of individualism and, by extension, the rise of market 
capitalism. 
If ‘the ethic of brotherhood’ waned over time on account of there being a more 
receptive market for a derivative and reductive principle of self-serving individualism, the 
same cannot be said for the ethic of sisterhood that had developed amongst female members 
of the Transcendentalist movement during this period. The history of these women and their 
connections is traced within Jana L. Argersinger and Phyllis Cole’s recent collection, Toward 
a Female Genealogy of Transcendentalism (2014). Argersinger and Cole’s introduction to the 
collection recognises not only the vertical genealogies by which knowledge was passed down 
through generations of Transcendentalist thinkers, but – in reference to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s concept of the ‘rhizome’ – also the lateral routes via which knowledge circulated 
throughout these New England communities in the mid-nineteenth century, for which – as 
Cole contends – ‘Relationality might become a term more apropos than influence or 
lineage’.19 The collection opens with a chapter on Ralph’s aunt, Mary Moody Emerson, 
identifying her as a key figure whose working practices influenced a generation of 
Transcendentalist thinkers. Particularly influential was her belief in ‘dialogic self-
                                                          
18 Philip F. Gura, ‘Transcendentalism and Social Reform’, in History Now: The Journal of the Gilder Lehrman 
Institute <https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/first-age-reform/essays/transcendentalism-and-social-
reform>. 
19 Jana L. Argersinger and Phyllis Cole, ‘Introduction’, in Toward a Female Genealogy of Transcendentalism, 
ed. by Jana L. Argersinger and Phyllis Cole (Athens, GA and London: The University of Georgia Press, 2014), 
pp. 5-30 (p. 17). 
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cultivation’, through which Moody Emerson and her contemporaries advocated conversation 
as a key means of self-advancement for the women of their community long before Fuller’s 
series of Boston ‘Conversations’.20 Beyond simply face-to-face dialogue, however, and most 
pertinent to the premise of this chapter, Emerson transferred these dialogical methods into her 
writings. She produced commonplace books throughout her lifetime, essentially scrapbooks 
in which she drew together fragments from journals, letters and literature, as well as original 
material directly addressing both real and imaginary interlocutors. These books – referred to 
as her ‘Almanacks’ – were circulated amongst her social circle in the spirit of ‘mutual self-
cultivation’, and are described by Baker as a space in which Emerson ‘chases her own 
evolving truth’ (36). As Baker’s epigraph acknowledges, the fact that this practice was 
directly borne out of Emerson’s conversational practices is recognised in an 1830 letter she 
received from her nephew (and Ralph’s brother) Edward Bliss Emerson, in which he 
remarks: ‘a scrap from your day-book must always have the worth and the effect of a letter; 
for it is as much like conversation, in the true sense of the term’ (35). As Baker 
acknowledges, it was through the creation of this ‘stimulating dialogic zone’ both on and off 
the page that ‘Emerson [engaged] in the scientific, theological, political, and philosophical 
debates’ of her time (38). Many years before her nephew would profess the self-affirming 
value of becoming ‘a transparent eye-ball’, then, Mary Moody Emerson recognised the 
liminal potential of what Baker invitingly refers to as ‘moments of expanding knowledge in 
the third sphere of public discourse’ (44).  
Several decades later, Margaret Fuller would prove to be another prominent thinker 
for whom liminal experiences were not primarily an abstract philosophical concept, but rather 
a dynamic integral to her working practice. As Carol Strauss Sotiropoulos argues, while her 
                                                          
20 Noelle Baker, ‘“Let me do nothing smale”: Mary Moody Emerson and Women’s “Talking” Manuscripts’, in 
Toward a Female Genealogy of Transcendentalism, pp. 35-56 (p. 36). 
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male counterparts remained wedded to the essay and lecture forms so popular in this period, 
Fuller ‘struggled to adapt to patriarchally endorsed writing modes’.21 Instead, she advocated 
the progressive potential of conversation, due to her ‘belief in the transformative power of 
self-expression and dialogue’.22 Adapting elements of both Unitarian church ‘Conversations’ 
and the European salon movement, Fuller organised a number of Conversation series over a 
period of five years (1839-44).23 While she organised the venues and set the overarching 
agenda for these discussions, Fuller was adamant that her role within these meetings was ‘not 
as teacher, but facilitator – she would be “one” among, not over, the “class” in their mutual 
exploration of the topics she proposed’. 24  Indeed, in the first conversation, the scribe – 
believed to be Elizabeth Peabody – acknowledges Fuller’s claim that ‘she merely meant to be 
the nucleus of conversation’.25 Although the notion of being ‘merely […] the nucleus’ of 
these discussions may not convey the self-effacing sentiment Fuller (or Peabody) intended, 
these conversations provided a forum for young women to engage in intellectual and political 
debate at a time when they were denied the social and educational privileges extended to their 
male peers. 
Positioning these practices alongside the more abstract liminal aesthetic found in the 
writings of their male counterparts, this chapter recognises both Moody Emerson and Fuller’s 
contribution to a Transcendentalist poetics of liminality. The discussion posits that the non-
hierarchical structure of their dialogical working practices, in which the artist is positioned as 
central to but not the primary voice of the discussion, offers a counterpoint to the ostensibly 
self-serving individualism commonly associated with New England Transcendentalism. The 
                                                          
21 Carol Strauss Sotiropoulos, ‘Fuller, Goethe, Bettine’, in Toward a Female Genealogy of Transcendentalism, 
pp. 81-101 (p. 84). 
22 ‘Fuller, Goethe, Bettine’, p. 84. 
23 ‘Fuller, Goethe, Bettine’, p. 84. 
24 Nancy Craig Simmons, ‘Margaret Fuller’s Boston Conversations: The 1839-1840 Series’, Studies in the 
American Renaissance (1994), 195-226 (p. 200).  
25 ‘Margaret Fuller’s Boston Conversations’, p. 203. 
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close readings below examine how more abstract liminal experiences in nature, akin to those 
found in the writings of Emerson and Thoreau, coexist alongside various formal and stylistic 
dialogical tactics, similar to those advocated by Moody Emerson and Fuller, in the writings of 
Dillard, Adnan, Robinson and Solnit. It recognises conversation as a recurring theme in and 
of itself, which, as we shall see, is integral to the liminal poetics which this thesis understands 
as integral to the New Transcendentalism it proposes. 
 
‘THE GAPS ARE THE THING’: ANNIE DILLARD’S PILGRIM AT TINKER CREEK (1974) 
In their introduction to Image and Pilgrimage in Christian Culture (1978), Victor and Edith 
Turner discuss how their work expands van Gennep’s concept of liminality, such that it 
articulates 
not only transition but also potentiality, not only ‘going to be’ but also ‘what may be’, 
a formulable domain in which all that is not manifest in the normal day-to-day 
operation of social structures […] can be studied objectively, despite the often bizarre 
and metaphorical character of its contents.26 
 
Building on ideas ventured in a 1974 article by Victor Turner, their analysis identifies 
pilgrimage as an exemplar of this liminal condition. They argue that it is the means by which 
‘Christianity generated its own mode of liminality’, in that it necessitates a departure from 
one’s fixed locality, ‘to a sacred site or holy shrine located at some distance away from the 
pilgrim’s place of residence and daily labour’ (4). The Turners’ description of pilgrimage as a 
practice that involves ‘a movement from a mundane center to a sacred periphery which 
suddenly, transiently, becomes central for the individual, an axis mundi of his faith; 
movement itself, a symbol of communitas’ reflects the integral individual-world dialectic 
that, as we have already seen, is so central to Transcendentalist thought (34). Using an 
analogy reminiscent of Emerson’s transitional surfaces, the Turners later describe the practice 
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as ‘comparable to a series of overlapping, interpenetrating ellipses’ that reflect both its 
exterior physical route and interior spiritual journey (22). Image and Pilgrimage presents this 
interrelation between the physical and spiritual routes of pilgrimage as integral to its liminal 
nature; they claim that ‘pilgrimage may be thought of as extroverted mysticism, just as 
mysticism is introverted pilgrimage. The pilgrim physically traverses a mystical way; the 
mystic sets forth on an interior spiritual pilgrimage’ (33-4). Here, I posit that Annie Dillard’s 
first major publication, Pilgrim at Tinker Creek, represents just such a pilgrimage experience. 
Taking the Turners’ own analogy, I argue that Pilgrim itself may be understood as 
incorporating three interpenetrating ellipses. The first and second reflect the dialogical 
relationship already identified by the Turners between the physical and the spiritual aspects 
of pilgrimage. For Pilgrim is both a physical journey, detailing Dillard’s actual liminal 
experiences when visiting Tinker Creek, and a spiritual journey, exploring the theological 
questions she works through during those excursions. Moreover, as a literary text, Pilgrim 
introduces a third element, in which the writing process itself is understood as integral to 
Dillard’s pilgrimage; an artistic journey she takes as she retrospectively seeks to capture these 
physical and spiritual elements in the creation of the text itself. The discussion below 
contends that the interrelation between these three elements – the physical, the spiritual and 
the artistic – is primarily borne out through the liminal motifs and strategies that Dillard 
deploys throughout the text, many of which echo those found in key passages from Emerson 
and Thoreau’s writings. 
Published in 1974 – notably the same year as Turner’s formative article on the subject 
of pilgrimage – Pilgrim details the months Dillard spent living close to Tinker Creek in 
Virginia. Its opening pages ‘propose to keep what Thoreau called “a meteorological journal 
of the mind”, telling some tales and describing some of the sights of this rather tamed valley, 
and exploring, in fear and trembling, some of the unmapped dim reaches and unholy 
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fastnesses to which those tales and sights so dizzyingly lead’.27 Dillard’s passing reference to 
‘this rather tamed valley’ is particularly significant here. For, much like Thoreau’s Walden 
Pond, Dillard’s Tinker Creek was not the isolated wilderness that the text leads us to imagine. 
Instead, Dillard’s excursions to this ‘sacred periphery’ were undertaken in the spaces between 
activities required by the ‘mundane center’ of her suburban life. As Diane Saverin reveals in 
‘The Thoreau of the Suburbs’, despite reading as ‘a chronicle of solitude’, Pilgrim was in fact 
written while Dillard was living with her then husband, Richard Dillard, in the hours between 
playing softball and seeing to the daily chores, a backdrop so obscured that many readers 
assume she lived in her own Walden-esque cabin.28 Here we see the interrelation between the 
physical and artistic dimensions of Dillard’s pilgrimage. For the wilful erasure of what she 
describes as her ‘stupid little suburban neighborhood’ was, as Saverin notes, due to Dillard’s 
sense that no one would take her seriously as a ‘Virginia housewife named Annie’, and her 
belief that such a position would preclude her from the male-dominated tradition in which she 
actively sought to position herself.29 The irony, of course, as Dillard well knew, is that these 
revered male writers were themselves guilty of overselling their ‘lone-man-in-the-wilderness’ 
perspectives, not least Thoreau, whose cabin was built on Ralph Waldo Emerson’s land and 
who famously took his washing home to his mother on a regular basis.30 As such, Dillard’s 
wilful obfuscation of her wider domestic situation ultimately brings her closer to the writing 
practices of her Transcendentalist forebears, in which liminal experiences are most often 
sought in the margins of daily life. Having said this, it would be facile to suggest that Pilgrim 
amounts to a simple derivative of those earlier Transcendentalist writings. In one early 
                                                          
27 Annie Dillard, Pilgrim at Tinker Creek (Norwich: Canterbury Press, 2011), p. 3. Hereafter referred to as 
Pilgrim. 
28 Diane Saverin, ‘The Thoreau of the Suburbs’, The Atlantic, 5 February 2015 
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review, for example, Hayden Carruth describes the text as ‘plain old-fashioned optimistic 
American transcendentalism […] with little reference to life on this planet at this moment’, 
and later as ‘atavistic and essentially passive, not to say evasive’.31  Yet – to revisit the 
Turners’ definition of liminality cited above – by creating her own ‘formulable domain in 
which all that is not manifest in the normal day-to-day operation of social structures […] can 
be studied objectively, despite the often bizarre and metaphorical character of its contents’ – 
it is exactly ‘life on this planet at this moment’ that Dillard is most closely concerned with 
here – life, for sure, but not as we know it. 
In her 2005 memoir, Heart of Lightness, Edith Turner describes liminality as ‘a place 
where the normal does not apply. It is a kind of crack between the worlds, like the looking 
glass world of Alice.’32 With this analogy in mind, let us turn to the closing pages of Pilgrim, 
where Dillard writes: 
The gaps are the thing. The gaps are the spirit’s only home […] Go up into the gaps. 
If you can find them; they shift and vanish too. Stalk the gaps. Squeak into a gap in 
the soil, turn, and unlock – more than a maple – a universe. This is how you spend 
this afternoon, and tomorrow morning, and tomorrow afternoon. […] I am interested 
in Alice mainly when she eats the cooky that makes her smaller. I would pare myself 
or be pared that I too might pass through the merest crack, a gap I know is there in the 
sky. I am looking just now for the cooky. (274) 
 
The striking similarity between these two passages (Turner writing some thirty years after 
Dillard), allows us to draw a direct parallel between the liminal conceptual frameworks of 
Dillard and the Turners. In a narrative that consistently undercuts resolution, it is these 
‘gaps’, experienced spiritually at the edges of the everyday and effected artistically through 
Dillard’s liminal poetics, that Pilgrim constantly strives towards. Indeed, the fact that this 
passage – one of Pilgrim’s few didactic moments – occurs in the closing pages of the text, 
presents the idea that ‘the gaps are the thing’ as a key to the text, emphasized by the image of 
                                                          
31 Hayden Carruth, ‘Attractions and Dangers of Nostalgia’, Virginia Quarterly Review, 50 (1974), 636-8 (p. 
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32 Edith Turner, Heart of Lightness: The Life Story of an Anthropologist (New York and Oxford: Berghahn 
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the maple key that introduces the section which the above quotation ends. In keeping with the 
dialectical perspective of the text, however, Dillard’s acknowledgement that she is still 
‘looking just now for the cooky’, alongside her recognition that these revelatory opportunities 
tend to ‘shift and vanish’, positions this ‘stalking of the gaps’ as not an endpoint to reach but 
the perpetual aim of Dillard in both her life and her writing.  
While this exposition doesn’t occur until Pilgrim’s closing pages, these intersecting 
liminal contexts are set up within its opening lines:  
I used to have a cat, an old fighting tom, who would jump through the open window 
by my bed in the middle of the night and land on my chest. I’d half-awaken. […] 
Some nights he kneaded my bare chest with his front paws, powerfully, arching his 
back, as if sharpening his claws, or pummeling a mother for milk. And some 
mornings I’d wake in daylight to find my body covered with paw prints in blood; I 
looked as though I’d been painted with roses. […] What blood was this, and what 
roses? It could have been the rose of the union, the blood of murder, or the rose of 
beauty bare and the blood of some unspeakable sacrifice or birth. The sign on my 
body could have been an emblem or a stain, the keys to the kingdom or the mark of 
Cain. I never knew. (3) 
 
From the outset, Dillard thrusts the reader into a liminal space between waking and dreaming 
(‘half-awakened’), violence (‘sharpening his claws’) and nurture (‘pummeling a mother for 
milk’), beauty (roses) and horror (blood), and, ultimately, between knowing and unknowing 
(‘I never knew’). This wrong-footing, in which neither the narrator nor the reader knows the 
‘true meaning’ of the image, or, more accurately, Dillard’s implication of the potential 
coexistence of both possibilities, lays the foundations for the liminal perspective that 
characterises the text as a whole. For, as has already been acknowledged, Pilgrim is a 
narrative in which definitive responses are constantly undercut; a text which continually 
directs us towards definitive answers, yet ultimately leaves the reader with a sense that our 
preoccupation with explaining mystery is ultimately (and necessarily) futile.  
The text’s liminal perspective is reiterated later in the first chapter by the image ‘of a 
small green frog […] exactly half in and half out of the water, looking like a schematic 
diagram of an amphibian’ (7). More than a symbol of the text’s own amphibious perspective, 
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however, the frog gestures towards a fundamental dialectic that lies at the heart of Dillard’s 
narrative. For as she watches, Dillard witnesses a ‘monstrous and terrifying sight’: ‘just as I 
looked at him, he slowly crumpled and began to sag. The spirit vanished from his eyes as if 
snuffed. His skin emptied and drooped; his very skull seemed to collapse and settle like an 
emptied tent. […] I gaped bewildered, appalled’ (7-8). Margaret Loewen Reimer has 
identified this moment – in which a giant water bug sucks out the frog’s innards from below 
the waterline – as representing one half of a dialectic that underpins Pilgrim. ‘The first level 
of the dialectic’, Reimer contends, ‘is the tension between the material and the spiritual, the 
natural and the transcendent, but another dialectic is at work within this framework: the 
prevailing contradiction between the beauty and the horror within the natural world.’33  
Clearly the suggestion here of ‘the tension between the material and the spiritual’ 
recalls the Turners’ explanation of the liminal pilgrimage experience. Moreover, this image 
of the crumpling frog, foregrounded here and recalled throughout the text, is an exemplar of 
one of the ‘gaps’ that Dillard alludes to in the final pages – a moment in which the 
paradoxical beauty and horror of the natural world is laid bare before our eyes. If the 
crumpling frog of the opening pages is one such image, it is balanced at the end of the second 
chapter by Dillard’s recollection of ‘the tree with the lights in it’, an experience Dillard 
describes as being ‘utterly focused and utterly dreamed’ (36). These two episodes, Reimer 
posits, ‘yield two opposite conclusions’ which Dillard ‘holds in constant tension throughout 
the book’.34 In an afterword added to the text in 1999, Dillard explicitly recognises how this 
dialectical perspective is reflected within Pilgrim’s structure: 
Running the story through a year’s seasons was conventional, so I resisted it, but since 
each of the dozen alternative structures I proposed injured, usually fatally, the already 
frail narrative, I was stuck with it. The book’s other, two-part structure interested me 
more. Neoplatonic Christianity described two routes to God: the via positiva and the via 
                                                          
33 Margaret Loewen Reimer, ‘The Dialectical Vision of Annie Dillard’s Pilgrim at Tinker Creek’, Critique: 
Studies in Contemporary Fiction, 24 (1983), 182-91 (p. 182). 
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negativa. […] The book’s first half, the via positiva, accumulates the world’s goodness 
and God’s. […] The via positiva culminates in “Intricacy”. A shamefully feeble 
“Flood” chapter washes all that away, and the second half of the book starts down the 
via negativa with “Fecundity”, the dark side of intricacy. “Northing” is the counterpart 
to “Seeing”. A concluding chapter keeps the bilateral symmetry. (279-80) 
 
While Dillard suggests a very clear distinction between these two sections of the text, with 
the first half being ‘washed away’ by the pivotal ‘Flood’ chapter, the analysis below argues 
that Pilgrim presents the inherent mutability of these two approaches. It will contend that, 
rather than being mutually exclusive, the two modes of engagement with God (which, as will 
be shown, is itself a negotiated term within this text) are held in productive tension 
throughout, thus becoming one of many ‘transitional surfaces’ upon which this text skates. 
While Reimer is right to dispute Carruth’s suggestion that Pilgrim amounts to ‘plain 
old-fashioned optimistic American transcendentalism’, then, the fact that she later suggests 
that Dillard’s ‘dialectical vision’ in some way distances the text from its Transcendentalist 
antecedents and that their work functions for Dillard as ‘only a fond remembrance of a world 
that seemed to promise more clarity’, is altogether more contentious.35 Likewise, we find a 
similar argument put forward by Sandra Humble Johnson in her 1992 study, The Space 
Between. Johnson cites ‘the tree with the lights in it’ as an exemplar of Dillard’s use of 
‘literary epiphany’.36 Standing apart from four other categories of ‘illuminated moment’ (the 
experience of the ‘sublime’, the mystical experience, the conversion and the vision), literary 
epiphany, Johnson posits, is most nearly concerned not with the epiphanic experience itself, 
but the means by which that experience is presented on the page. Most important, Johnson 
argues, is the extent to which the moment engages the reader: ‘the literary epiphany works 
upon the reader, forcing him into an experienced moment’, such that the readers are ‘allowed 
to make their own connections and are consequently drawn into the subjectivity of the 
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36 Sandra Humble Johnson, The Space Between: Literary Epiphany in the Work of Annie Dillard (Kent, OH: 
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moment’ (8). It is this sense of immediacy that, Johnson suggests, aligns Dillard more readily 
with a Wordsworthian Romanticism as opposed to an American Transcendentalism: ‘[i]n the 
hands of Emerson and Thoreau, the illuminated moment becomes […] a different literary 
experience, from that expressed by Wordsworth. The change might be summed up by stating 
that in general these Americans lost immediacy and gained philosophic exposition in the 
matter of illumination’ (39). Johnson contends that Emerson ‘begins to lose epiphanic power 
when he depersonalizes this experience by using the third person’ (38). She continues: ‘[b]y 
shifting out of a personal narrative, a single incident, by changing voices, and by offering 
meanings to his reader, Emerson is not acting substantially different from his fellow 
Transcendentalists’ (38). Moving to a consideration of several near-epiphanic moments in 
Thoreau’s Walden, Johnson contends, somewhat patronisingly, that ‘the gilded poetry of the 
language is a lovely and fitting extension of Walden’s themes but [this] does not lift it fully 
into the epiphanic tensions of a Wordsworth or Dillard illumination’ (39).  
While Johnson’s reading of the affinity between Wordsworth’s and Dillard’s use of 
the epiphanic moment is compelling for the most part, I would argue that there is a distinct 
irony in the fact that her study sets so many rigid criteria in order for a passage ‘to qualify as 
a literary epiphany’, particularly given her insistence that the central function of the device is 
its ‘necessary ambiguity and psychological depth’.37 She states within the opening chapter 
that the epiphanic moment remains ‘entirely personal’ and echoes Henry Vaughan’s claim 
that epiphany is ‘the opposite of allegory, conceit, metaphor’.38 It strikes me, however, that 
these aspects of the Wordsworthian epiphany are at odds with the dialogical nature of 
epiphanic experience. This tension is borne out to an extent as Johnson’s study develops 
through chapters considering ‘The Shape of Epiphanic Time’ and ‘Surfaces and Directions in 
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Epiphanic Time’, titles which are themselves clearly suggestive of an Emersonian 
preoccupation with surface and temporality. Towards the end of the study, Johnson posits 
that:  
the objectless space between […] is where the attention should be placed. […] The 
heart of the epiphany can only be observed obliquely, as it glances off the bordering 
objects of the moment. But just as the physical objects or the staged properties of 
epiphany should not be seen as symbolic or metaphoric, so the objectless center 
should not be considered as symbol. The symbol is too static a device for the extreme 
organic quality an epiphanist must achieve.39  
 
I would argue that the privileging of the first person perspective and the emphasis on the 
particular event as opposed to the general experience that Johnson identifies as integral to 
Wordsworthian literary epiphany undermines both this imperative for an ‘objectless center’, 
and her later assertion that ‘if the language is left open, if spaces are left between word 
meanings, the moment can occur’.40 Moreover, for all the attention placed on ‘the space 
between’, it is striking that, to a greater extent even than Jonathan Levin, Johnson never 
brings theories of liminality to bear on Dillard’s (or anyone else’s) use of literary epiphany. 
Yet in these attempts to articulate ‘the objectless center’ of the epiphanic experience, along 
with her reference to ‘[glancing] off the bordering objects of the moment’, and her 
acknowledgement that the epiphanic moment cannot be reduced to a static symbol, the study 
veers ever closer to the rhetoric of the unfolding potential of the liminal condition so central 
to Emerson’s philosophy.  
I wish to argue here that while both Reimer and Johnson offer cogent readings of 
Pilgrim, their suggestion that these dialogical, liminal aspects of the text in some way 
distance Dillard from her Transcendentalist antecedents is decidedly less compelling, for 
reasons that may be borne out by a comparative reading of the moment Dillard witnesses ‘the 
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tree with the lights in it’ and Emerson’s ‘transparent eye-ball’ scene, alluded to within the 
introduction to this chapter and which I cite here again for ease of reference: 
Crossing a bare common, in snow puddles, at twilight, under a clouded sky, without 
having in my thoughts any occurrence of special good fortune, I have enjoyed a 
perfect exhilaration. I am glad to the brink of fear. In the woods too, a man casts off 
his years, as the snake his slough, and at what period soever of life, is always a child. 
In the woods, is perpetual youth. […] There I feel that nothing can befall me in life – 
no disgrace, no calamity (leaving me my eyes), which nature cannot repair. Standing 
on the bare ground, - my head bathed by the blithe air, and uplifted into infinite space, 
- all mean egotism vanishes. I become a transparent eye-ball; I am nothing; I see all; 
the currents of the Universal Being circulate through me; I am part or particle of God. 
The name of the nearest friend sounds then foreign and accidental: to be brothers, to 
be acquaintances, -- master or servant, is then a trifle and a disturbance.41 
 
That opening section has already identified the liminal contexts that are foregrounded 
within the first lines of this passage. Moreover, far from losing a sense of immediacy, I would 
argue that the shift from ‘I have enjoyed’ to ‘I am glad’ and the persistent use of the present 
tense throughout imbues the passage with a continuity of experience, suggesting that the 
significance of the moment transcends the boundaries of its specific context, thus enabling 
the reader to become – to revisit Johnson’s terms – ‘drawn into the subjectivity of the 
moment’. As we enter the epiphanic moment proper, the first person continues to 
predominate, not only literally, but also through the conflation of the ‘I’ and the ‘eye’. Yet 
this self-affirmation is undercut by the assertion that ‘all mean egotism vanishes’, and by the 
centred subject becoming at the same time ‘transparent’ and ‘nothing’ in the moment of 
epiphany. Likewise, the notion of ‘the Universal Being’ and of being ‘part or particle of 
God’, alongside the suggestion that ‘to be […] master or servant, is then a trifle and a 
disturbance’, collapses the (Hegelian) dialectic between the self and the other (or, to use 
Emerson’s terms, the ME and the NOT ME), and complicates the power structures at play 
within the passage. Yet the assertion that ‘the name of the nearest friend sounds then foreign 
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and accidental’ simultaneously identifies this as a retreat from the social, reiterated by the 
claim that such experiences are only found in these solitary ‘tranquil landscapes’, as opposed 
to in ‘the streets or villages’. While this moment may be set in stark relief, then, it ultimately 
serves to encapsulate many elements of Emerson’s broader liminal poetics, not least the 
knowing contradictions and paradoxes that characterise his philosophy. My central argument 
here is that although Johnson suggests early in her study that this Emersonian epiphanic 
moment fails to meet certain rigid criteria given its shifting qualities, and thus distances 
Emerson’s mode of literary epiphany from Dillard’s, there are a number of productive 
parallels that may be drawn between the two passages. 
In her afterword to the text, added in 1999, Dillard offers her thoughts on Pilgrim, 
twenty-five years after its original publication: ‘Above all, and salvifically, I hope, it seems 
bold. That it is overbold, and bold in metaphor, seems a merit. […] Its willingness to say “I” 
and “me” embarrasses – but at least it used the first person as a point of view only, a hand-
held camera directed outwards’ (281-83). Prompted by the publication of her second novel, 
The Maytrees, in 2007, Dillard added a second brief afterword, in which she explicitly 
acknowledges Emerson’s influence on Pilgrim: ‘Using the first person, I tried to be – in 
Emerson’s ever-ludicrous phrase – a transparent eyeball’ (283). In both celebrating her bold 
use of metaphor and distancing herself from the pervasive use of the first person throughout 
Pilgrim, Dillard’s comments here to some extent undermine Johnson’s eagerness to 
foreground these aspects of the narrative and to distance Dillard’s writing from its 
Transcendentalist influences. This may be gleaned when comparing Emerson’s ‘transparent 
eye-ball’ experience with Dillard’s experience of ‘the tree with the lights in it’. Through its 
woodland setting and apparent nonchalance – ‘one day I was walking along Tinker Creek 
thinking of nothing at all and I saw the tree with the lights in it’ (35) – the passage is 
immediately reminiscent of that famous Emersonian moment. As we delve deeper into 
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Dillard’s description of the experience, the heightened rhetoric so characteristic of 
Transcendentalist writings ensues: ‘I saw the backyard cedar where the mourning doves roost 
charged and transfigured, each cell buzzing with flame’ (36). The last phrase here may be 
read as a conscious allusion to Emerson’s notion of being ‘part or particle of God’, in that 
Dillard chooses not to specify whether it is the cells of the tree or her own that are ‘buzzing 
with flame’, such that the whole scene is set alight.42 In this regard, I agree with Johnson, for 
there is a certain openness to the language here; by not explicitly defining this as a moment of 
divine intervention, as Emerson does, Dillard enables power to circulate much more freely 
through the passage. Here we find another striking echo between Dillard and Edith Turner. In 
Heart of Lightness, Turner differentiates between ‘Power I’ and ‘Power II’, the former 
pertaining to the City of Man and the latter to the City of God; the first associated with 
hierarchy, power, dominion and structure and the second connoting love, communitas and 
holding ‘its own meaning, in its own right’ beyond the hegemonic structures imposed upon 
it.43 
Yet despite its indeterminate aspects, I would argue that the passage does just that 
‘shifting out of a personal narrative, a single incident’, and the same ‘offering [of] meanings 
to [its] reader’ that Johnson condemns in Emerson’s writing. Though unexpected in its 
particular moment, Dillard highlights that this witnessing of ‘the tree with the lights in it’ 
was, in fact, an experience she had been searching for ‘through the peach orchards of 
summer, in the forests of fall and down winter and spring for years’ (36). More than this, it 
was a phenomenon she was inspired to seek by the story she read in Marius von Senden’s 
Space and Sight of a previously-blind girl who gained sight for the first time, and was taken 
out into a garden where she described seeing ‘the tree with the lights in it’ (35). Further still, 
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although the passage focuses primarily on the first time Dillard experienced the phenomenon, 
she recognises that she has ‘since only very rarely seen the tree with the lights in it. The 
vision comes and goes, mostly goes, but I live for it, the moment when the mountains open 
and a new light roars in’ (36). As in Emerson’s case, however, these aspects do not 
necessarily detract from the epiphanic tension of the moment. Instead Dillard positions 
herself within a wider dialogical framework in which she represents both writer and reader, in 
that the moment alludes to not only the solitary nature of traditional epiphanic experiences, 
but also simultaneously to their social dimension through the connection drawn between 
herself, Marius von Senden, the female subject of the story he tells, and, in turn, us as the 
reader. In addition to reinstating the social dimension of epiphany, there are a number of 
other ways in which Dillard reimagines Emerson’s earlier mode. As has already been alluded 
to, this is particularly apparent in the moment’s conspicuous subversion of power relations. 
Like Emerson, Dillard foregrounds the motif of ‘Seeing’ – this passage provides the final 
image of a chapter with this title, in fact – but rather than the all-seeing eyeball of Emerson’s 
rendering, Dillard posits that her experience was ‘less like seeing than like being for the first 
time seen, knocked breathless by a powerful glance’ (36). Far from disempowering, however, 
the experience imbues Dillard with an enduring power that she is ‘still spending’ long after 
the epiphanic moment has passed (36). For Dillard, power is depicted as residing in – to use 
Emerson’s phrase – these moments of transition but, more than this, as a process of 
transaction; a process – to use Edith Turner’s terms – that may be characterised as Power II 
as opposed to Power I. 
This dynamic is borne out further through the bell metaphor here, in which Dillard 
describes herself as having been ‘lifted and struck’. A semi-echo of Emerson’s notion of 
being ‘uplifted into infinite space’, the image presents Dillard as being acted upon by an 
unspecified force. By describing herself as a metaphorical bell, however, Dillard articulates 
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how this process is simultaneously turned outwards as a means of reaching out to others – for 
what use is the resonating ring of a bell without others to hear it? Far from antithetical to the 
epiphanic moment, then, I would argue that this bell metaphor functions as a means of 
signalling epiphanic experience or the ‘gaps’. There are a number of allusions to the chime of 
bells throughout Pilgrim, and it is notable that such instances recur alongside moments of 
epiphany. For instance, in the fourth chapter, ‘The Fixed’, Dillard recounts a childhood 
experience in which her class conducted an experiment with the cocoon of a Polyphemus 
moth: ‘The teacher fades, the classmates fade, I fade: I don’t remember anything but that 
thing’s struggle to be a moth or die trying’ (62). The story – itself, of course, an exemplar of 
the liminal condition – concludes with Dillard standing ‘alone, stock-still, but shivering’ as 
she watches the recently-released moth ‘[heaving] himself down the asphalt driveway by 
infinite degrees’ (61-2). But the scene is interrupted: ‘The bell rang twice; I had to go. […] I 
went; I ran inside. The Polyphemus moth is still crawling down the driveway, crawling down 
the driveway hunched, crawling down the driveway on six furred feet, forever’ (62). While 
the ringing school bell may be easily dismissed as a mundane detail of this formative 
experience, I would argue that in setting this moment into high relief, Dillard aligns the 
ringing of the bell here with the recurrence throughout the wider narrative of the bell motif as 
a marker of illuminated experience. 
More than simply a signalling, however, the bell also functions more specifically as a 
means of articulating the liminal positioning of the artist. This connection is previously 
established when the bell metaphor is first introduced in Pilgrim’s opening chapter: ‘I walk 
out; I see something, some event that would otherwise have been utterly missed and lost; or 
something sees me, some enormous power brushes me with its clean wing, and I resound like 
a beaten bell’ (14). Once again, the image is presented alongside an awareness of both seeing 
and being seen. To reiterate this liminal dynamic, Dillard describes herself as ‘an explorer 
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[and] also a stalker, or the instrument of the hunt itself’, drawing an analogy with the Native 
American hunting practice in which hunters ‘used to carve long grooves along the wooden 
shafts of their arrows’ (14). Dillard elaborates:  
The function of lightning marks is this: if the arrow fails to kill the game, blood from a 
deep wound will channel along the lightning mark, streak down the arrow shaft, and 
spatter to the ground, laying a trail […] that the barefoot and trembling archer can 
follow into whatever deep or rare wilderness it leads. I am the arrow shaft, carved along 
my length by unexpected lights and gashes from the very sky, and this book is the 
straying trail of blood. (14-15)  
 
Unpacking this analogy, it seems that Dillard understands her role as an artist in much the 
same way as Emerson outlines in ‘The Poet’. The introduction to this chapter discussed 
Emerson’s ideal poet – a hypothetical figure who ‘stands among partial men for the complete 
man […] in virtue of being the largest power to receive and impart. […] The poet is the sayer, 
the namer, and […] stands on the centre.’44 As cited above, Joan Wry asserts that ‘here “the 
centre” represents not the status of authority but a liminal positioning that allows the poet to 
filter impressions from the natural world and then translate them for the “partial” individuals 
who do not yet share his higher form of seeing’.45 While my discussion questioned Wry’s 
reading of the hegemonic imperatives underpinning Emerson’s idealised poet, it corroborated 
the underlying premise presenting the artist as a liminal figure mediating between ‘the 
seeing’ and ‘the saying’. As we have seen, this notion rings true with the readings of both 
Emerson and Dillard offered above. It may be said, in fact, that it is even more apparent in 
Dillard’s work than Emerson’s, in that Dillard often consciously foregrounds her own liminal 
positioning and the reciprocal nature of her own epiphanic experience.  
One of the central motifs used to articulate the inherent duality of her perspective is 
the image of her ‘[straddling] the sycamore log over the creek, […] I’m drawn to this spot. I 
come to it as an oracle’ (7). That Dillard returns again and again to this place, physically, and 
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to this image, textually, and that she often adopts the verb ‘straddle’ to describe this position, 
suggests that in these moments she is consciously presenting her own liminal position. It is 
notable that within the ‘Flood’ chapter, which, as we have seen, ostensibly serves to ‘wash 
away’ the via positiva approach of the text’s first half, Dillard draws conspicuous attention to 
her sycamore log: ‘My log is gone for sure, I think – but in fact, I discover later, it holds, 
rammed between growing trees’ (154-55). It may be said, then, that this image gestures 
towards the enduring duality of Dillard’s perspective, acknowledging how despite 
professedly foregrounding these two approaches as discrete and mutually exclusive, the text 
ultimately demonstrates their inherent mutability. Elsewhere, she questions the very ideology 
underpinning notions of power, positing an image of a God who ‘has not absconded but 
spread […] to a fabric of spirit, so grand and subtle, so powerful in a new way, that we only 
feel blindly at its hem’ (9; emphasis added). ‘But,’ she goes on, ‘have we come even that far? 
Have we rowed out to the thick darkness, or are we playing pinochle at the bottom of the 
boat?’ (11). It is through this constant shifting, this mode – to quote Marilynne Robinson – of 
‘[creating] models of understanding and then [destroying] them’, that Dillard articulates her 
own dialogical perspective and indicates a fundamental resistance to forms of rhetorical 
control, and an awareness that the role of the artist is not unequivocally one of power.46 For 
although these two apparently disparate ‘routes to God’ inevitably emphasise a theological 
perspective, by calling the very concept of ‘God’ into question as she does here, Dillard 
implies that the most pertinent element of these two modes is the juxtaposition they present 
between omniscience (via positiva) and unknowability (via negativa). That Dillard asserts 
that she finds the latter route ‘more congenial’ once again reiterates her resistance to 
hegemonic constructs (279).  
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Early in On Leaving, Branka Arsić outlines what she understands as a key implication 
of Emerson’s thinking:  
In order to reconnect to things, being, and emotions, […] men need to overcome the 
fear of discontinuities and heal the anxiety of change. […] by coming closer to life 
one would by no means avoid pain and danger; such a protected life doesn’t exist, and 
that is not what Emerson is proposing. Rather, he enjoins us to follow the 
interruptions and inspect the line of breakages, despite the fear that comes with it. One 
would be required to register motions and movements and welcome changes. […] To 
allow for change, to abandon the stationary, to overcome the fear of rupture, and to 
face interruption are all, in fact, modes of leaving where and what one is.47 
 
As we have seen, Dillard’s Pilgrim’s ability to articulate and embrace the coexistence of 
beauty and horror, its insistence that ‘the gaps are the thing’ and its unwavering attention to 
almost imperceptible changes makes it an exemplar of this Emersonian mode. Where Arsić 
seems to frame this as some sort of crisis of masculinity here, may be read as an act of self-
assertion, situating herself confidently and squarely within this historically male-oriented 
tradition. 
 
‘LINGERING BETWEEN THE KNOWN AND THE UNKNOWN’: ETEL ADNAN’S JOURNEY TO 
MOUNT TAMALPAIS (1986) AND SEA AND FOG (2012) 
In a 2012 essay entitled, ‘The Cost of Love We Are Not Willing to Pay’, Adnan remarks: ‘I 
can recall in my own existence two passions that did not concern human beings but that at 
turns took center stage.’ 48  She elaborates: ‘I developed from my early years a sensual 
response to the sea, a fascination, a need that I lived like a secret. It enchanted me, and it 
isolated me. It has lasted all my life.’49 She describes the sea as her ‘one great love’, to the 
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extent that her ‘sensuality was absorbed by the beauty of the sea all around Beirut’.50 The 
second of these ‘two passions’ is her love of Mount Tamalpais. Located in the Bay Area of 
San Francisco where Adnan has lived for over thirty years, the mountain she describes as her 
‘very idea of home’ and as ‘the very center of [her] being’.51 Elsewhere, Adnan has also 
acknowledged how the mountain ‘became a companion. […] I painted nothing else but this 
for years, until I couldn’t think of anything else. To observe its changes became my major 
preoccupation. I even wrote a book in order to come to terms with it – but the experience 
overflowed my writing. I was addicted.’52 Brandon Shimoda has described Adnan’s work as 
‘clarifying a great, if even more ephemeral existence, holding anchor the world among 
mountains and paintings, bodies of water and language […] indivisible passions’.53 Through 
a comparative reading of Adnan’s 1986 poetic essay, Journey to Mount Tamalpais and her 
2012 work, Sea and Fog, this section examines the dialectical relationship Adnan constructs 
between these two spaces – the mountain on the one hand and the sea on the other. It 
recognises, in line with Shimoda’s suggestion here, how this relationship informs her creative 
practice, the mountain symbolising stability, her immediate physical context in America and 
her role as a painter, the sea representing flux, her recollections of Beirut and her role as a 
writer. In doing so, it presents this dialectical relationship and the nexus of interconnections 
that emanate from it as integral to Adnan’s evolving poetics of liminality. Extending the 
premise of the previous section, I begin by establishing how Journey may also be read as a 
pilgrimage narrative, before going on to read passages from the text alongside the two 
extracts from Emerson and Thoreau discussed earlier in this chapter. The analysis contends 
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that two similarly liminal moments in Journey reflect both the affirming and hostile images 
of nature reflected in the comparison above between Emerson’s transparent eyeball scene and 
Thoreau’s excursion to Mount Ktaadn. These readings provide a point of departure for the 
comparative study of Journey and Sea and Fog, which identifies a shift from the sense of 
self-affirming creative freedom articulated in the former text to the frustrations of stifled 
artistic expression foregrounded in the latter. As well as recognising how these texts may be 
read in light of Adnan’s Transcendentalist predecessors, my analysis also identifies a second 
parallel to Dillard’s Pilgrim, drawing an analogy between the dialogical relationship Dillard 
sets up between the via positiva and via negativa, and Adnan’s exploration of a similar 
tension between the known and the unknowable across the broader arc of her writings. 
While Pilgrim makes an explicit claim via its title, Adnan’s Journey also incorporates 
many key elements of the pilgrimage narrative. The text details her first years in San 
Francisco in the late 1950s, and has been described by fellow American writer Wendell Berry 
– who, as the introduction to this thesis acknowledges, has himself been named anecdotally 
as a potential New Transcendentalist – as ‘a new outlook on the importance of Nature as an 
element of thinking; one of the major works of the “spirit of place” in contemporary 
literature’. 54  As Berry’s comment here implies, Journey is very much the product of a 
specific time and place in American cultural history; a time when, as Stephen Motika 
acknowledges, the area surrounding Mount Tamalpais ‘emerged as an important site for 
artists and writers’.55 Rather than placing its focus on the broader theological questions posed 
in Pilgrim, however, Journey is framed as an artistic pilgrimage above all else, bound for the 
cultural Mecca of San Francisco’s Bay Area, a journey to the veritable shrine of Mount 
Tamalpais. Similarly to Pilgrim – and in line with both the Turners’ analogy and Emerson’s 
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notion of ‘presenting as much transitional surface as possible’ – Journey may too be read as 
incorporating a series of interpenetrating ellipses, in which the physical, spiritual and artistic 
overlap, a space in which ‘geographic spots become spiritual concepts’ (10). This 
interrelation is indicated within the opening pages, where Adnan writes: 
Like a chorus, the warm breeze had come all the way from Athens and Baghdad, to 
the Bay, by the Pacific Route, its longest journey. It is the energy of these winds that I 
used, when I came to these shores, obsessed, followed by my home-made furies, 
errynies, and such potent creatures. And I fell in love with the immense blue eyes of 
the Pacific: I saw its red algae, its blood-colored cliffs, its pulsating breath. The ocean 
led me to the mountain. (9)  
 
The Turners recognise arduousness as integral to pilgrimage, noting that ‘not only may it be 
long, it is also hazardous, beset […] by natural dangers’, but equally that ‘these fresh and 
unpredictable troubles represent, at the same time, a release from the ingrown ills of home’.56 
Adnan’s journey is here presented in just such terms: not just long but ‘the longest’, not just a 
release from but actually borne along by her ‘home-made furies’. Moreover, this early 
passage gestures towards the dialogical relationship between the ocean and the mountain that 
is developed throughout the essay. Indeed, Adnan later foregrounds the fact that the name 
Tamalpais itself derives from the mountain’s original Indian name, ‘Mountain Tamal-Pa, 
“The One close to the Sea”’ (15), and the fact that she sees her journey between the two 
landscapes – her pilgrimage – as integral to the construction of this dialectical relationship is 
more explicitly acknowledged within her subsequent claim that: ‘[a] Voyage is like water. A 
pure experience. What kind of experience? A JOURNEY. I am water and I move. I need to 
circle the mountain, because I am water. The mountain has to stay and I have to go, and it all 
comes to the same thing’ (18).  
 Beyond such abstract examples, there are a number of more tangible ways in which 
we can align Journey with the pilgrimage narrative. The Turners describe the pilgrim as ‘an 
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initiand, entering into a new, deeper level of existence than he has known in his accustomed 
milieu. […] While the pilgrim seeks temporary release from the structures than normally bind 
him, the tribal intitiand seeks a deeper commitment to the structural life of his local 
community.’57 Problematic pronouns aside, Adnan’s experience of the O’Hanlon workshops 
corresponds with this description. ‘The early workshops’, she remarks,  
participated of the newness of the world. Yes, they were at the very beginning of the 
Sixties, yes they participated in the prophetic spirit of a decade […] This time a whole 
nation was again being involved in a Great Experiment, unabashedly, through street 
marches, music, songs, underground movies, and millions of silent events which tried 
to uproot a culture and plant a new one, a new forest. (37)  
 
This notion of ‘being involved in a Great Experiment’, of trying ‘to uproot a culture and plant 
a new one, a new forest’ can be understood in much the same terms as the New England 
Transcendentalists’ project before them, particularly in regard to this last metaphor of 
planting a new forest, a new wilderness, a new potential site of national, cultural and artistic 
progress.58 Adnan presents Tamalpais as representative of an increasingly elusive wilderness 
in Journey’s opening pages, remarking that ‘[t]here is a smell of wilderness in a civilized 
country thanks to that majestic being which stands among us in all its beauty’ (10). 
If Dillard’s pilgrimage was taken in the tradition of self-reliant solitude akin to 
Emerson and Thoreau (albeit, as we have seen, in reimagined terms), Adnan’s more readily 
mirrors the practice of ‘mutual self-cultivation’ promoted by Moody Emerson and Fuller as 
outlined at the outset of this chapter. ‘It was destiny’, Adnan asserts early on, ‘to join in a 
great experience: to live with the mountain and with a team, to encounter them regularly, to 
know them without ever reaching a point or an end’ (11). Just as Moody Emerson and Fuller 
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advocated, this sense of ‘mutual self-cultivation’ directly informed the group’s creative 
practice. Adnan recalls one workshop in particular: 
A painter also looks like a loner. His work seems to be the result of a solitary struggle. 
[…] But one day at the Loft we broke tradition. Ann distributed huge pieces of paper, 
[…] and within an hour or two there were five or six people working on the same 
surface, overlapping, interfering with each other’s work […] The paintings had, each, 
more quality, more strength, more ‘unity’ of composition and feeling, than many 
individual works. […] Through them, a moment, a group, an adventure, a culture, 
found its expression. They were a being made of us all. (48) 
 
As gestured towards in the reading of Dillard above, the notion of communitas is integral to 
the Turners’ understanding of pilgrimage, and to their concept of liminality more generally. 
Described as ‘a spring of pure possibility’, communitas denotes a group bond characterised 
by ‘a relational quality [and] liminal phenomenon which combines the qualities of lowliness, 
sacredness, homogeneity, and comradeship’.59 The Turners identify three overarching forms 
of communitas: spontaneous, normative and ideological. The latter is most pertinent here, 
referring to ‘the formulation of remembered attributes of the communitas experience in the 
form of a utopian blueprint for the reform of society’.60 The resonances of such a notion of 
communitas and the experience Adnan outlines above and throughout Journey are self-
evident, as are the resonances between Adnan’s commitment to creative endeavour ‘without 
ever reaching a point or an end’ and that anti-teleological Transcendentalist mode considered 
throughout this thesis. More intriguing still, Adnan herself highlights the liminal significance 
of her pilgrimage experience as indicated by her assertion that ‘[w]e, members of the 
Perception Workshop, had climbed a steep trail thinking of […] a long travel across lava 
country, of sudden bursts of meteors. We had with us no rite of passage. We had gone 
through no initiation, as we went into childhood and into adolescence with no warning. This 
is why we come to the mountain. We have no other elevation’ (21). 
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For all its foregrounding of communitas, however – and in line with the Turners’ later 
acknowledgement of pilgrimage as a process which is both characterised by the ‘emergence 
of the integral person from multiple personae’ and serves as ‘a symbol of communitas’ – 
Journey also presents images of the solitary self in nature (34). The natural landscape is 
identified as a site of personal and artistic inspiration throughout Journey, culminating in 
moments of revelatory self-affirmation, as is most memorably demonstrated in the following 
passage: ‘Standing on Mount Tamalpais I am in the rhythms of the world. Everything seems 
right as it is. I am in harmony with the stars, for the better or the worst. I know. I know. I 
know’ (13). Within the context of this discussion, this passage cannot fail to remind us of 
Emerson’s transparent eyeball scene; we cannot but hear the chiming of Adnan’s ‘everything 
seems right as it is’ with Emerson’s ‘I feel that nothing can befall me in life’, of her being ‘in 
harmony with the stars’ with his having ‘the currents of the Universal Being circulate through 
me’, and of her self-affirming ‘I know. I know. I know’ with his ‘I see all’. Couched as they 
are in an idealistic rhetoric, Adnan’s liminal experiences on the mountain, of which the above 
is an exemplar, often read as a somewhat derivative reworking of that characteristically 
Transcendentalist mode, by which the human subject becomes subsumed within the 
overarching rhythms of the natural landscape. Within the space of a few lines, however, this 
sense of a benevolent and welcoming nature is undercut: ‘Tamalpais remains alone, wise in 
its ingathering, peaceful in its knowledge, happy. Do not climb that mountain unless you 
know it needs you. Otherwise, you shall die like a diseased raven, and carry your skeleton in 
crowded streets, and never, never, recover your memory’ (14). So soon after an image 
strikingly reminiscent of Emerson’s pivotal scene, this warning strongly evokes Thoreau’s 
experience at the top of Mount Ktaadn, where he depicts a hostile landscape which ‘seems to 
say sternly […] Why seek me where I have not called thee, and then complain because you 
find me but a stepmother? Shouldst thou freeze or starve, or shudder thy life away, here is no 
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shrine, nor altar, nor any access to my ear’ (64). While perhaps not so sustained as Pilgrim, 
then, Journey explores the coexistence of beauty and the horror in the natural world, a 
dialectical vision (to repurpose Reimer’s terms) which enables Adnan to assert that: ‘It was 
most appropriate that they found a man hanging by a tree near the top of Tamalpais. It was 
not horrible. It was just one of the many events that happen up there following the death of 
birds or the growth of plants’ (18).  
While central to the liminal poetics Adnan develops throughout her body of work, the 
paradoxical ambivalence of the natural landscape functions primarily throughout Journey as 
an analogous backdrop to the text’s central focus: Adnan’s evolving artistic sensibility. Much 
of the text is devoted to meditating on this process: ‘We are most of the time painting but this 
is beside the point; our involvement is with Perception. Ann O’Hanlon, who started it all, 
says “To perceive is to be both objective and subjective. It is to be in the process of becoming 
one with whatever it is, while also becoming separated from it”’ (11). This assertion clearly 
resonates strongly with Emerson’s sense that ‘it is impossible to speak or to think without 
embracing both’ oneness and otherness, reflecting a shared belief that the challenge of 
reconciling this paradox is integral to ‘the experience of poetic creativeness’.61 What is more, 
its allusion to a continuing ‘process of becoming’ again gestures towards the anti-teleological 
perspectives that underpin Transcendentalist thought, as does her later description of a mode 
of painting (recognised in Cézanne) which ‘moves within [a] circle. With no satisfaction, no 
resting point’ (57). Moreover, the notion of simultaneously ‘becoming one […] while also 
becoming separated’ anticipates the intersubjective perspectives that will be considered 
within the second chapter of this thesis. The dual perspective afforded to Adnan as both a 
writer and a painter is a touchpoint throughout Journey. Adnan consistently reiterates what 
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she sees as the intrinsic connection between perception and painting, describing them at one 
point as ‘an unbreakable dual concept. They became interchangeable’ (28). Within this same 
section, she suggests that ‘[p]ainters have a knowledge which goes beyond words. [They] 
have always experienced the oneness of things. They are aware that there is an interference 
and intervention between the world and ourselves’ (27). Cole Swensen expands on Adnan’s 
sentiment here in an essay on her work:  
it is only with the work of a person who, like Etel, works both in painting and writing 
that one can notice in any detail just how differently painting and writing occupy the 
mind, how they allow two completely different sorts of imaginative expansion. And 
these two sorts are not at all exclusive; in fact, only with a person who works in both 
can we get the full effect of their potential complementarities. Etel’s work does this; 
each one renders the other more complex, all the while building toward a more intricate 
whole. A single mind and sensibility responding to the world in multiple forms and 
media creates a whole that cannot be achieved in any other way.62 
 
In both instances, the suggestion that an awareness of our mediated existence is reserved to 
only those who both write and paint is, of course, highly contentious. However, in 
recognising how ‘each one renders the other more complex’, both Adnan and Swensen 
gesture towards the potentiality of the liminal state ‘betwixt and between’ these distinct yet 
inherently connected creative practices, a perspective further evidenced within Adnan’s later 
assertion that ‘[p]oetry, it is believed, is the revelation of the self. Painting, the revelation of 
the world. But it could also be the other way round’ (34). Despite such claims, it is intriguing 
that Adnan has commented elsewhere: ‘[m]y writing and my paintings do not have a direct 
connection in my mind. But I am sure they influence each other in the measure that 
everything we do is linked to whatever we are.’63 While this may seem contradictory, given 
her various meditations on the inherent connection between her roles as writer and painter, I 
would argue that rather than placing the emphasis on the end product itself and on how this 
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dual perspective of both writer and painter may or may not manifest itself within her work, 
Adnan’s remark here suggests that she is primarily concerned with presenting this process 
and perspective as creatively productive in and of itself.  
 ‘Whatever one’s feelings’, Adnan affirms, ‘the moment of painting is always a 
moment of happiness. […] Hell will belong to the folklore of the past, and suffering will feel 
monstrous, out of place, if we say paradise now, and use our hands’ (28). In this light, much 
like that early review of Pilgrim, we may be inclined to describe Journey as at least as 
‘atavistic and essentially passive, not to say evasive’ as Dillard’s earlier work. For despite 
being punctuated with these ambivalent and interconnecting juxtapositions between the 
mountain and the sea, nature’s beauty and its horror, the practice of painting and the practice 
of writing, Journey’s overriding tone remains one of self-revelation and artistic freedom. If 
we were in any doubt, the closing lines of the essay provide one final reiteration of this 
sentiment: ‘In this unending universe Tamalpais is a miraculous thing, the miracle of matter 
itself: something we can single out, the pyramid of our identity. We are, because it is stable 
and it is ever changing. Our identity is the series of the mountain’s becomings, our peace is 
its stubborn existence’ (63).  
In Transcendentalism in America, Donald N. Koster outlines a number of the 
reservations held by critics of the movement. He cites twentieth-century historian, James 
Truslow Adams, who ‘questions the maturity of a Transcendental doctrine that refuses to 
recognize and to wrestle with the problem of evil’, and traces this same concern back to 
Herman Melville, who could not reconcile the Transcendentalists’ sense of ‘blind optimism 
and its failure to conceive of evil as a positive force operative in a mindless universe’.64 
Melville’s opposition here found its way into his most famous work, Moby-Dick (1851), 
when a ‘sunken-eyed young Platonist’ takes his post on the mast-head and becomes 
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lulled into such an opium-like listlessness of vacant, unconscious reverie […] by the 
blending cadence of waves with thoughts, that at last he loses his identity; takes the 
mystic ocean at his feet for the visible image of that deep, blue, bottomless soul, 
pervading mankind and nature […] In this enchanted mood, thy spirit ebbs away to 
whence it came; becomes diffused through time and space; […] forming at last a part 
of every shore the round globe over. […] Heed it well ye Pantheists!65 
 
In many ways, Adnan’s 2012 collection, Sea and Fog reads as just such an oblique 
meditation on this ‘blending cadence of waves with thoughts’, presenting as it does a series of 
interrelated yet elusive aphorisms inspired by the elements to which Adnan’s title refers. It is 
notable, therefore (as will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three), that Melville’s 
novel is a particularly frequent touchpoint in Adnan’s writing. Indeed, she explicitly asserts 
that ‘[a]s everyone who heard of Melville knows this oft repeated remark: “meditation and 
water are wedded forever.”’66 As will be shown, however, rather than ‘vacant, unconscious 
reverie’, Sea and Fog takes these natural elements as the necessarily shifting base from which 
to interrogate the shadowy sides of human existence. As such, once again, we find those 
many transitional surfaces, those interpenetrating ellipses held in ambivalent tension, here 
constituting a series of separate yet interrelated meditations on war, ecological catastrophe, 
and the limits of language. 
Drawing back to a comparison with Journey, then, what we find in Sea and Fog is the 
counterpoint to the dialectic introduced in that earlier text: the sea’s flux versus the 
mountain’s stability, the unfathomability of war versus the self-affirmation of peace, the 
frustrations of articulating subjective experience versus the ‘pure perception’ of creative 
communitas. These two latter themes are intertwined throughout Sea and Fog, as is indicated 
within the opening lines: ‘[t]he sea. Nothing else. Walls ruptured. Sea. Water tumbling. Oil. 
Transparency. The sea. Field of stirring liquid. Gathering of pouncing waves going to battle’ 
(3). The reading above has already outlined the nexus of ideas that are consistently evoked in 
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relation to the sea, tending towards two overarching strands: those pertaining to language and 
the practice of writing on the one hand, and those evoking memories of Beirut and the Middle 
East on the other. In this light, each of these images reflect this two-fold significance. Framed 
by the context of war, the ruptured walls connote the physical destruction caused by years of 
civil and international unrest. The juxtaposition of oil/transparency gestures towards the 
widely assumed but never officially acknowledged motivation for the West’s intervention in 
the Middle East; the gathering waves ready for battle are indicative of Adnan’s perpetual 
sense of an impending threat in the region. At a more meta level, however, the same lines 
may be read as establishing the formal and stylistic mode of the text: the ruptured walls 
indicative of the text’s desire to break down (or break out) of existing semiotic structures; the 
incongruent movement from oil to transparency anticipating the paradoxical logic that, as we 
shall see, characterises the text. 
If rather oblique in these first lines, this interrelation is taken up once again within the 
later assertion that ‘[w]ater’s iridescence is language. An exchange of blood endangers our 
arteries for this salt, this oil. A privilege’ (6). This ‘exchange of blood’ is still more explicit in 
its foregrounding of war, an allusion that is again presented in relation to oil, acknowledged 
here as ‘a privilege’ to those who desire it – not an entitlement. That this stanza is prefaced 
with the notion that ‘water’s iridescence is language’ is once again indicative of the 
paradoxical associations by which the text is borne along, as an image that highlights the 
beauty of language while equally acknowledging this beauty as that which precludes seeing 
beyond itself. Perhaps to an even greater extent than Dillard’s Pilgrim, then, the elusive 
nature of the text is such that positing any definitive response is to impose a structure that the 
text itself resists. What we can say, however, is that by overlapping seemingly paradoxical 
semantic fields, Adnan generates unexpected connections between apparently disparate 
themes, locating the text’s meaning in the space between these fields of association. In doing 
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so, while often abstract and obscure, Adnan does not flinch from the coexistence of beauty 
and horror. 
It is here that we may reiterate the connection between the dialogical relationship set 
up between these two texts and the ‘bilateral symmetry’ of Pilgrim. On the one hand, Journey 
may be read as analogous to the via positiva perspective, in which the workings of the world 
are laid bare to the beholder in brilliant clarity. On the other, Sea and Fog explores the 
‘darker side’ of this dialectic, through a perspective akin to the via negativa, whereby the 
world’s workings are concealed in essential unknowability. Moreover, like Dillard, I would 
argue that it is this latter perspective by which Adnan is increasingly compelled: 
And we are here, anywhere, so long as space would be. Is given to us sea/ocean, sea 
permanent revelation; open revelation of itself, to itself. Mind approximates those lit 
lines in the front, that darkness above, meant not to understand but to penetrate, to 
silence itself by heightening its power, to reach vision in essential unknowing. 
 
The sun hasn’t set yet and there is no light. O the obscure clarity out of which we are 
made. (35; emphasis added) 
 
A far cry from the revelatory clarity of ‘I know. I know. I know’ on the mountain in Journey, 
this notion of an ‘obscure clarity’, of ‘reaching vision in essential unknowing’ recurs 
throughout Sea and Fog. This idea is set up within the opening pages: 
On a clear day a different kind of clarity starts to be lacking. We face the river. 
 
Oh these walls that surge, building impregnable fortresses, then collapse suddenly, in 
fierce light, and rise further down, in similar though not similar repetition. 
 
And this erratic edge called restless tide changes its geometry, and with urgent, 
terrifying power, covers the flat rocky formations that were here and are no more, 
when waters and foam are so icy that the spine calls for mercy. (7) 
 
Within these three short stanzas, the river becomes analogous to history, with ‘these walls 
that surge’ representing the received ideas of an historical moment which ultimately become 
‘impregnable fortresses’ of accepted knowledge. The sudden collapse of these fortresses may 
therefore signify moments of paradigm shift (‘fierce light’), which, in turn, are themselves 
destined to become ‘impregnable fortresses’ (‘rise further down, in similar though not similar 
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repetition’). The ‘restless tide’ here seems to represent the cyclical nature of these processes, 
with the references to ‘terrifying power’ and ‘water and foam […] so icy that the spine calls 
for mercy’ perhaps articulating a sense of the intellectual and creative paralysis such 
structures inflict. In seeking ‘obscure clarity’, Adnan recognises the potentiality of those 
liminal experiences located ‘betwixt and between’ established structures, whether they be the 
limiting structures of language or the hegemonic structures by which history perpetuates 
itself. This reading is more clearly evidenced later in the text, where Adnan posits that 
‘[p]oetry reaches the unsaid, and leaves it unsaid. It’s familiar, it’s indecently close, 
overpowering at times, as gray as cloudy skies over melancholy mountain ranges; It’s what it 
is, and for ever the question remains about its nature, and why we’re still looking for an 
answer’ (42). 
 The integral relation between Adnan’s lived experience of war and her creative 
practice and the tension between the Beirut of her past and the California of her present will 
be taken up in much greater detail later in this thesis. What this comparative reading of 
Journey and Sea and Fog has established, however, is how the overarching dialectical 
relationship that Adnan’s writings construct between the sea and the mountain provides the 
foundation for her wider poetics of liminality. For Adnan, then, like Emerson before her, the 
experience of poetic creativeness is indeed found in presenting as much transitional surface 
as possible, in the movements between the stability of the mountain (‘sea seen from shore’) 
and the flux of the ocean (‘shore seen from sea’). But more than this, as demonstrated by the 
evolution from Journey to Sea and Fog, Adnan’s liminal poetics develops into a means by 
which she negotiates the ambivalent politics of her own liminal condition. 
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‘THE BLUE OF DISTANCE’: REBECCA SOLNIT’S BLUE WORLD 
In A Field Guide to Getting Lost, Rebecca Solnit muses on the differences between fiction 
and non-fiction. She asserts that whereas ‘fiction like painting lets you start with a blank 
canvas’, nonfiction presents the ‘challenge of finding form and pattern in the stuff already out 
there’.67 This challenge of finding connections between seemingly disparate subject materials 
is taken up across Solnit’s body of work and nowhere more so than in the two texts focused 
on within the final section of this chapter: A Field Guide to Getting Lost (2006) and The 
Faraway Nearby (2013). The analysis below will argue that one of the primary ways in 
which the narratives of these two texts are held together is through their liminal poetics. It 
will contend that, like the other texts discussed in this chapter, this liminal poetics manifests 
itself in both the form and the content of these two works, in such a way that we may read 
The Faraway Nearby as a companion text to the earlier Field Guide, and understand both as 
establishing a politics of liminality that resonates throughout Solnit’s wider body of work. 
The first half of Field Guide’s opening chapter, entitled ‘Open Door’, sets up two 
‘arts’ of getting lost. The first pertains to a mode that requires an acute knowledge of the 
landscape: ‘attending to weather, to the route you take, to the landmarks along the way, […] 
to the thousand things that make the wild a text that can be read by the literate’ (10). Solnit 
celebrates this ability, acknowledging it as ‘the language of the earth itself’, and lamenting 
the fact that many now ‘don’t stop to read it’ (10). It is notable that she sees this ability as 
particularly prevalent in the ‘nineteenth-century Americans [who] seldom seem to have 
gotten lost’, on account of the fact that they ‘knew how to live off the land, how to track, how 
to navigate by heavenly bodies, waterways, and word-of-mouth in those places before they 
were mapped’ (13). Of course, as we have seen, it is exactly this ability that we see manifest 
                                                          
67 Rebecca Solnit, A Field Guide to Getting Lost (Edinburgh: Canongate, 2006), pp. 143-44. This text will from 
here be referred to as simply Field Guide. 
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in The Maine Woods, a text in which Thoreau’s surveyor’s perspective is all-pervasive and is 
particularly apparent in his painstaking attention to ‘names and distances, [provided] for the 
benefit of future tourists’, his ‘entire faith in the compass’, and his claim that, when lost, ‘a 
stranger […] must set about a voyage of discovery first of all to find the river’.68 Solnit 
mentions Thoreau specifically, in fact, alongside Daniel Boone and Lewis and Clark, citing 
his assertion that ‘[n]ot till we are lost, in other words, not till we have lost the world, do we 
begin to find ourselves, and realize where we are and the infinite extent of our relations’.69 
However, by qualifying his claim ‘in other words’, Thoreau reveals his underlying sentiment: 
that to be productively lost is to position oneself outside the world and its complications – or, 
indeed, its obligations. While this issue is not explicitly raised by Solnit, she identifies 
‘another art in being at home in the unknown, so that being in its midst isn’t cause for panic 
or suffering’ (10). Despite recognising its indebtedness to a Thoreauvian aesthetic, then, it is 
this second dynamic that runs throughout Field Guide; a dynamic through which Solnit sets 
into dialogue not only those liminal wilderness experiences that may be found in retreating to 
the periphery, but also those that lie at the heart of contemporary existence.  
 That Field Guide constitutes a departure from an underlying rhetoric of control which 
seems to characterise conventional wilderness narratives is made apparent in the second half 
of the opening chapter. The section opens with a question from Meno: “How will you go 
about finding that thing the nature of which is totally unknown to you?” (15) Solnit 
acknowledges this as a question that she pondered ‘for years and years’, one which remained 
unanswered until, at a time ‘when everything was going wrong, friends came bearing stories 
[that] seemed to provide, if not answers, at least milestones and signposts’ (15). Solnit relays 
these stories: the Virginia Woolf extract sent by a friend that reminded her of Woolf’s ‘urgent 
                                                          
68 The Maine Woods, p. 36. 
69 Walden, p. 217. 
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need, to become no one and anyone’ and her ability to do so ‘in a stroll down the street’ (16); 
the story of the Wintu community for whom, as a result of conceiving space in relation to the 
cardinal directions as opposed to left and right, ‘the self only exists in reference to the rest of 
the world’ and for whom ‘it’s the world that’s stable, yourself that’s contingent, that’s 
nothing apart from its surroundings’ (17). She tells the story of a tattoo artist who was 
hospitalised as a result of his drug addiction, a stay that saw him lose his arm and with it his 
craft, but that cured him of his addiction, and  describes his leaving hospital as ‘as abrupt and 
overwhelming an emergence into the world as birth’ (20). The final story presents ‘the 
blindfolded figure of Justice holding the scales’, which, in Solnit’s rendering, suggests that 
‘to reside in comfort can be to fall by the wayside’; that one must ‘go to hell, but keep 
moving once you get there, come out the other side’ (21). As will be drawn out below, then, 
these stories present in microcosm the thematic threads of balance, rebirth and reciprocity 
running throughout the text. What is more, in relaying the stories that others have told her, 
Solnit draws the reader into the reciprocal dynamic that the stories themselves foreground. 
That dialogical relationships lie at the heart of this text is more readily apparent within the 
closing passages of Field Guide’s opening chapter. Drawing back to Meno’s question, Solnit 
acknowledges her expectation that in its original the question would be posed as ‘part of a 
collection of aphorisms or fragments, like the fragments of Heraclitus’ (23). Yet in returning 
to the original, Solnit finds that Meno is, in fact, ‘the title of one of Plato’s dialogues’ (23). In 
this juxtaposition between the Heraclitus fragments – which themselves, as has been noted 
previously, explore the inherent ‘unity of opposites’ – and Plato’s ‘rigged boxing contests’, 
Solnit gestures once again towards her resistance to forms of rhetorical control (23). For, of 
course, Plato’s dialogues are not the ‘Open Door’ that the chapter’s title suggests. In Solnit’s 
memory, and much like Dillard’s notion of ‘resounding like a beaten bell’, Meno’s question 
resounded, ‘like a bell whose reverberations hang on the air’; a reverberating note that, Solnit 
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suggests, the contrived logic of the Platonic dialogues ‘seems determined to stop’ (24). 
Through this analogy, Solnit articulates her belief that ‘some questions are more significant 
than their answers […] It is not, after all, really a question about whether you can know the 
unknown, arrive in it, but how to go about looking for it, how to travel’ (24). It is on such a 
journey, then, an exploration of that liminal space between destinations and their origins, 
questions and their answers, that Solnit’s Field Guide takes us; a journey in which mystery, 
to use a term favoured by both Dillard and Solnit, becomes its own ‘kind of compass’ (25).  
 If the leap here between dialogue, the dialogical and the text’s liminal perspective is a 
somewhat abstract theme running throughout the opening chapter of Field Guide, its second 
chapter addresses this theme more explicitly. It is here that Solnit introduces us to ‘The Blue 
of Distance’ that serves as the title for each alternate chapter. The phrase refers to the 
phenomenon of perspective that causes everything at the horizon to be tinged by a ‘deeper, 
dreamier, melancholy blue’ (29). As Solnit acknowledges, this is ‘the color of where you can 
never go’, for this blue is not found in the faraway place itself but is the colour of ‘there seen 
from here, […] in the atmospheric distance between you and the mountains’ (28-9). Solnit 
sees this colour, this distance, as ‘inherent to the human condition’ and later describes it as 
one which ‘comes with time, with the discovery of melancholy, of loss, the texture of 
longing, of the complexity of the terrain we traverse, and the years of travel’ (29, 39). She 
continues: ‘If sorrow and beauty are all tied up together, then perhaps maturity brings with it 
not what [Gary] Nabhan calls abstraction, but an aesthetic sense that partially redeems the 
losses time brings and finds beauty in the faraway’ (40). The four ‘Blue of Distance’ 
chapters, then, become liminal textual spaces within the wider narrative, through which 
Solnit explores this ‘aesthetic sense’, developed not through a distancing from but a 
prolonged engagement with the trials and tribulations of the material world.  
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 While never framed in such terms, liminal spaces, characters and experiences 
permeate the Field Guide. In the second chapter, for instance, Solnit discusses the term shul, 
a Tibetan word which refers to ‘the impression of something that used to be there’: a path, a 
footprint, or – for Solnit – the middle name she inherited from her great-grandmother and 
dropped in her teens, that now exists only as ‘the blank space between [her] names’ (62; 
emphasis added). Later in the text, Solnit describes conversations with an ex-partner as 
‘words filling up the narrow space between us, as much a buffer as a link’ (130). And in the 
penultimate chapter, Solnit muses on the fact that ‘it is the unsurpassingly brief intervals of 
darkness between each luminous image that make [movies] possible’, and likewise that ‘a 
runner’s every step is a leap, so that for a moment he or she is entirely off the ground’ (175). 
While these images serve to extend the scope of the liminal aesthetic running through the 
text, perhaps the most intriguing of them are those that engage with the concept of liminality 
in its original sense, as the central phase of a rite de passage.  
The clearest example of this is the motif of metamorphosis recurring throughout the 
text, presented primarily through the image of the caterpillar emerging from the chrysalis as a 
butterfly. This motif is first introduced in the closing passage of the second ‘Blue of 
Distance’ chapter. Perhaps surprisingly, however, the analogy precedes the original image: 
Some people inherit values and practices as a house they inhabit; some of us have to 
burn down that house, find our own ground, build from scratch, even as a 
psychological metamorphosis. As a cultural metamorphosis the transition is far more 
dramatic.  
The people thrown into other cultures go through something of the anguish of the 
butterfly, whose body must disintegrate and reform more than once in its life cycle. 
[…] We have not much language to appreciate this phase of decay, […] nor of the 
violence of the metamorphosis, which is often spoken of as though it were as graceful 
as a flower blooming. (80-1)  
 
It is this observation that motivates Solnit – during ‘a free hour in between a conversation and 
an obligation’ (81) – to visit a butterfly garden close to her home, where she watches four 
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butterflies emerge from their chrysalises. Having described the metamorphic process before 
her, however, the dynamic switches once more, and the analogy is reinstated:  
The strange resonant word instar describes the stage between two successive molts […] 
It remains a caterpillar as it goes through these molts, but no longer one in the same 
skin. There are rituals marking such splits, graduations, indoctrinations, ceremonies of 
change, though most changes proceed without such clear and encouraging recognition. 
Instar implies something both celestial and ingrown, something heavenly and 
disastrous, and perhaps change is commonly like that, a buried star, oscillating between 
near and far. (83; emphases added). 
 
The instar, described as such, is the liminal analogy par excellence. Indeed, Turner himself 
remarks that ‘an apt analogy for the rite de passage would be […] a pupa changing from bug 
to moth’, and so the image of the instar, along with the references to ‘rituals’ and ‘ceremonies 
of change’, suggests that this passage is perhaps a conscious allusion to van Gennep and 
Turner’s seminal works.70 While it is easy to identify this liminal motif running throughout 
the text, however, it is not, of course, simply the proliferation of these images that constitute 
the text’s progressive poetics of liminality. What is most striking about Solnit’s work is its 
ability to create these seamless transitions between natural analogies and their real-world 
implications primarily through the incorporation of this liminal aesthetic within, between and 
across her diverse body of work. More significant still, given the context of this thesis, is 
Solnit’s ability to reintegrate, as it were, a Transcendentalist idealism into the most unlikely 
spaces.  
Field Guide’s fifth chapter, ‘Abandon’, is an exemplar of this dynamic. Positioned as 
the pivotal fifth chapter of this nine-chapter text, it recalls Solnit’s ‘coming of age in the 
heyday of punk’, a cultural moment in which she recognises that she was ‘living at the end of 
something’ (88). Having established the concept of the instar only a few pages earlier, 
‘Abandon’ immediately encapsulates both the personal and cultural rites de passage that this 
                                                          
70 Victor W. Turner, ‘Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period of Rites de Passage’, The Proceedings of the 
American Ethnological Society (1964), Symposium on New Approaches to the Study of Religion, pp. 4-20 (p. 
4). 
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analogy gestures towards. Various rites of passage shape this section of the narrative: Solnit’s 
own ‘coming of age’; the seemingly failed rite of passage of Solnit’s close friend, Marine; the 
cultural rite of passage initiated by punk culture; the spatial rite of passage of the city left 
over to ruin; indeed, the textual rite of passage of the narrative itself as it traverses this pivotal 
point of its nine-part structure. It is telling, therefore, that this chapter represents a rhetorical 
collision, with Transcendentalist tropes of fecundity seamlessly reincorporated as a means of 
articulating these various liminal phases (88): ‘Before and after, landscapes rural and wild 
would be the places that resonated most powerfully for me, but for the decade that started 
with my discovery of punk it was cities’ (90). Yet Solnit undermines this distinction between 
the natural and the urban: ‘[w]hat’, she questions, ‘is a ruin, after all? It is a human 
construction abandoned to nature, and one of the allures of ruins in the city is that of 
wilderness. […] Ruins become the unconscious of a city, its memory, unknown, darkness, 
lost lands, and in this truly bring it to life’ (88-9). Drawing this analogy out further still, 
Solnit asserts that, ‘like ruins, the social can become a wilderness in which the soul too 
becomes wild, seeking beyond itself, beyond its imagination’ (90-1). Here, then, Solnit 
expands the Transcendentalist view of the natural world as an emblem of human 
consciousness, proposing that, in our contemporary context, urban ruins, both literally and 
analogously, become the dialogical counterpart of the natural world. This view is further 
evidenced later in the chapter, within Solnit’s assertion that ‘the time was about this kind of 
place, one that was ruinous, bleak, but somehow still imbued with a romantic outlaw sense of 
possibility, freedom, even the freedom to be idealistic, idealistic in the bitter vein of the Sex 
Pistols’ “No Future”, perhaps, but idealistic all the same’ (105). But rather than simply stated 
in abstraction, this notion of the social-as-wilderness and of death as the necessary 
counterpart of beauty is borne out through the story of Marine, a close friend of Solnit upon 
whose premature death the chapter centres.  
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Implicitly aligned with Persephone, a figure who, Solnit suggests, ‘knew that to be 
truly alive death had to be part of the picture just as winter must’, Marine represents ‘the 
glamour of a turbulent world [Solnit] was never quite part of’ (91). But, more than this, 
Marine is an artist; a musician in possession of a talent ‘utterly alien’ to Solnit (97). That 
Marine holds a wider symbolic significance may be read in the fact that Solnit often describes 
her through tripartite structures: ‘Three things define her for me, her beauty, her talent, and 
her mercurial disposition’, and later, more notably, ‘[p]erhaps rather than describe her as 
three characteristics, I could describe her as three places: the suburbs that made us and that 
we scorned and fled, the urban night she made into a home of sorts, and the pastoral world of 
a lyrical European culture and maybe of the hills past our childhood backyards’ (96, 98). This 
last spatial structure, I would argue, alludes to Marine’s layered function within the text. For 
while Marine herself never moves beyond ‘the urban night’ (she is found dead on her 
mother’s wedding night, aligning her once again with a rite of passage), her death is 
presented as the catalyst for Solnit’s own reintegration: ‘[e]verything had changed for me in 
the couple of years that ended with Marine’s death […] I lost a whole life and gained another 
one, more open and more free’ (107).  
While ‘Abandon’ reincorporates a Transcendentalist sensibility into the urban 
landscapes so often eschewed by Solnit’s nineteenth-century antecedents, this is not to say 
that Field Guide excludes the more recognisable liminal experiences found in those earlier 
texts. Indeed, Solnit herself remarks: ‘Though I think of the 1980s as my most urban phase, 
Marine and I, who had both grown up in that suburban country of beautiful hills, kept one 
foot in the rural or the wild, for that direction was also an escape’ (107). Several such escapes 
are depicted within Field Guide, including her time spent in the Mojave Desert: ‘Once I loved 
a man who was a lot like the desert, and before that I loved the desert. It wasn’t particular 
things but the space between them, that abundance of absence, that is the desert’s invitation’ 
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(129; emphasis added). Solnit wonders how one ‘could give all this up for what cities and 
people have to offer, for it ought to be less terrible to be lonely than to have stepped out of 
this sense of a symbolic order that the world of animals and celestial light offers’ (133). She 
concludes that the essential difference between these differing wilderness experiences relates 
to solitude: ‘[s]olitude in the city is about the lack of other people […] but in remote places it 
isn’t an absence but the presence of something else, a kind of humming silence in which 
solitude seems as natural to your species as to any other, words strange rocks you may or may 
not have to turn over’ (131). Despite this assertion of the essentially solitary nature of these 
experiences, however, by highlighting the reciprocity between her time in the desert and the 
relationship that punctuated her time there (and the fact that she chooses this desert 
experience rather than her time spent ‘in other deserts’ (131)), Solnit reiterates the social-as-
wilderness analogy set up in the earlier ‘Abandon’. Moreover, the chapter is once again 
framed as a rite of passage. Solnit remarks in its closing passages on how she ‘came out of 
this house transformed, stronger and surer than I had been, and carrying with me more 
knowledge of myself, of men, of love, of deserts and of wildernesses’ (136). As she so 
admires in Thoreau, then, Solnit, too, is a writer ‘for whom life and wilderness and meaning 
are the same art, who slips subtly from one to the other in the course of a sentence’ (14). 
Through storytelling, Field Guide reimagines the function of wilderness in the cultural 
imagination. Most pertinent to this chapter, however, is the way in which this is achieved 
through the combination of two liminal discourses: a Transcendentalist notion of the creative 
potentiality of liminal spaces, articulated through and engaging with the rhetoric of personal, 
cultural and textual rites of passage. 
If Field Guide may be read as essentially outward-facing, presenting the evolving 
cultural imagination through personal storytelling, The Faraway Nearby may be understood 
as taking the opposite trajectory, as ultimately inward-facing, navigating personal trauma via 
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wider public events. For lying at the heart of this text is the very private story of a woman 
coming to terms with the death of her mother; a woman facing her own mortality. As such, 
The Faraway Nearby is, at root, ‘the history of an emergency’.71 Several elements of the text 
point towards a specific connection between these two texts. Like Field Guide, whose 
alternating chapters mirror the dialogical relationships constructed throughout the text, the 
chapter structure of The Faraway Nearby reflects the central rite de passage traversed within 
the narrative. In a more explicit way than Dillard’s Pilgrim, Solnit presents the ‘bilateral 
symmetry’ of the experience: the chapters unfold – ‘Apricots’, ‘Mirrors’, ‘Ice’, ‘Flight’, 
‘Breath’, ‘Wound’ – towards a central fulcrum, or ‘Knot’, in which Solnit faces her own 
cancer diagnosis, before the second half – initiated by ‘Unwound’ – travels back to its 
beginnings, ending, as it began, with ‘Apricots’. As the pivotal shift from ‘Wound’ to 
‘Unwound’ highlights, however, this movement is not a regression but, as in Turner’s model, 
a reintegration. While Solnit suggests that the text takes its title from the phrase used by 
Georgia O’Keeffe when signing off letters to her loved ones back in New York when moving 
to New Mexico – ‘from the faraway nearby’ (108) – I would argue that, although this may be 
the origin of the specific phrase, the title relates more specifically to an analogy that runs 
throughout Field Guide, occurring perhaps most notably in the following two instances: ‘in 
this world we actually live in, distance ceases to be distance and to be blue once we arrive in 
it. The far becomes near, and they are not the same place’ (35); and ‘perhaps change is 
commonly like that, a buried star, oscillating between near and far’ (83). This dialogical 
relationship between the near and the faraway, then, aligned as it is with ‘The Blue of 
Distance’ and the instar, reiterates the liminal motif that runs through Solnit’s writing, and 
draws a specific connection between these two texts. 
                                                          
71 Rebecca Solnit, The Faraway Nearby (London: Granta, 2013), p. 249. 
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As in Field Guide, the importance of storytelling is a central theme running 
throughout The Faraway Nearby. The opening chapter begins:  
What’s your story? It’s all in the telling. Stories are compasses and architecture; we 
navigate by them […] and to be without a story is to be lost in the vastness of the world 
that spreads in all directions. […] To love someone is to put yourself in their place, we 
say, which is put yourself in their story, or figure out how tell yourself their story. 
Which means that a place is a story, and stories are geography, and empathy is first 
of all an act of imagination, a storyteller’s art, and then a way of travelling from here to 
there. (3) 
 
This opening paragraph picks up where Field Guide left off, tracing the dialogical 
relationship between landscape and love (conceived in its broadest sense) through the art of 
storytelling; a relationship that is further reiterated in the ticker-tape text that runs along the 
bottom of each page:  
Moths drink the tears of sleeping birds. This is the title of a short scientific report from 
2006, […] but the title is a sentence, and the sentence reads like a ballad of one line or a 
history compressed down to the barest essentials. There are two protagonists in it, a 
sleeper and drinker, a giver and a taker, and what are tears to the former is food to the 
latter. The story tells us everything we ever wanted a story to tell. There is difference. 
There is contact. (3-9) 
 
The interaction between these passages – the main body of the text and the single line of text 
running along the bottom of the page – set, quite literally, into dialogue on the page, 
articulates not only the philosophical perspective of this text but the philosophical perspective 
that resonates throughout Solnit’s body of work; a perspective which, I would argue, may be 
understood as a reimagining of the following much-quoted passage of The Maine Woods:  
I stand in awe of my body, this matter to which I am bound has become strange to me. I 
fear not spirits, ghosts, of which I am one, […] but I fear bodies, I tremble to meet 
them. […] Think of our life in nature, - daily to be shown matter, to come in contact 
with it – rocks, trees, wind on our cheeks! the solid earth! the actual world! the 
common sense! Contact! Contact! Who are we? where are we?72 
  
Here, alone in the wilderness, detached from his own corporality and contemplating others 
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with fear and trembling, Thoreau is, indeed, ‘lost in the vastness of the world’ (3). For, as 
Solnit suggests, it is only through the act of storytelling, through the dialogical relationship 
we set up between both the places and the people around us, that this vastness becomes 
navigable. In many ways, this is an inversion of – and, I would argue, a challenge to – a more 
conventional Transcendentalist liminal aesthetic that locates, to use Emerson’s phrase once 
more, ‘power […] in the moment of transition’, and that suggests that the productive liminal 
experience lies beyond the social.73 My argument here is borne out more explicitly towards 
the end of The Faraway Nearby. Commenting on the pervasive concern of postmodern 
culture that ‘every experience was mediated [and] some pristine direct experience had fled’, 
Solnit claims that such an anxiety is ultimately bogus in its assumption that ‘it were not part 
of the world worth looking at […] as though you could be outside, and outside was a 
desirable place’ (191). ‘The real question,’ Solnit concludes, ‘was the caliber of what was 
mediating experience, and how much you’re cognizant of it’ (191). Significantly, the 
metaphor Solnit employs to explore her point here, is conversation: 
With practice, you can pause the conversation, in your head and around you, but exiting 
is not an option; it is you; and if you’re lucky, you’re it, participating in making this 
tangible and immaterial world around us and within you. […] You digest an idea or an 
ethic as though it was bread, and like bread it becomes part of you. Out of all this 
comes your contribution to the making of the world, your sentences in the ongoing 
interchange. The tragedy of the imprisoned, the unemployed, the disenfranchised, and 
the marginalized is to be silenced in this great ongoing conversation, this symphony 
that is another way to describe the world. (192) 
 
I would argue that this passage may also be fruitfully read alongside Emerson’s ‘transparent 
eye-ball’ passage. What is more, the rhetoric of communion here – ‘like bread it becomes 
part of you’ – reincorporates the Transcendentalist trope of becoming ‘part and particle of 
God’ through these liminal experiences, but in such a way that foregrounds reciprocal 
communication (etymologically linked, of course, with communion) as opposed to patriarchal 
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dominion. Moreover, Solnit’s conspicuous foregrounding of the hegemonic structures 
underpinning this ‘tangible and immaterial world’; her acknowledgement that ‘some of us 
have far more latitude than others’; and assertion that ‘the tragedy of […] the marginalized is 
to be silenced in this great ongoing conversation’, undermine Emerson’s individualist notion 
that ‘nothing can befall me in life’ (192). This shift, in which the central metaphor switches 
from one of passive witness to active participant, is perhaps the most tangible realisation of 
the dynamic between the seeing and the saying so central to Emerson’s philosophy. 
‘Empathy,’ Solnit posits, ‘means that you travel out of yourself a little or expand’ (194). For, 
in empathising with others, ‘you haven’t only witnessed something but also translated it into 
your own experience; you have felt with and for that other’ (194). In its closing passages, The 
Faraway Nearby ends where Field Guide begins:  
Listen: you are not yourself, you are crowds of others. The usual I we are given has all 
the tidy containment of the kind of character the realist novel specialises in and none of 
the porousness of our every waking moment. […] Essayists too face the temptation of a 
neat ending, that point where you bring the boat to shore and tie it to the dock and give 
up the wide sea. […] What if we only wanted openings, the immortality of the 
unfinished, the uncut thread, the incomplete, the open door, and the open sea? The 
quest is the holy grail, the ocean itself is the mysterious elixir, and if you’re lucky you 
realize it before you dock at the cup in the chapel. (248-9). 
 
Here, then, we come full circle to the pilgrimage analogy set up in the earlier readings of this 
chapter and the anti-teleological perspective shared by all of the writers considered here that, 
to quote Emerson, ‘everything good is on the highway’.74 It is significant, though, that in 
drawing specific attention to her belief that ‘you are not yourself, you are crowds of others’, 
Solnit asks us in the same moment to take a decisive step away from the self-reliant 
individualism which tends to come hand-in-hand with such ideas of perpetual becoming. As 
will be further evidenced throughout the chapters that follow, the dialectical relationship 
between selfhood and community, or, to use another Emersonian construct, between the ME 
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and the NOT ME is a central preoccupation of Solnit’s writings. As we have seen, this 
perspective is reflected within her evolving poetics of liminality, through which Solnit invites 
us to explore that liminal space between the here and there, between the question and its 
answer. 
 
‘A RUPTURE IN THE CONVERSATION’: DIALOGICAL TACTICS IN GILEAD (2004) AND HOME 
(2008) 
Extending the themes of conversation raised in the reading of Solnit above, this final section 
explores the dialogical tactics that Robinson employs within her ‘coqual’ novels, Gilead 
(2004) and Home (2008). While the readings above have focused primarily on the parallels 
that may be drawn to Emersonian and Thoreauvian liminal experiences in the natural 
landscape, this discussion takes as a point of departure Robinson’s own acknowledgement 
that through her writing she is ‘consciously trying to participate in the conversation’ 
advanced by her nineteenth-century forebears which she ‘felt had been dropped’ by 
intervening generations. 75  Extending this theme of intergenerational dialogue – and 
specifically Robinson’s reference to Emerson, Thoreau, Melville and Emily Dickinson as ‘the 
old aunts and uncles’ to whom she ‘will always answer’ – the discussion recognises in turn 
Emerson’s own indebtedness to his forebears, and particularly his aunt, Mary Moody 
Emerson, whose belief in ‘dialogic self-cultivation’ influenced a generation of 
Transcendentalist thinkers.76 In doing so, the discussion reveals a number of striking parallels 
between Waldo’s aunt and Robinson, thus adding another intriguing layer to the multiple 
shifting genealogies that this reading examines within and across the two Gilead novels.  
                                                          
75 Tace Hedrick and Marilynne Robinson, ‘Interviews with Marilynne Robinson: On Influence and 
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In addition to this overarching dialogical analogy, the analysis also draws upon 
Robinson’s claim that what most interests her about these nineteenth-century New England 
writers is the way in which they ‘create models of understanding and then destroy them, so 
that the larger apprehension you get is the inadequacy of any particular apprehension’.77 
Extending her thinking further in a 1994 interview with Thomas Schaub, Robinson 
recognises 
an Emersonian method which is based on the assumption of the inadequacy of the 
method. That’s what’s so brilliant about it. You can create an absolutely dazzling 
metaphor that seems to be resolving things and pulling things together and reconciling 
things and making sense of things, and then you can collapse the metaphor and what 
you’re left with is an understanding that’s larger than you had before, but finally it is a 
legitimate understanding because you know it’s wrong or you know it’s imperfectly 
partial. […] There’s always the drift toward self-invited order in language that makes 
resolutions that are too neat or too small or beside the point. This is what happens 
most of the time with most attempts to deal with anything in language.78 
 
Robinson posits that, for her, ‘the pleasure [of this method] is that what it is, whatever we are, 
whatever is passing between us, there is something passing between us, there’s some kind of 
conversation’. 79  Much like Dillard, Adnan and Solnit, Robinson here recognises (to use 
Adnan’s terms) our capacity to ‘reach vision in essential unknowing’. Yet Robinson believes 
that even this process ultimately amounts to only ‘snagging a bit of reality’, in that we 
converse not so much with each other but with a totality that neither of us – nor any of us, for 
that matter – can ever fully access.80 Below, I explore how this notion of ‘conversing with 
totality’ – as Schaub succinctly phrases it – is borne out within Robinson’s Gilead novels. I 
argue that this idea is integral to Robinson’s liminal poetics, and that the many overlapping 
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conversations that she constructs within and across the two novels may be read as a means by 
which she creates ‘as much transitional surface as possible’ within her writings.  
The analysis begins by recognising the series of intergenerational dialogues that 
Robinson constructs between the four generations of Gilead, contending that this layering of 
voices – both within and beyond the novels – functions much like Moody Emerson’s practice 
of commonplacing. For just as Noelle Baker describes Moody Emerson’s Almanacks as a 
space in which she ‘chases her own evolving truth’ by engaging with ‘both real and 
imaginary interlocutors’, so too do the Gilead novels set up a ‘stimulating dialogic zone’ in 
which Robinson ‘engages with the […] theological, political, and philosophical debates’ of 
her time.81 Recognising the parallel that may be drawn between this practice and the idea of 
‘conversing with totality’, I argue that this mode is particularly significant in terms of the 
relationship between the two novels, in that by presenting the same narrative events from 
alternative perspectives Robinson affords the narrative its own ‘evolving truth’, located 
somewhere between the two texts, and thus only partially accessible to the reader. In doing 
so, the analysis both draws back to the productive ambivalence between the known and the 
unknown already examined within this chapter in relation to Dillard, Adnan and Solnit, and 
anticipates the intersubjective models discussed within Chapter Two. 
As the introduction to this chapter has already acknowledged, Mary Moody Emerson 
was a strong believer in ‘dialogic self-cultivation’. Moody Emerson transferred this belief 
into the commonplace books that she produced throughout her lifetime, which were described 
by her nephew, Edward Bliss Emerson, as having ‘the effect of a letter; for it is as much like 
conversation, in the true sense of the term’.82 With this in mind, let us consider the opening 
section of Gilead which begins with a conversation between two unidentified interlocutors: 
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I told you last night that I might be gone sometime, and you said, Where, and I said, To 
be with the Good Lord, and you said, Why, and I said, Because I’m old, and you said, I 
don’t think you’re old. […] It seems ridiculous to suppose the dead miss anything. If 
you’re a grown man when you read this – it is my intention for this letter that you will 
read it then – I’ll have been gone a long time.83 
 
Like the other texts considered within this chapter, then, these opening lines foreground the 
liminal contexts that underpin the novel as a whole. It soon becomes clear that what we are 
reading here is a letter from a dying father to his son. Within the context of the novel, 
however, this letter reads as not only a communication from father to son, but also man to 
man, its voice simultaneously anticipating its own imminent death and projecting itself many 
years into the future. These genealogical lines are further skewed due to the relative ages of 
Ames and his son. For while, objectively speaking, Ames is only one generation removed 
from Robert, the great gulf between their ages is such that he seems to function as 
simultaneously father and grandfather to the young boy. 
In Toward a Female Genealogy of Transcendentalism, Jana L. Argersinger and 
Phyllis Cole recognise not only the vertical genealogies by which knowledge is passed down 
through generations, but – taking up Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizomatic metaphor – the lateral 
routes via which knowledge circulated throughout New England communities in the mid-
nineteenth century. ‘Relationality’, Cole contends, ‘might become a term more apropos than 
influence or lineage.’84 As is apparent within the opening lines cited above, the coexistence of 
these vertical and lateral genealogies is integral to Robinson’s Gilead novels. Ames’s letter to 
his son (which constitutes the entirety of Gilead) traces at least four generations of that small 
Midwest town, and in particular two families whose men have served as the town’s 
clergymen since it was first settled. As Jason W. Stevens acknowledges, Gilead is 
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characterised as ‘a barren town from which many of the young seem to have moved on’; as 
Ames recalls his brother stating very late in the narrative: ‘looking back on Gilead from any 
distance made it seem a relic, an archaism’ (268).85  Yet, as Stevens goes on to contend, there 
are many ways in which Gilead may be read as ‘an embarrassment to the complacencies of 
the present and a challenge, for those who remember the town’s heroic past, to recover their 
forebears’ prophetic fire’.86 This last image is an allusion to the hope Ames expresses in the 
final pages of the novel that ‘it is all an ember now, and the good Lord will surely someday 
breathe it into flame again’ (281). Given Robinson’s own acknowledgement of her intention 
to ‘consciously participate in a conversation’ that had been ventured by her nineteenth-
century antecedents and then dropped by an intervening generation, this characterisation of 
the town as a space of shifting genealogies and forgotten hopes warrants closer scrutiny.  
Considered within this context, the many striking parallels that may be drawn 
between Ames and Waldo Emerson are worth exploring. Like Emerson, Ames is born into a 
family at the centre of his community and follows in the ecclesiastical footsteps of his 
forefathers, a tradition towards which he often exhibits ambivalence. Like Emerson, Ames 
works through these ambivalences via informal dialogue with respected friends – his nightly 
porch conversations with Boughton reminiscent of those late night meetings of Concord’s 
Transcendental Club. Both record their thinking in tome upon tome of acutely observed 
prose, driven by their desire to leave something for a future generation. Indeed, even more 
specific parallels emerge when we consider their personal histories: both men marry young 
and are heavily impacted by the loss of their first wife and child, and both are asked to 
become godfather to a friend’s son as a direct result of this loss (Emerson to William James 
and Ames to Jack Boughton). As such (and here the chiming of Ames/Emerson, 
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Robbie/Robinson is rather inviting), we might read the text as not only Robert’s familial 
inheritance but also Robinson’s cultural inheritance. Yet to complicate these intersecting 
genealogies further still, another layer is added when we consider Robinson’s position as 
author of the text, in that we may say she functions as simultaneously addressee and speaker, 
such that the text sets the cycle in motion once more, and the reader is drawn into its ongoing 
conversation.  
That the interplay between these vertical and lateral genealogies is of particular 
importance to Robinson is indicated very early in the narrative. Ames remarks: 
Your mother told you I was writing your begats, and you seemed very pleased with 
the idea. Well, then. What should I record for you? I, John Ames, was born in the 
Year of Our Lord 1880 in the state of Kansas, the son of John Ames and Martha 
Turner Ames, grandson of John Ames and Margaret Todd Ames. At this writing I 
have lived seventy-six years, seventy-four of them here in Gilead, Iowa, excepting 
study at the college and at seminary. 
 And what else should I tell you? (10) 
 
With this objective account of his life and ancestry established, the very next line enters into 
the story of when Ames’s father took him to the grave of his grandfather. Here, within the 
opening pages of this most geographically anchored of texts, Robinson relates as clear an 
example of pilgrimage as any considered elsewhere in this chapter. Ames remembers his 
father as being ‘set on finding that grave despite any hardship’, and recalls moments in which 
he ‘truly believed they might just wander off and die’ (12). Indeed, Ames recalls his father’s 
claim that they ‘were like Abraham and Isaac on the way to Mount Moriah’ (12). The 
makeshift cemetery that they find at the end of this arduous journey is presented as the most 
liminal of spaces, a ‘half row’ of grave markers ‘swamped with brown grass’ at the edge of 
an overgrown road – ‘the incompleteness of it seemed sad to me’, remarks Ames (13). As the 
sun sets the following evening, having spent hours ‘putting things to rights’, Ames and his 
father stand alongside his grandfather’s grave and bow their heads in prayer: 
Every prayer seemed long to me at that age, I was truly bone tired. I tried to keep my 
eyes closed, but after a while I had to look around a little. At first I thought I saw the 
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sun setting in the east; I knew where east was, because the sun was just over the 
horizon when we got there that morning. Then I realized that what I saw was a full 
moon rising just as the sun was going down. Each of them was standing on its edge, 
with the most wonderful light between them. It seemed as if you could touch it, as if 
there were palpable currents of light passing back and forth, or as if there were great 
taut skeins of light suspended between them. […] They seemed to float on the horizon 
for quite a long time, I suppose because they were both so bright you couldn’t get a 
clear look at them. And that grave, and my father and I, were exactly between them. 
(17) 
 
No more comment is made at this point in the narrative as to the enduring significance of this 
experience, but later Ames recalls ‘what sweet strength’ he felt in this moment, and how he 
has ‘rarely felt joy like that, and assurance’ (56). He continues: ‘[i]t was like one of those 
dreams where you’re filled with some extravagant feeling you might never have in life […] 
and you learn from it what an amazing instrument you are, so to speak, what a power you 
have to experience beyond anything you might ever actually need’ (55-6). I would argue that 
this episode has a threefold significance within the context of this discussion. Firstly, we find 
here another exemplar of the liminal experience in nature, the effects of which parallel 
particularly closely with Dillard’s experience of seeing ‘the tree with the lights in it’ 
discussed earlier in this chapter: the recognition of the self as ‘an amazing instrument’, the 
ambiguous sense of power that such recognition affords the self, and the fact that this 
experience is not framed in explicitly theological terms, for example. Yet this is not the usual 
image of solitary self-affirmation. Quite the opposite, in fact, as Robinson draws specific 
attention to the shared nature of this vision, a ‘miracle’ (as Ames describes it) which throws 
its light simultaneously across three generations (55). Extending this reading further, and with 
her earlier comments in mind, we may draw an analogy here to Robinson’s own 
intergenerational conversation with her nineteenth-century antecedents. For not only does this 
conspicuous shift from a sun setting in the east to a moon rising from that direction reflect 
Robinson’s desire to shine renewed light on the ideals expounded by the nineteenth-century 
New Englanders, but the image of ‘palpable currents of light passing back and forth’ between 
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these two phenomena recalls that sense of an ineffable ‘something passing between us’ that 
she identifies as being so integral to that nineteenth-century mode. Moreover, the fact that 
Robinson draws attention – in a manner which recalls Solnit’s ‘blue of distance’ – to the 
‘most wonderful light between them’ and that both are ‘so bright that you couldn’t get a clear 
look at them’ may be read as analogous to that mode of ‘conversing with totality’, whereby 
impartial knowledge created in a dialogical space between is ultimately more illuminating 
than engaging solely with either of the poles from which that knowledge is borne. 
If this is one way in which we may apply the notion of ‘conversing with totality’ to 
Gilead, another more tangible example is Ames’s ongoing meditation on his religious faith. 
For Robinson, as is borne out throughout the novel, religious faith is positioned as an 
exemplar of that method by which we converse with an ultimately unknowable totality or 
truth. This belief pervades the narrative, and is perhaps most readily apparent in the 
conversations between Ames and Jack Boughton. Midway through the narrative, for example, 
Jack interrupts one of Ames and Boughton’s nightly conversations and attempts to draw 
Ames out on the subject of predestination. Ames responds:  
there are certain attributes our faith assigns to God: omniscience, omnipotence, 
justice, and grace. We human beings have such a slight acquaintance with power and 
knowledge, so little conception of justice, and so slight a capacity for grace, that the 
workings of these great attributes together is a mystery we cannot hope to penetrate. 
(171) 
  
In presenting God in this way, then, as ‘a mystery we cannot hope to penetrate’, Robinson 
(via Ames) comes very close to Dillard’s conception of a God who has ‘a fabric of spirit and 
sense so grand and subtle, so powerful in a new way, that we can only feel blindly at its 
hem’.87 As in the case of Dillard, however, this is not to suggest that Ames does not question 
the religious doctrine that underpins his faith. Late in the narrative, he recalls a conversation 
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with his brother, Edward, who encourages Ames to recognise that they have ‘lived within the 
limits of notions that were very old and even very local. I want you to understand that you do 
not have to be loyal to them’ (268). Yet Ames rejects his brother’s sentiment: ‘I knew 
perfectly well at that time, as I had for years and years, that the Lord absolutely transcends 
any understanding I have of Him, which makes loyalty to Him a different thing from loyalty 
to whatever customs and doctrines I happen to associate with Him. I know that, and I knew it 
then’ (268-69). This distinction between religious faith and religious doctrine is an integral 
one. For while Ames’s theological ambivalence punctuates the narrative (he often offers 
qualifications such as ‘[t]heologically, that is a completely unacceptable notion’ (229) and 
explicitly states that ‘doctrine is not belief, it is only one way of talking about belief’ (273)), 
his faith is never in doubt. Here we may draw another parallel between Ames and the 
sentiment expressed by Waldo Emerson in a journal entry of June 1832: ‘I have sometimes 
thought that, in order to be a good minister, it was necessary to leave the ministry. The 
profession is antiquated. In an altered age, we worship in the dead forms of our forefathers.’88  
For all its theological meditation, however, Gilead’s most pressing prayer is the 
narrative itself, the letter from Ames to the adult son he will never know the clearest example 
of his ability to embrace an unknowable truth that extends beyond his own existence. From 
Ames’s perspective, the ongoing tension between himself and Jack Boughton, and his 
quandaries regarding Jack’s moral character are interpreted within the context of his own 
imminent death. Told from Ames’s perspective, the narrative sets the reader up in the same 
way; we see Jack’s increasing closeness with Lila and Robert from the context of Ames 
reality. As such, we too are wrong-footed in the final chapter of the novel, which opens with 
Ames’s abrupt assertion: ‘Jack Boughton has a wife and child. […] the wife is a colored 
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woman. That did surprise me’ (247). In this one passage Robinson exemplifies that 
nineteenth-century method of ‘[creating] models of understanding and then [destroying] 
them, so that the larger apprehension you get is the inadequacy of any particular 
apprehension’. For while this moment cannot be said to provide some unequivocal truth to 
Jack’s narrative arc or explain away his moral ambiguity, it does impose an alternative reality 
on the narrative – one which has been present throughout but which we have not had access 
to up until this point. 
Robinson’s decision to revisit these same narrative events four years later in Home 
from the perspective of Glory and Jack reflects her claim that ‘[w]hen I write in general I try 
not to create oppositions. What I’ve tried to do whenever there are conflicts is to make both 
sides as equal as possible.’ 89  Moreover, given the sibling relationship between the two 
protagonists of this narrative – it is written in the third person, focalised through Glory but 
much of the dialogue occurs between Glory and Jack – Robinson reopens this conversation 
from the perspective of lateral relationality. Significantly, both characters – and also Lila, 
who remains very much a peripheral character throughout Gilead and Home – represent that 
middle generation which Robinson identifies as having caused a rupture in America’s cultural 
conversation. All are portrayed as more worldly, as supposed sinners who are able to bring 
their lived experience of the world beyond Gilead to bear on the Christian principles that their 
fathers and their fathers and their fathers before them adhere to so unwaveringly. As in 
Gilead, Robinson foregrounds the dialogical relationship between vertical and horizontal 
genealogies within the opening pages of the narrative. Musing on her own intellectual and 
familial heritage, Glory asserts: ‘[s]o much had never been explained to her. They were that 
kind of family. Things necessary to know were passed along, brother to brother, sister to 
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sister, and this was sufficient for most purposes. […] but the chain of transmission was 
broken when Grace left to live with Hope in Minneapolis.’90 She continues soon after:  
Her father taught his children, never doubting, that there was a single path from 
antiquity to eternity. Learn the psalms and ponder the ways of the early church. Know 
what must be known. Ancient fathers taught their ancient children, who taught their 
ancient children these very things. (22) 
 
If this mode of vertical genealogy forms the backbone of Gilead (both the novel and the town 
itself), here it is more openly challenged. Glory describes this mode of transmission as being 
‘like a voice heard from another room, singing for the pleasure of the song, and then you 
know it too, and through you it moves by accident and necessity down generations’ (22). Yet 
‘Why pleasure in it?’, Glory asks, ‘[a]nd why the blessing of the moment when another voice 
is heard, dreaming to itself?’ (22). Thinking of her old life as a teacher, she considers her own 
role in this cycle: ‘No need to be a minister. To be a teacher was an excellent thing. […] The 
young might have been restless around any primal fire where an elder was saying, Know this. 
Certainly they would have been restless’ (22).  
With the novel set in 1956, Glory speaks from a generation which was indeed a time 
of the restless young who sought to challenge the precepts of their elders. And while Gilead 
inevitably retains the insularity of the town itself on account of being written from Ames’s 
perspective, this second novel brings this wider world context to bear on its theological and 
moral meditations. Indeed, akin to the Underground Railroad that circulated beneath Gilead a 
century before, it is the wider cultural conversation of the civil rights movement that lingers 
in the margins of this narrative. For readers who haven’t read Gilead, the early allusions 
towards this underlying context could be easily missed: Glory finds Jack reading a well-worn 
copy of W. E. B. Du Bois which he describes as ‘something a friend gave me’ (49), for 
example, and she later finds him unable to draw himself away from the televisions in the 
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window of the hardware store that are showing the footage from Montgomery (99). That 
afternoon, Glory and Jack decide to have a television delivered to the house for their father, 
and the first thing they watch is a news bulletin, showing ‘white police with riot sticks […] 
pushing and dragging black demonstrators’ (101). A debate ensues between Jack and his 
father, the latter having remarked, ‘[t]here’s no reason to let that sort of trouble upset you. In 
six months nobody will remember one thing about it’ (101). When Jack exclaims ‘Jesus 
Christ!’ at the sight of ‘police […] pushing the black crowd back with dogs’, Boughton’s 
flippant attitude towards the news bulletin is juxtaposed with his anger at having heard his 
son blaspheme: ‘[t]hat kind of language has never been acceptable in this house’ (102). 
Stopping himself short of highlighting his father’s skewed priorities, Jack apologises, to 
which Boughton responds: ‘[n]o need to be sorry, Jack. Young people want the world to 
change and old people want it to stay the same. And who is to judge between me and thee?’ 
(102). I would argue that it is into just this space that Robinson pitches the reader. As the 
narrative continues, Jack’s own personal connection to this history – for those who aren’t 
already fully aware having read Gilead – becomes increasingly clear, as does his father’s 
ignorance. Yet while a number of strong hints are woven throughout the narrative – Jack 
often makes comments such as ‘I have known a good many Negroes who are more 
respectable than I am’ (162), and ‘I have lived in places where there are Negro people. They 
are very fine Christians, many of them’ (227) – it is striking that Robinson again chooses to 
wait until the closing passages of the narrative to ultimately reveal that Jack is married to a 
black woman with whom he has had a child; it is not until Della arrives in Gilead with her 
son in the final chapter that Glory learns this information, just like Ames in the previous 
novel. While this may be read again as an example of her tendency to ‘create models of 
understanding and then destroy them’, I would argue that this strategy is less successful here; 
it strikes me as problematic that across the two novels this clearly integral discourse is voiced 
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only through its impact on an all-white cast of characters. The novel does, however, retain a 
glimmer of hope and some sense of parity in its final pages. For just as Gilead closes looking 
ahead to the life of Robert Boughton Ames, son of John Ames, in an acknowledgement that 
‘hope deferred is still hope’ (281), Home concludes by looking ahead to the life of Robert 
Boughton Miles, son of John Ames Boughton (Jack). Where Gilead closes extending its 
prayer out to the future, Home imagines a moment in which Della and Jack’s son Robert has 
returned to an unchanged Gilead and ‘answered his father’s prayers’ (339).  
While the other texts considered throughout this chapter have sought liminal 
experiences in the natural landscape, then, Robinson locates hers in ‘warn, modest, 
countrified Gilead’, a last bastion of dormant hopes and forgotten values that endures on the 
margins of American society (338). Through the dialogical relationships she constructs 
within and between these novels – and here we may also include Lila which will be 
considered later in this thesis – Robinson creates a space (both textually and geographically) 
that is able to accommodate the complex ambivalences of her characters, a space which 
presents these religious, moral and cultural ambiguities alongside one another without 
reaching for any definitive answers. Much like the various threads running through the texts, 
the relationship between the novels is not one that develops vertically. The three novels 
inform one another dialogically, such that no one text encapsulates all that can be known 
about the narrative events. Instead, the ‘truth’ lies somewhere between the three – a ‘truth’ 
that in itself shifts depending on the order in which the novels are read – and it is only in the 
dialogue between the three texts that we are able to partially access that totality. While very 
different to the liminal poetics identified in the other texts considered within this chapter, 
then, Robinson’s Gilead novels develop that dialogical mode which is itself indicative of the 
Transcendentalist proclivity towards ‘the betwixt and between’. In doing so, Robinson not 
only engages in her own dialogue with those ‘aunts and uncles’ that so inspire her writings, 
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but also opens a route to recognising the intergenerational dialogues in which New England 
Transcendentalism was itself engaged, and in particular the significant role Mary Moody 
Emerson played in shaping the intellectual perspective and practices of her nephew and the 
wider New England Transcendentalist community.  
 
*** 
 
Drawing together the above, the readings have identified a range of thematic, stylistic and 
formal strategies that may be read as constituting a shared liminal poetics across 
Transcendentalist writings. These include setting textual elements into dialogue with one 
another quite literally on the page (most notably in Solnit’s writing through alternating 
chapter structures and the use of extratextual marginalia) so as to effect a layering of 
meanings across the text; the capacity to account for the coexistence of beauty and horror 
(most often found in nature) and to recognise the simultaneity of existential jeopardy and 
potentiality in the liminal space (exemplified in Dillard’s Pilgrim); and an aversive mode 
which undercuts definitive responses by effecting what I refer to here as productive 
ambivalence (most succinctly borne out in Adnan’s concept of ‘obscure clarity’). The last 
section highlighted dialogue and conversation as integral to Transcendentalist intellectual 
practices and demonstrated how Robinson creates a series of intergenerational dialogues 
across her novels which exemplify the concept – to use Thomas Schaub’s phrase once more – 
of ‘conversing with totality’. Looking ahead, the second chapter of this thesis builds upon the 
themes of dialogue and vertical and lateral routes of influence identified in the reading of 
Robinson. It considers how the work of my four writers may be positioned at the intersection 
of New England Transcendentalism and feminist psychoanalysis, such that their liminal 
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poetics becomes a means by which they negotiate the relationship between self and other in 
their writings. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 ‘WHAT IF THE OBJECT STARTED TO SPEAK?’: SITUATING NEW TRANSCENDENTALISM IN 
THE INTERSUBJECTIVE SPACE BETWEEN 
So far, then, we have identified several key implications of the Transcendentalist mode of 
liminality outlined at the outset of this project. These include: an ability to hold seemingly 
disparate concepts, modes and viewpoints in productive tension; a recognition of the 
coexistence of potentiality (beauty) and existential jeopardy (horror) in the liminal space, 
particularly as experienced in nature; and a shared belief in the importance of conversation 
and dialogue as a mode of mutual self-culture, which the previous chapter traced back to the 
intellectual practices of Mary Moody Emerson in particular. Building upon these themes, this 
second chapter recognises how the Transcendentalist mode of liminality becomes in turn a 
point of departure for exploring the lived experience of relationships with the other. Drawing 
on readings by George Kateb, Johannes Voelz and Branka Arsić, my analysis examines 
intriguing parallels between Emerson’s key writings on friendship and love and the 
psychoanalytic frameworks of Luce Irigaray and Jessica Benjamin. While nineteenth-century 
Transcendentalism and twentieth-century feminist psychoanalysis may not at first seem the 
most likely interpretative pairing, my analysis proceeds with a twofold critical intention.  
The first section identifies Benjamin’s notion of ‘redemptive critique’, exploring how 
both she and Irigaray excavate the foundations of psychoanalytic theory, uncovering its 
original principles in an attempt to reclaim and reinvigorate their progressive potential whilst 
simultaneously challenging their underpinning hegemonic assumptions. 1  The similarity 
between this mode of redemptive critique and my own proposal of a New Transcendentalism 
which reactivates and repurposes progressive elements of Emersonian Transcendentalism to 
                                                          
1 Jessica Benjamin, ‘The Bonds of Love: Looking Backward’, Studies in Gender and Sexuality, 14 (2013), 1-15 
(p. 4). 
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articulate the lived intersectional experience of contemporary U.S. culture is self-evident. 
Moving beyond this methodological similarity, therefore, I outline several relevant aspects of 
Emerson’s thinking on themes of love and friendship. By setting these aspects into dialogue 
with Irigaray and Benjamin’s respective writings on intersubjectivity, thirdness and the 
sensible transcendental, I demonstrate how feminist psychoanalysis provides a theoretical 
lens through which to explore the gendered implications of Emersonian understandings of the 
relationship between self and other. The chapter bears out this proposition through close 
readings of texts by Solnit, Robinson and Dillard, positioning them at the intersection of this 
dialogue between Emersonian and psychoanalytic approaches to the interpersonal dynamic. 
In line with this thesis’s central proposal of a New Transcendentalism which 
emphasises an integral movement – itself dialogical – between a poetics and a politics of 
liminality, my analysis thus explores the potential political (and particularly gendered) 
implications and applications of the specifically Transcendentalist mode of liminality that 
informs this project. Of particular interest is the primacy of the mother figure. Extending the 
theme of intergenerational dialogue established in the previous chapter, the discussion offers 
readings of Rebecca Solnit’s The Faraway Nearby (2013) and Marilynne Robinson’s 
Housekeeping (1980) which foreground the reclamation of the mother figure as a complex 
subjectivity in her own right and which recognise the mother-child (and specifically mother-
daughter) relationship as foundational to subsequent interactions between self and other. The 
final section turns to an examination of romantic and marital love, in a reading of Annie 
Dillard’s 2007 novel, The Maytrees. Here, I consider how both Emerson and Irigaray’s 
interpretations of love may read within the context of Plato’s Symposium and particularly 
Diotima’s speech, demonstrating how the Transcendentalist liminal poetics outlined in the 
previous chapter becomes a means of negotiating sexual difference throughout the novel.  
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By examining these various psychoanalytic and Transcendentalist writings alongside 
one another, the discussion positions the respective works of Irigaray and Benjamin as a 
theoretical framework through which we can further explore the complex relationship 
between my four writers and their nineteenth-century antecedents, a framework which allows 
us to negotiate the often ambivalent dynamics at play in such relationships without 
appropriating an agonistic oedipal model of intellectual inheritance. This is a line of enquiry 
that is all the more significant given the relationship identified within the introduction to this 
thesis between Harold’s Bloom’s notion of New Transcendentalism and his ‘anxiety of 
influence’ model, which, as we saw, serves to perpetuate the very patriarchal logic that 
Irigaray, Benjamin, and my four contemporary writers seek to displace. Moreover, and in 
keeping with the various dialogical strategies explored throughout this thesis, the discussion 
identifies not only how feminist interventions in psychoanalysis provide a framework through 
which to understand the relationship between Solnit, Dillard, Robinson and the New England 
Transcendentalists, but equally how the New England Transcendentalists prefigure many of 
the formal and stylistic ‘innovations’ proposed by Irigaray and Benjamin. 
 
 ‘AN INNAVIGABLE SEA WASHES SILENTLY BETWEEN US’: EMERSON’S SELF-RELIANT 
INTERSUBJECTIVE 
In Emerson and Self-Reliance (1995), George Kateb poses a question: ‘[i]f we say that self-
reliance is the true principle of Emerson, we then ask, Does the self-reliant individual need 
others?’2 Here, we take self-reliance to mean that aversive process identified at the outset of 
this thesis and examined throughout whereby one seeks a permanent state of potentiality 
through a perpetual turning away and turning toward the self. Kateb contends that this 
process takes two overarching forms: mental self-reliance and active self-reliance, and argues 
                                                          
2 George Kateb, Emerson and Self-Reliance (Thousand Oaks, CA, London and New York: Sage, 1995), p. 96. 
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that the former – which he, like Emerson, privileges above the latter – is attained (or at least 
potentially attained) through the mutual self-culture found in friendship. Though he never 
uses the term explicitly, Kateb’s reading gestures towards the intersubjective dynamic that is 
so often evoked in Emerson’s writings, foregrounding Emerson’s sense that ‘friends assist the 
self-reliant individual to progress toward a particular and especially personal acquisition of 
truth: the sense that some other being in the world is as real as oneself.’3 The foundations of 
this thinking can be read in the following passage from Emerson’s 1837 lecture, ‘Society’: 
What constitutes the charm of society, of conversation, of friendship, of love? This 
delight of receiving again from another our own thoughts and feelings, of thus seeing 
them out of us, and judging of them as of something foreign to us. […] Your own 
thought and act you shall behold with new eyes, when a stranger commends it.4  
 
The previous chapter recognised the origins of just such a dialogical mode in the intellectual 
practices of Mary Moody Emerson, and here Kateb traces its development in Waldo 
Emerson’s thinking. That this may be understood as a specifically intersubjective dynamic is 
borne out by the following passage from ‘Friendship’: 
Friendship requires that rare mean betwixt likeness and unlikeness, that piques each 
with the presence of power and of consent in the other party. […] Let him not cease 
an instant to be himself. The only joy I have in his being mine, is that the not mine is 
mine. […] There must be very two, before there can be very one. Let it be an alliance 
of two large, formidable natures, mutually beheld, mutually feared, before yet they 
recognize the deep identity which beneath these disparities unites them.5 
 
Kateb summarises this dynamic thus: ‘The not mine must not become merely mine if it is to 
be mine in a worthwhile way. It must remain its own simultaneously. I, too, must not be 
merely mine, and I must also remain my own.’6 Johannes Voelz examines the intersubjective 
nature of this Emersonian dynamic explicitly. For Voelz, this dynamic is at root a process of 
                                                          
3 Emerson and Self-Reliance, p. 106. 
4 Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘Society’, in The Early Lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. by Stephen E. Whicher, 
Robert E. Spiller and Wallace E. Williams (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1964), pp. 98-112 (p.100) 
5 Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘Friendship’, in Essays: First Series (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and 
Company, 1890), pp. 153-74 (p. 168). 
6 Emerson and Self-Reliance, p. 107. 
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mutual recognition which he defines as ‘a term that attempts to account for the social genesis 
of identity’.7 In line with the revised interpretation of self-reliance which informs this thesis, 
Voelz asserts that, ‘Emerson’s notion of self-reliance was concerned with recognition much 
more centrally than has hitherto been noted.’8 For Emerson, Voelz contends, ‘friendship must 
be of use, for us, for our achieving self-reliance’, and he theorises it thus as ‘a relationship 
from which we want to extract identity. Friendship is a relationship from which we seek 
recognition’.9 Voelz describes the specifically Emersonian understanding of recognition in 
which ‘the process of growth itself is part of the individual’s identity. In other words, he 
conceptualizes what we think of as identity as a tension between a moment of fixity and 
transformation, or, self-possession and growth.’10  Drawing back, this may be read as an 
extension of the aversive process of turning towards and away from the self which underpins 
the Transcendentalist mode of liminality examined within this thesis, in which one situates 
oneself in a liminal state or phase of potentiality between definitive categories. Applied 
within the context of intersubjectivity, this process also explores the other side of the self-
reliant dialectic: that as one turns away from and toward the self, one turns towards and away 
from the other. Thus, identity is not understood here, as it is in van Gennep’s model, as a 
fixed principle occupying either side of a binary, but as the unsettled liminal process itself. 
What is more, akin to the vertical and lateral genealogies discussed in the previous chapter, 
when applied to the meeting of selves, this dynamic may be understood as both diachronic 
(between the old self and the new self) and synchronic (between two persons). 
 In 1990, Jessica Benjamin published ‘An Outline of Intersubjectivity: The 
Development of Recognition’ in which she extends the developmental model outlined in The 
                                                          
7 Johannes Voelz, Transcendental Resistance: The New Americanists and Emerson’s Challenge (Lebanon, NH: 
Dartmouth College Press, 2010), p. 95. 
8 Transcendental Resistance, p. 96. 
9 Transcendental Resistance, p. 96. 
10 Transcendental Resistance, p. 122. 
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Bonds of Love. The article emphasises the role of ‘mutual recognition [whereby] the subject 
gradually comes to recognize the other person’s subjectivity, developing the capacity for 
attunement and tolerance of difference’. 11  Benjamin argues that ‘the human mind is 
interactive rather than monadic, that the psychoanalytic process should be understood as 
occurring between subjects rather than within the individual’ (34). As such, intersubjectivity 
is defined as ‘the field of intersection between two subjectivities, the interplay between two 
different subject worlds’ which recognises ‘that zone of experience or theory in which the 
other is not merely the object of the ego’s need/drive or cognition/perception, but has a 
separate and equivalent center of self’ (34-5). Intersubjective theory maintains that ‘the other 
must be recognized as an other subject in order for the self to fully experience his or her 
subjectivity in the other’s presence’ (35). Most crucially, Benjamin’s intersubjective model 
‘[stresses] the simultaneity of connection and separation. Instead of opposite endpoints of a 
longitudinal trajectory, connection and separation form a tension, which requires the equal 
magnetism of both sides’ (38).  
Writing over a century and a half apart, Emerson’s and Benjamin’s thinking on the 
intersubjective dynamic is strikingly similar. Indeed, while both Irigaray and Benjamin 
present their models of intersubjectivity as frameworks through which they challenge ‘the 
logic of the subject and object that predominates in Western philosophy and science’, it is 
clear from the above passages that Emerson had gone some way towards articulating this 
more reciprocal interpersonal dynamic. As the next section discusses, however, where 
Emerson’s intersubjective ultimately serves to obfuscate the intersectional identities that an 
individual may bring to bear on interpersonal interactions, Benjamin, Irigaray and the writers 
who I position here as New Transcendentalists (Adnan, Solnit, Robinson and Dillard) present 
                                                          
11 Jessica Benjamin, ‘An Outline of Intersubjectivity: The Development of Recognition’, Psychoanalytic 
Psychology, 7 (1990), 33-46 (p. 33).  
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the intersubjective as means by which to articulate and negotiate sexual and cultural 
difference. 
 
LOOKING BACK, MOVING FORWARD: IRIGARAY’S AND BENJAMIN’S REDEMPTIVE 
CRITIQUES 
In 1974, Luce Irigaray published her first monograph, Speculum, a complex and wide-
ranging text that is split into three overarching sections. The first of these sections offers a 
critique of Freud’s conception of femininity and female sexuality. Irigaray takes issue with 
the fact that the female position is consistently conceived as the not-male (read: not-present, 
not-active, not-subject) side of a self-perpetuating dualism, in such a way that assumes and 
reinforces the notion that men are the true arbiters of meaning. This is borne out most clearly, 
she argues, within Freud’s oedipal model and the concept of ‘penis envy’, in which the girl is 
ultimately understood as ‘a disadvantaged little man […] whose needs are less catered to by 
nature and who will yet have a lesser share of culture. […] Unattracted to the social interests 
shared by men. A little man who would have no other desire than to be, or remain, a man.’12 
Throughout this opening section of Speculum, we see Irigaray ‘quote Freud’s own words 
against him’ in such a way that undermines their logic, not least by assuming the role of the 
active (activist) subject and by galvanising other women to do the same.13 For, as Irigaray’s 
conclusion contends, what is most concerning is the fact that Freud’s assumptions – and those 
of Western philosophy more generally – have been so readily accepted, such that women 
have been ‘reduced to a function and a functioning whose historic causes must be 
reconsidered: property systems, philosophical, mythological, or religious systems – the 
                                                          
12 Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, trans. by Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1985), p. 26. 
13 Speculum, p. 43. 
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theory and practice of psychoanalysis itself – all continually, even today, prescribe and define 
that destiny laid down for woman’s sexuality’.14  
This revisionary intent continues into the second section, in which the eponymous 
‘Speculum’ constitutes a subversion of the Lacanian mirror stage. As Margaret Whitford 
acknowledges, Irigaray’s central premise here is that ‘Lacan’s mirror can only see women’s 
bodies as lacking, as a “hole”; […] the mirror, of course, is the mirror of theory and 
discourse, and although Lacan is not named, Speculum is as much a challenge to Lacan as it 
is to Freud and to Western philosophy.’15 Reclaiming the mirror analogy employed by Lacan, 
the notion of specularization functions throughout this section of Irigaray’s text as a means of 
reflecting and challenging the phallogocentric nature of discourse (and by extension, culture) 
that she problematises throughout her oeuvre. Moreover, the castration anxiety of the text’s 
first section on Freud’s oedipal theory is mirrored here as Irigaray considers the systematised 
obstruction of women from the subject position in language. She asserts that ‘the silent 
allegiance of the one [the woman], guarantees the autosufficiency, the auto-nomy of the other 
as long as no questioning of this mutism as a symptom – of historical repression – is 
required’.16 ‘But what’, Irigaray ventures, ‘if the object started to speak?’17 In An Ethics of 
Sexual Difference (1984; trans. 1993), Irigaray argues that the issue of sexual difference 
amounts to a fundamental ‘problematic of space and time’, one which requires ‘the creation 
of a new poetics’. 18  This primary dualism, Irigaray posits, maps directly onto sexual 
difference. On the one hand, she suggests, ‘the feminine is experienced as space’ – as the 
bodily or the origin of the bodily; as the object into which the masculine enters and against 
                                                          
14 Speculum, p. 129.  
15 Luce Irigaray, The Irigaray Reader, ed. by Margaret Whitford (Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 
1991), pp. 6-7. 
16 Speculum, p. 135. 
17 Speculum, p. 135. 
18 Luce Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference, trans. by Carolyn Burke and Gillian C. Gill (London: Athlone 
Press, 1993), p. 7. Italics in original. 
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which he must define himself, both physically and psychologically. On the other hand, 
Irigaray states that ‘the masculine is experienced as time’ – as genealogy, language and the 
subject, and thus as ‘the axis of the world’s ordering’.19 Irigaray contends that subverting this 
(culturally constructed) dichotomy requires ‘a change in our perception and conception of 
[…] the relations of matter and form and of the interval between’, a change which equates, 
she claims, to ‘a change in the economy of desire’.20  
 In 1988, Jessica Benjamin drew on similar source materials for her first book, The 
Bonds of Love. Like Speculum, the text opens with a critique of Freud, whose ‘vision of 
conflict between instinct and civilization’, Benjamin posits, ‘has actually created an impasse 
for social thought’.21 She challenges Freud’s assumption that the relation between the self and 
the other is inherently hostile, and takes issue with Freud’s flawed logic of a self-perpetuating 
cycle of fear, revolt and guilt – a cycle which she identifies as being articulated ‘always in 
terms of the primary metaphor of the father-son struggle’ (6). Similarly to Irigaray, however, 
Benjamin’s central concern is not only the overt cultural privileging of this patriarchal 
metaphor, but the underlying hegemonic structures that have allowed this systematic 
oppression to be so readily accepted, or worse perpetuated by ‘even the most radical’ of 
psychoanalytic thinkers, such that ‘woman’s subordination to man is taken for granted, 
invisible’ (6-7). 
 While not generally considered an obvious source of progressive gender politics, 
Emerson’s writings demonstrate at least an awareness of the limitations imposed by this 
primary dualism between masculine and feminine. To draw this out, we begin with the 
following passage from ‘Society’: 
 
                                                          
19 An Ethics of Sexual Difference, p. 7. 
20 An Ethics of Sexual Difference, pp. 7-8. 
21 Jessica Benjamin, The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism and the Problem of Domination (London: 
Virago, 1990), p. 4. 
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The first Society of Nature is that of marriage, not only prepared in the distinction of 
Sex, but in the different tastes and genius of Man and Woman. This society has its 
own end which is an integrity of human nature by the union of its two great parts, 
Intellect and Affection. For, of Man the predominant power is Intellect; of Woman, 
the predominant power is Affection. One mainly seeks Truth, whose effect is Power. 
The other delights in Goodness, whose effect is Love.22 
 
In this early lecture, then, we find just that reductive essentialism that Irigaray and Benjamin 
seek to challenge. Following this strand of his thinking, however, we find increasing nuance 
in Emerson’s responses to sexual difference. Acknowledging at the outset of his analysis that 
Emerson ultimately ‘remains bound by convention to the extent he finds that the love 
between men and women must be a relationship of unequals’, George Kateb nevertheless 
identifies how Emerson at least confronts the masculine/feminine dualism.23 In doing so, 
Kateb suggests, Emerson considers how we might ‘allow its rigidity to be loosened’, such 
that ‘the self-reliant eye, unimprisoned by gendered thinking, will see equal potentiality in 
men and women to become self-reliant individuals.’ 24  Kateb focuses on two ‘loosening 
strategies’ in particular.25  The first, whilst still based on the essentialist assumption that 
certain behaviours can be broadly attributed based on biological sex, concedes that women 
can display masculinity, and that men can likewise display femininity (a fact which, of 
course, undermines the validity of framing them in essentialist terms in the first place). The 
second loosening strategy is the claim that the most realised mode of self-reliance is 
predicated upon the idea that ‘both masculine and feminine traits […] are equally 
indispensable.’ 26  Kateb here cites from Emerson’s journal where he states: ‘[t]he finest 
people marry the two sexes in their own person. Hermaphrodite is then the symbol of the 
finished soul […] in every act should appear the married pair: the two elements should mix in 
                                                          
22 ‘Society’, p. 102. 
23 Emerson and Self-Reliance, p. 119. 
24 Emerson and Self-Reliance, p. 120. 
25 Emerson and Self-Reliance, p. 120. 
26 Emerson and Self-Reliance, p. 120. 
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every act.’27 The evolution of this thought would be evidenced years later in Representative 
Men (1850): ‘In fact, in the spiritual world we change sexes every moment. You love the 
worth in me; then I am your husband […] Meantime, I adore the greater worth in another, 
and so become his wife. He aspires to a higher worth in another spirit, and is wife or receiver 
of that influence.’28 Kateb aligns this passage with the following from ‘Compensation’: 
The radical tragedy of nature seems to be the distinction of More and Less. How can 
Less not feel the pain; how not feel indignation or malevolence towards More? . . . It 
seems a great injustice. But see the facts nearly and these mountainous inequalities 
vanish. Love reduces them as the sun melts the icebergs in the sea. . . If I feel over-
shadowed and outdone by great neighbours, I can yet love; I can still receive; and he 
that loveth maketh his own the grandeur he loves.29 
 
The implication here, it seems, is that the oppressed should somehow accept inequality by 
finding ‘pleasure in thinking that although one does not share privileges, they exist in the 
world and enhance it. In abandoning resentment, one loses sight of one’s lack. To use 
gendered language, the feminine thus becomes masculine, or overcomes it.’ 30  Whether 
Emerson’s own sentiment or Kateb’s exaggerated interpretation, this is an astoundingly 
problematic claim, which ultimately collapses any sense in which Emerson ‘tries to efface the 
stark distinction between men and women and hence between conventional masculinity and 
conventional femininity.’31 My reading of The Maytrees which forms the closing section of 
this chapter will draw back to Emerson’s thinking on marital love in a way which redeems it 
somewhat from the essentialist understandings highlighted in this section. For the purposes of 
this section, however, I wish to highlight the disjunction between Emerson’s more abstract 
sense of the intersubjective dynamic as outlined in the opening section of this chapter, and its 
problematic application to sexual difference as outlined here. This disjunction marks another 
                                                          
27 Ralph Waldo Emerson, cited in Emerson and Self-Reliance, p. 123. 
28 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Representative Men: Seven Lectures (London: George Routledge, 1850), p. 77. 
29 Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘Compensation’, cited in Emerson and Self-Reliance, p. 124. 
30 Emerson and Self-Reliance, p. 124. 
31 Emerson and Self-Reliance, p. 126. 
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way in which, in line with my argument throughout this thesis, the cultural discourses and 
imperatives of his moment limit the more progressive intent of Emerson’s thinking. As such, 
as will be drawn out below, it opens another avenue for exploring the ‘newness’ of the New 
Transcendentalism I propose here. 
 For both Benjamin and Irigaray, the recovery of female subjectivity must begin with a 
cultural revaluing of the mother, who for too long has been denied subjectivity, not only 
within psychoanalytic theory (as demonstrated by the oedipal model) but across the entire 
history of Western philosophy (as demonstrated in part by Emerson’s thinking above which 
unequivocally defines the feminine as ‘the receiver’). Irigaray argues that due to this failure 
to grant the mother ‘her place and her thing in an intersubjective dynamic, man remains 
within a master-slave dialectic’. 32  Benjamin also shares Irigaray’s belief that female 
subordination is most clearly reflected in the lack of subjectivity afforded to the mother 
within psychoanalytic theory and, indeed, the wider culture. For Freud and others who 
followed him, Benjamin argues, the mother is ‘an object of the baby’s needs’; is ‘provider, 
interlocutor, caregiver, […] a secure presence to walk away from […] – but she is rarely 
regarded as another subject with a purpose apart from her existence for her child’ (23-4). This 
conception of the mother-child relationship, so often positioned as the basis for all future 
interpersonal relationships, is, as Irigaray also recognises, indicative of many ideological 
imperatives underpinning Western culture, and particularly, as Benjamin posits, ‘our 
[implicitly American] culture’s high valuation on individualism’ (25). As a result, Benjamin 
contends, ‘this assumption does more than just give sanctuary to the old ideas, conscious and 
unconscious, about men and women; it also provides […] the ultimate rationalization for 
accepting all authority’ (7). She goes on to acknowledge the influence of Simone de 
Beauvoir, proposing that her own work reexamines the notion that ‘woman functions as 
                                                          
32 An Ethics of Sexual Difference, p. 10. 
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man’s primary other, his opposite – playing nature to his reason, immanence to his 
transcendence, primordial oneness to his individuated separateness, and object to his subject’ 
(7). Through this reexamination, Benjamin develops her intersubjective perspective which 
‘reorients the conception of the psychic world from a subject’s relations to its object toward a 
subject meeting another subject’ (20). In doing so, Benjamin’s text ‘offers a fresh perspective 
on the dualism that permeates Western culture. It shows how gender polarity underlies such 
familiar dualisms as autonomy and dependency, and thus establishes the coordinates for the 
positions of master and slave’ (7). 
 The parallels that may be drawn between Irigaray and Benjamin are thus both 
methodological and thematic. Not only do they emphasise their revisionary intentions but 
both theorists also focus on a re-evaluation of female subjectivity, the mother-child dyad, and 
a belief in the importance of intersubjective interaction. Yet crucially, despite their strong 
sense of the limitations imposed by Freudian and Lacanian theories, both Benjamin and 
Irigaray consistently reiterate that their intention is not to overthrow or replace their 
predecessors. For, as both acknowledge, such a method ‘amounts to the same thing in the 
end’, and ultimately ‘reproduces the structure of gender polarity under the guise of attacking 
it’.33 Rather, when asked in a 1975 interview whether her work constitutes a fundamental 
challenge to psychoanalytic theory and practice, Irigaray asserts that:  
It is rather a matter of making explicit some implications of psychoanalysis that are 
inoperative at the moment. Saying that if Freudian theory indeed contributes what is 
needed to upset the philosophic order of discourse, the theory remains paradoxically 
subject to that discourse where the definition of sexual difference is concerned. […] 
And of course it would be interesting to know what might become of psychoanalytic 
notions in a culture that did not repress the feminine.34 
 
Likewise, as she begins to posit her model of intersubjectivity in the first chapter proper of 
The Bonds of Love, Benjamin remarks that her methods and Freud’s before her ‘should not be 
                                                          
33 Luce Irigaray, ‘The Power of Discourse and the Subordination of the Feminine’, in The Irigaray Reader, pp. 
118-39 (p. 118); The Bonds of Love, p. 10. 
34 ‘The Power of Discourse’, pp.121-2. 
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seen in opposition to each other (as they usually are) but as complementary ways of 
understanding the psyche’ (20). ‘My point here’, Benjamin continues, ‘is not to reverse 
Freud’s decision for the inner world by choosing the outside world; it is, rather, to grasp both 
realities’ (21). Here, as shall be discussed in more detail later, in a method much like that 
which has been established as integral to the Transcendentalist mode of liminality explored 
throughout this thesis, Benjamin employs her model as her mode, resisting a cycle of 
(critical) rejection and domination by positioning her work within an intersubjective space 
that allows for the coexistence of both perspectives. 
Recognising the liminal nature of this intersubjective space, the close readings that 
follow explore how the respective theories of Irigaray and Benjamin allow us to extend the 
significance of Dillard, Adnan, Robinson and Solnit’s formal and stylistic practices beyond 
the textual considerations of the previous chapter, thus adding another dimension to the 
politics of liminality alluded to within the preceding discussion. The analysis argues that this 
(perhaps inadvertent) engagement with recent feminist interventions in psychoanalysis 
exemplifies a fundamental aspect of the New Transcendentalism proposed within this project, 
whereby the underlying progressive principles of nineteenth-century Transcendentalism are 
propelled forward into our contemporary cultural context as a means of articulating 
intersectional experience. 
 
COPING WITH CONTRADICTION: THE CREATION OF A NEW POETICS? 
Despite the considerable differences between the two movements, not least those outlined in 
the previous section, there are several ways in which nineteenth-century Transcendentalist 
writings may be read as prefiguring elements of the radical poetics proposed within those 
later psychoanalytic works. This may be drawn out in relation to the following passage, taken 
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from the second section of Speculum, in which Irigaray suggests that a new iteration of 
language is required in order to recognise sexual difference: 
Let us imagine that man (Freud in the event) had discovered that the rarest thing […] 
would be to articulate directly, without catacombs, what we are calling these two 
syntaxes. Irreducible in their strangeness and eccentricity one to the other. Coming out 
of different times, places, logics, “representations”, and economies. In fact, of course, 
these terms cannot fittingly be designated by the number “two” and the adjective 
“different”, if not only because they are not susceptible to comparison. To use such 
terms serves only to reiterate a movement begun long since, that is, the movement to 
speak of the “other” in a language already systematized by/for the same. Their 
distribution and demarcation and articulation necessitate operations as yet non-existent, 
whose complexity and subtlety can only be guessed at without prejudicing the results. 
Without a teleology already in operation somewhere.35 
 
Passages such as the above have led many critics to position Irigaray as ‘one of the high 
priestesses of écriture féminine, along with Kristeva and Cixous’.36 While Whitford argues 
that ‘this reading blurs the differences, both theoretical and political, between the three 
women’, Irigaray herself has acknowledged that her writing style – and Speculum specifically 
– ‘confounds the linearity of an outline, the teleology of discourse, within which there is no 
possible place for the “feminine”, except the traditional place of the repressed, the 
censured’.37 Again, however, Irigaray asserts that ‘it is not a matter of toppling that order so 
as to replace it […] but of disrupting and modifying it, starting from an “outside” that is 
exempt, in part, from phallocratic law.’38 Yet if we take this description out of its feminist 
context, it is striking how closely it resembles the liminal poetics identified as integral to 
nineteenth-century Transcendentalist discourses – both male- and female-authored – 
throughout the previous chapter. Moreover, Irigaray’s acknowledgement here of the intrinsic 
connection between teleological modes of discourse and the hegemonic values that underpin 
them reinforces the tension identified in the previous chapter as running throughout 
Transcendentalist writings. 
                                                          
35 Speculum, p. 139. Emphasis added. 
36 The Irigaray Reader, p. 2. 
37 The Irigaray Reader, pp. 2, 118. 
38 ‘The Power of Discourse’, p. 120. 
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 These affinities are still more evident in Benjamin’s work. Having acknowledged 
feminism’s ‘tendency to reinforce the dualism it criticizes’, Benjamin posits that ‘what is 
necessary is not to take sides but to remain focused on the dualistic structure itself’. 39  
Elaborating on this point, she asserts her intention to ‘retell Freud’s story of domination in a 
way that preserves its complexity and ambiguity. […] To persevere in that approach, it seems 
to me, requires of theory some of that quality which Keats demanded for poetry – negative 
capability’.40 Given the premise of this chapter, Benjamin’s appropriation of John Keats’s 
term is intriguing, and tracing its origins allows us to draw together several key lines of 
enquiry. The phrase was first coined in a letter from the Romantic poet to his brothers, 
George and Tom, on 22 December 1817, in which he recounts a conversation he had when 
walking home one night from the Christmas pantomime:  
I had not a dispute but a disquisition with [Charles Wentworth] Dilke, on various 
subjects; several things dovetailed in my mind, & at once it struck me, what quality 
went to form a Man of Achievement especially in Literature & which Shakespeare 
possessed so enormously – I mean Negative Capability, that is when a man is capable 
of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact 
and reason.41 
 
Remarking that Samuel Taylor Coleridge is ‘incapable of remaining content with half 
knowledge’, he concludes that ‘with a great poet the sense of Beauty overcomes every other 
consideration, or rather obliterates all consideration’.42 It is perhaps fitting, then, that this 
phrase in its original context – a debate between one of the most revered Romantic poets and 
the radical Whig politician and literary commentator, Charles Wentworth Dilke – seems itself 
to reflect the very hegemonic tensions that Benjamin, Irigaray, and this thesis wish to 
interrogate. For while it encapsulates the notion of a mode loosed from a teleological quest 
                                                          
39 The Bonds of Love, p. 9. 
40 The Bonds of Love, p. 10. 
41 John Keats, Selected Letters, ed. by Robert Gittings and intro. by Jon Mee (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), pp. 41-2. 
42 Selected Letters, p. 42. 
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for ‘facts’, it simultaneously circulates exclusively in the world of men, in the world of Great 
Men no less; a world which can afford, Keats suggests, to privilege Beauty above all else. 
Although he doesn’t refer specifically to the concept of negative capability, Ray 
Benoit draws a number of related parallels between the philosophies of Keats and Emerson. 
His 1963 article recognises the two men as near contemporaries who are both writing in the 
Romantic tradition, and his analysis focuses specifically on Keats’ and Emerson’s Platonic 
influences, with particular reference to the Timaeus dialogue. As we have seen elsewhere in 
this thesis, Plato is presented throughout Emerson’s writings as perhaps the Greatest of Great 
Men, and Benoit goes so far as to suggest that ‘if one does not understand the Timaeus, he 
can never understand Emerson’. 43  Like many of the revisionary readings of Emerson 
considered throughout this thesis, Benoit’s central aim is to retrieve Emerson from 
accusations of inconsistency; from being labelled by turns a materialist and a naïve idealist. 
He argues that the many contradictions and ambivalences to be found in his work are, in fact, 
‘a logical inconsistency that stems from his contact with Plato [whereby] he chose neither 
spirit nor matter’.44 Expanding on this point, Benoit posits a reading of Keats’s Ode on a 
Grecian Urn in which he argues that the poem’s final aphorism – ‘Beauty is truth, truth 
beauty’ – could be rewritten as ‘Change is permanence, permanence change’, such that it 
reflects the conflict between these terms that runs throughout the poem. As such, Benoit 
argues, both Keats and Emerson gesture towards ‘a mutual harmony of those opposites in a 
higher third realm where the opposition ceases though neither item is reduced to the other.’45 
Within The Bonds of Love, Benjamin makes no more than a passing reference to Keats’s 
notion of ‘negative capability’, appropriating it only briefly in order to contend that ‘the 
theoretic equivalent of that ability to face mystery and uncertainty […] would be the effort to 
                                                          
43 Ray Benoit, ‘Emerson on Plato: The Fire’s Center’, American Literature, 34 (1963), 487-98 (p. 489). 
44 ‘Emerson on Plato’, p. 490. 
45 ‘Emerson on Plato’, p. 490. 
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understand the contradictions of fact and reason without any irritable reaching after one side 
at the expense of the other’.46 In doing so, however, she allows us to trace a number of 
significant philosophical affinities between her own approach and the Romantic tradition 
from which she borrows the phrase. Particularly significant here is the shared sense of the 
dialectical relationship between spirit and matter, which, as we shall see, is integral to both 
the Transcendentalist and psychoanalytic texts considered throughout this chapter. More 
intriguing still is the relationship of this dialectic to Benoit’s positing of an Emersonian 
notion of an intermediary ‘third realm where opposition ceases though neither item is reduced 
to the other’, a concept which anticipates almost verbatim ‘the potential space of thirdness’ 
that, as we shall see, is integral to the intersubjective models that both Benjamin and Irigaray 
develop throughout their work. 
Having discussed at some length the parallels that may be drawn between Irigaray and 
Benjamin, the allusion to Keats here also allows us to highlight a significant divergence in 
their theoretical praxes. For while both theorists engage in modes of redemptive critique, 
Irigaray remains inherently suspicious of established forms, advocating, as the opening 
quotation of this section articulates, so fundamental a change to the current order that it 
would ‘necessitate operations as yet non-existent’.47 To follow many critics who seek to 
dismiss Irigaray’s work on grounds of its seemingly reductive essentialism is, as Whitford 
argues, not a position which ‘stands up to scrutiny’, and I have already acknowledged above 
my reluctance to overstate this aspect of her writings. Having said this, I would argue that by 
exploring sexual difference through the gendering of certain modes of thought, indeed, 
through the gendering of the underpinning ideas themselves as opposed to the culturally 
determined ideals that they come to embody in popular discourse, Irigaray backs herself into 
                                                          
46 The Bonds of Love, p. 10. 
47 Speculum, p. 139. 
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a corner whereby the only possible resolution is, as she suggests, a fundamental overhaul of 
the current semiotic system. In contrast, Benjamin demonstrates a willingness, an eagerness 
even, to work with and within current psychoanalytic and cultural discourses, while all the 
time reshaping their relevance. We see this borne out in the following passage from a 2013 
article in which Benjamin looks back at the circumstances that enabled her to write The 
Bonds of Love: 
this position of not throwing the baby out with the bathwater would not have been 
satisfying without the ability to actually analyze what goes wrong when people 
uncritically embrace ideals. The perspective [was that] even ideals that took form in 
perverse and painful expression could be redeemed by understanding the desire and 
aspiration that lay beneath. […] This perspective allowed me to write Bonds of Love 
in light of what I felt were miscarriages in feminism […] and psychoanalysis while 
trying to redeem them both.48 
 
The central distinction I wish to identify here, then, amounts to the difference between 
rewriting the system itself and reimagining the contexts to which that system, model or idea 
are most progressively and productively suited. The first, it may be argued, is a practice that 
ultimately risks reimposing its own dialogical impasse between the sexes, while the latter 
mirrors more readily the reciprocal dynamic that both Irigaray and Benjamin ostensibly strive 
towards. As the central premise of this thesis argues, it is this integral distinction between 
original ideas and the cultural ideals that they come to evoke in the popular imagination that 
is most crucial to our understanding of the trajectory of New England Transcendentalism. 
For, as has already been discussed, and as Benoit also acknowledges, New England 
Transcendentalism is ‘a movement which, like Emerson himself, too often has been 
caricatured by an easy acceptance of the popular image’.49  
The analysis below will discuss Irigaray and Benjamin’s intersubjective models in 
greater detail, setting them into dialogue with close readings of both old and new 
                                                          
48 Benjamin, ‘The Bonds of Love: Looking Backward’, p. 4.  
49 ‘Emerson and Plato’, p. 490. 
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Transcendentalist texts. The readings recognise how elements of both New England 
Transcendentalism and feminist psychoanalysis – and particularly this dialectical interrelation 
between spirit and matter – converge in the writings of Robinson, Dillard and Adnan as a 
means of exploring the relationship between self and other, and of negotiating sexual and 
cultural difference. In doing so, this discussion continues to present New England 
Transcendentalism’s legacy in terms other than the overdetermined trope of (typically 
masculine) self-reliance and individualism, and to challenge critical conceptions of the 
movement which suggest that it is characterised by philosophical inconsistency. Instead, the 
close readings below demonstrate how the shifting and often ambivalent liminal poetics of 
New England Transcendentalism readily lends itself to contemporary explorations of sexual 
and cultural difference. 
Let us now draw back to the centrepiece of this thesis, which proposes a New 
Transcendentalism that recovers the progressive principles of nineteenth-century (and 
particularly Emersonian) Transcendentalism to articulate my writers’ intersectional 
experiences of contemporary U.S. culture. Below I offer three readings which consider the 
implications of the various strands introduced above in order to bear out this claim. The first 
offers an Irigarayan reading of Rebecca Solnit’s The Faraway Nearby. Following Kateb’s 
claim that ‘it is possible to see Emerson as above all an advocate of distance’, my reading 
explores how Solnit’s text reflects an Emersonian sense of both the ‘innavigable sea’ that 
separates the self from the other, and the tension between potentiality and actuality that arises 
from that dynamic. 50  Set into dialogue with Irigarayan readings of the mother-daughter 
relationship and applied to Solnit’s own fraught relationship with her mother, we can ground 
                                                          
50 Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘Self-Reliance’, in Selected Prose and Poetry, ed. by Reginald L. Cook (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), pp. 72-93 (pp. 82-3). 
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these abstract elements of Emerson’s philosophy in the reality of human interactions in such a 
way that is informed by the cultural, personal and political contexts in which they circulate.  
The second reads Marilynne Robinson’s Housekeeping in light of Jessica Benjamin’s 
concept of ‘the potential space of thirdness’. 51  Here, I examine how Robinson’s 
characterisation of Ruth bears out Emerson’s belief, cited above, that ‘there must be very 
two, before there can be very one’, and how Benjamin’s concept of thirdness provides a 
framework through which to explore the development of this dynamic throughout the novel. 
Returning to the specifically Transcendentalist mode of liminality that informs this thesis, my 
reading highlights again that coexistence of beauty and horror that is so integral to the 
Transcendentalist writings both old and new. Here, however, the Transcendentalist liminal 
experience in nature functions as a backdrop for the novel’s more pressing exploration of an 
interpersonal dynamic which is characterized simultaneously as a site of potentiality and 
existential jeopardy. 
The final reading opens a four-way dialogue between Diotima’s speech in Plato’s 
Symposium, Irigaray’s response to that speech in An Ethics of Sexual Difference, Emerson’s 
writings on both the poet and marital love, and Dillard’s 2007 novel, The Maytrees. While 
my readings of Solnit and Robinson centre on the implications of the intersubjective dynamic 
for female interactions, the final reading turns to a consideration of its implications for male-
female relationships. Similarly to both The Faraway Nearby and Housekeeping, the 
landscape of Dillard’s novel evokes a particularly Transcendentalist aesthetic, and I draw a 
connection between the Provincetown location of Dillard’s novel and that of Thoreau’s Cape 
Cod. Again, however, this landscape becomes primarily a backdrop against which to explore 
the more materialist concerns of human relationships. With reference to George Kateb’s 
                                                          
51  Jessica Benjamin, ‘Beyond Doer and Done to: An intersubjective view of thirdness’, Psychoanalytic 
Quarterly, 73 (2004), 5-46. 
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distinction between mental and active self-reliance, I examine how the respective trajectories 
of Lou and Toby Maytree bear out several key differences I see between Emersonian 
Transcendentalism on the one hand and my sense of New Transcendentalism on the other. 
Drawing back to the specifically Transcendentalist mode of liminality developed throughout 
this project, I argue that all three texts considered here may be understood as responding to a 
question posed by Branka Arsić: ‘What kind of love relationship or friendship is predicated 
on the necessity of leaving?’52  
  
‘A RIDDLE I HAD TO DECIPHER’: REBECCA SOLNIT’S THE FARAWAY NEARBY (2013) 
Within her introduction to Speculum, Irigaray contends that  
women’s rebellions are never aimed at the paternal function – which is sacred and 
divine – but at that powerful and then castrated mother, because she brought a 
castrated child into the world. […] The fact that the woman has not solved the 
relationship to her beginning, to her mother, to those of her own sex, affects her love 
relations.53 
 
The Faraway Nearby may be understood as Solnit’s attempt to solve (or at least work 
through, given that solve suggests the very teleological thinking that both Irigaray and Solnit 
are keen to resist) her relationship to her beginning and to her mother. Having recognised the 
structural similarities between The Faraway Nearby and A Field Guide to Getting Lost in the 
opening chapter, I wish to consider here another way in which these two works may be 
considered companion texts. For if the stories told in Field Guide are held together through 
their exploration of a series of intersecting liminal landscapes (the desert, the post-punk city, 
the shoreline), The Faraway Nearby’s series of liminal landscapes (the perpetual daytime of 
Reykjavik, the desert, and particularly the Grand Canyon) are woven together in terms of 
their relevance to the central thread of the text: Solnit’s poignant reconstruction of her 
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mother’s final months living with Alzheimer’s (itself, of course, a liminal phase) and the 
fraught history of their relationship. With those liminal contexts in mind, the reading below 
sets Solnit’s text into dialogue with Irigaray’s writings on the integral and symbolic mother-
daughter relationship, contending that Solnit’s liminal poetics is the primary means by which 
she works through that relationship. 
The Faraway Nearby is structured into thirteen chapters that move towards a pivotal 
‘Knot’ and, quite literally, back to their beginnings as the chapter titles repeat themselves in 
reverse order in the latter half. The first chapter explored one layer of meaning here, likening 
this pattern to the alternating chapters of A Field Guide to Getting Lost in order to establish 
the liminal poetics that both texts share. However, a consideration of the following passage 
from Irigaray’s To Speak is Never Neutral (1985; trans. 2002) adds another dimension to this 
reading:  
The Oedipus complex states the law of the non-return of the daughter to the mother. It 
cuts her off from her beginnings, her conception, her genesis, her birth, her childhood. 
[…] The limit of transference would appear to be in this distanceless proximity between 
women – between mother and daughter? – distanceless because no symbolic process 
allows us to account for it. […] A chiasmus takes place in the immediate, with no 
mirror. […] Has not history forced this impossibility upon them: they must live, cut off 
from their beginning, and from their end?54 
 
Read in light of this passage, the structure of Solnit’s text takes on new meaning, for we may 
now describe it as not only indicative of her wider liminal poetics, but, more specifically, as 
reflecting the chiastic structure of the mother-daughter relationship. The chapters unfold as 
such: Apricots – Mirrors – Ice – Flight – Breath – Wound – Knot – Unwound – Breath – 
Flight – Ice – Mirrors – Apricots. But what thread links these headings? In the context of 
Irigaray’s work, the shift from wound to unwound is particularly intriguing. For given the 
simultaneous connotations of both a winding thread and visceral wounding, we may perhaps 
describe this more appropriately as a connecting cord; as an attempt to move back and 
                                                          
54 Luce Irigaray, ‘The Limits of the Transference’, in The Irigaray Reader, pp. 105-17 (pp. 105-9).  
138 
 
beyond that first wound that establishes the ‘distanceless proximity […] between mother and 
daughter’.  
Irigaray makes much of ‘our separations from our first home. 55  In ‘The Bodily 
Encounter with the Mother’, she asserts that ‘the unavoidable and irreparable wound is the 
cutting of the umbilical cord’, before going on to argue that Western philosophy's skewed 
positioning of this severed bond as secondary to the ‘law of the father’ (as represented by the 
phallus) amounts to being severed from ‘the origins of our culture’. 56  As such, Irigaray 
asserts that:  
we must also find, find anew, invent the words, the sentences that speak the most 
archaic and most contemporary relationship with the body of the mother, with our 
bodies, the sentences that translate the bond between her body, ours, and that of our 
daughters. We have to discover […] words which do not bar the corporeal, but which 
speak corporeal.57 
 
As we shall see, The Faraway Nearby may be understood as engaging in such a project. The 
previous chapter alluded to the centrality of the corporeal throughout this text, tracing as it 
does not only her mother’s physical and psychological decline due to Alzheimer’s (discussed 
mainly in ‘Apricots’ and ‘Mirrors’, the opening and closing two chapters), but also Solnit’s 
own preventative cancer surgery, which serves as the primary focus of the pivotal ‘Knot’ 
chapter. It is due, in part, to this identification between her own corporality and her mother’s 
that Solnit begins to recognise her mother’s autonomous subjectivity as detached from her 
parental role, and thus begins to reconcile the fraught history of their relationship. Of course, 
such a reading cannot be established by considering the connection between these chapter 
headings alone. As we enter the first chapter proper, the connections become clearer. Solnit 
begins:  
To love someone is to put yourself in their place, we say, which is to put yourself in 
their story, or figure out how to tell yourself their story. […] What is it like to be the old 
                                                          
55 Luce Irigaray, ‘The Bodily Encounter with the Mother’, in The Irigaray Reader, pp. 34-46 (p. 40). 
56 ‘The Bodily Encounter’, pp. 40-1. 
57 ‘The Bodily Encounter’, p. 43. 
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man silenced by the stroke, the young man facing the executioner, the woman walking 
across the border, the child on the roller coaster, the person you’ve only read about, or 
the one next to you in bed?58  
 
While the experience outlined within this passage may perhaps be more readily understood as 
empathy, there is a clear parallel to be drawn here between this recognition of the other’s 
subjectivity and the Emersonian and psychoanalytic models of intersubjectivity outlined 
above. Though perhaps we needed to look no further than Solnit’s title to establish this 
connection, for what is ‘the faraway nearby’ if not a perfect analogy for the intersubjective 
experience, an allusion to just that ‘distanceless proximity’ that Irigaray identifies? 
In its recollection of her mother’s final years as Alzheimer’s disease takes hold, 
Solnit’s story is one of simultaneous growth and decay, loss and reclamation; a story 
mirrored by the ‘Apricots’ of the first and last chapters. A far cry from the redemptive 
readings of nature found elsewhere in her writings, this ‘mountain of apricots in every stage 
from hard and green to soft and browning’, which arrives within the opening pages, having 
been taken from their mother’s tree by her brother, presents an image of nature having 
outgrown its nurturing roots and in a state of terminal decline (5). ‘I had expected’, Solnit 
writes, ‘for them to look like abundance itself and they looked instead like anxiety’ (5). 
Throughout this first chapter, Solnit describes the apricots as an ‘inheritance from a mother 
who had given [her] almost nothing since [her] childhood’, as her ‘birthright, ‘a last harvest’, 
‘a magic seed’, ‘a riddle [she] had to decipher’, and in the final passage as ‘[seeming] to 
invoke old legacies and tasks and to be an allegory, but for what?’ (13-15). Here we find 
further echoes of Irigaray. For this uncanny mound of furry, fleshy, ripening and rotting fruit 
embodies, quite literally, the simultaneity of (and tensions between) abundance and anxiety, 
fecundity and decay, birthright and legacies that characterize the mother-daughter 
relationship throughout Irigaray’s work. This is perhaps most readily apparent if we turn once 
                                                          
58 Rebecca Solnit, The Faraway Nearby (London: Granta, 2013), p. 3. 
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more to ‘The Bodily Encounter with the Mother’, which first appears in Sexes and 
Genealogies (1987).59 It is notable that in the French original, the essay was entitled ‘Le 
corps-à-corps avec la mère’, a phrase which Gillian C. Gill acknowledges ‘has no simple 
translation in English’, connoting as it does both ‘armed combat between two warriors’ and, 
in Irigaray’s rendering, an encounter which generates ‘a new relationship between mother 
and child that accepts the body of both parties and moves toward a new imaginary and a new 
symbolic’.60  
If the ‘Apricots’ of the first and last chapters of Solnit’s book look like metaphorical 
equivalents of this corps-à-corps, then the ‘Mirrors’ of the second and penultimate chapters 
begin to flesh out the dynamic more explicitly. As we have already seen, ideas of mirroring 
and specularization are integral to Irigaray’s philosophy, providing as they do an analogy for 
the physical, historical and philosophical objectification of women. Thinking back to the 
earlier-cited quotation in which Irigaray describes the mother-daughter relationship as one in 
which ‘a chiasmus takes place in the immediate, with no mirror’, Solnit’s use of ‘Mirrors’ in 
the second and penultimate chapter of the text’s chiastic structure reads as her conscious 
attempt to reflect upon the fraught history of her relationship with her mother. Developing the 
fairytale theme introduced in the opening chapter – where they are described as being ‘almost 
always the stories of the powerless’ (14) – Solnit draws on the trope of the ‘mirror, mirror, on 
the wall’, remarking on how ‘that conjunction of mothers and mirrors made me recognize just 
how murderous my mother’s fury was’ (19). She depicts her mother as being ‘devoured by 
envy’, and acknowledges her mother’s sense ‘that beauty was the key to some happiness that 
                                                          
59 The essay was translated from a lecture Irigaray delivered at a Montreal conference entitled ‘Women and 
Madness’ in 1980. Here I am predominantly using David Macey’s translation as it appears in The Irigaray 
Reader (pp. 34-46); however, where Gillian C. Gill’s translation better articulates the premise of my argument, I 
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Relation to the Mother’. 
60 Luce Irigaray, Sexes and Genealogies, p. 9. 
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had eluded her, that she had been done out of something that was rightfully hers, whether it 
was her mother’s favor or her daughter’s golden hair’ (20). Here, by tracing her own 
mother’s problematic relationship with her grandmother, Solnit recognises the genealogical 
nature of these mother-daughter tensions. What is more, the fact that much of her mother’s 
envy stemmed from a belief that she was less physically attractive than her daughter 
demonstrates her internalization of the patriarchal values that seek to dictate her worth as a 
woman.  
We may draw this out further with reference to three interrelated points made by 
Irigaray. Firstly, in an essay entitled ‘Divine Women’, she posits that: 
female beauty is […] almost never perceived as a manifestation of, an appearance by 
a phenomenon expressive of interiority […] We look at ourselves in the mirror to 
please someone […] The mirror almost always serves to reduce us to a pure 
exteriority – of a very particular kind. It functions as a possible way to constitute 
screens between the other and myself.61  
 
Solnit’s experience bears out this claim. She suggests that, ‘for mothers, some mothers, my 
mother, daughters are division and sons are multiplication; the former reduce them, fracture 
them, take from them, the latter augment and enhance’ (21). She continues:  
The queen’s envy of Snow White is deadly. It’s based on the desire to be the most 
beautiful of them all, and it raises the question of whose admiration she needs […] At 
the back of this drama between women are men, the men for whom the queen wants 
to be beautiful, the men whose attention is the arbiter of worth and worthlessness. (21)  
 
Again, in this global to local narrowing from ‘[m]others, some mothers, my mother’, Solnit 
resists an essentialist presumption of what it is to be a mother whilst also bearing out the 
generalised tendency identified by Irigaray and others in the suggestion that the crux of the 
tension in her own experience was her ‘failure to be the miracle of her [mother’s] completion 
and to be instead her division’ (22).  
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Returning to ‘The Bodily Encounter’, Irigaray suggests that the resolution to these 
tensions may be to ‘try and situate ourselves within this female genealogy [on our mother’s 
side, for] this love is necessary if we are not to remain servants of the phallic cult, objects to 
be used by and exchanged between men, rival objects on the market, the situation in which 
we have always been placed’.62 This is a point she reinforces in a short interview originally 
published alongside ‘Le corps-à-corps avec la mère’ in 1987, in which she identifies the 
necessity for women to ‘establish a woman-to-woman relationship of reciprocity with our 
mothers, in which they might possibly also feel themselves to be our daughters’.63 And it is 
on this unexpected – and decidedly problematic – trajectory that Solnit’s mother’s 
deteriorating condition takes us. For if the ‘Mirrors’ of the first half of the text reflect an 
envious, bitter woman whose fury drives a wedge between herself and her daughter – and, 
indeed, a bitter daughter who remains bound by the perceived lack of affection extended to 
her throughout her childhood – those of the latter half present a much more balanced 
reciprocity between the two women: 
Finally, the war ended. She forgot the stories that fueled her wrath, and when they 
were gone, everything was different. […] Nearly all the grudges, comparisons, 
expectations, resentments, ancient histories, and anxious anticipations seemed to 
disappear in that second spring of her life. […] Mostly she was festive, even if those 
jokes that I was her mother had an edge – as well as an edge of confusion about how 
this world was organized and how we were related. With Alzheimer’s time runs 
backward, and given that, maybe I was her mother, and certainly I sometimes played 
a mother’s part. (225) 
 
The Faraway Nearby thus allows us to draw out Irigaray’s theories through a tangible 
exploration of sexual difference and its lived implications. Here, as ‘time runs backward’ for 
Solnit’s mother, she draws ever closer to that Irigarayan ideal of unmooring herself from the 
organising principles of a patriarchal order. And it is in these phases of her increasing ‘not-
knowing’ that Solnit and her mother find a more harmonious relation to one another (226). 
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Yet what conclusions are we to draw from this trajectory? Do we infer that Irigaray’s ideal is 
so incompatible with the complexities of human consciousness that it is only through 
debilitating neurological disease that it may be realised? Here the reader is once again 
projected into that ambivalent space that Solnit so often invokes, a space in which Solnit’s 
mother’s condition is presented as akin to a pharmakon, as explored in Jacques Derrida’s 
1968 essay, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’. Developed from Plato, the term refers to that which ‘acts as 
both remedy and poison [and] can be – alternately or simultaneously – beneficent or 
maleficent’.64  It is in this way that Solnit’s mother’s condition functions throughout The 
Faraway Nearby, as an element that ‘introduces itself into the body of the discourse with all 
its ambivalence’.65 Solnit presents her mother’s illness as at once that which sees her ‘being 
erased, a page returned to whiteness on its way to non-being’ and equally as marking a period 
in which she ‘achieved a new equilibrium and a new joy [having been] liberated from the 
burden of her past’ (222-5). Indeed, Derrida’s notion of the pharmakon is yet more apt, 
defined as it is as that which is both substance and anti-substance (‘nonidentity, nonessence, 
nonsubstance’), and also as that which ‘makes one stray from one’s general, natural, habitual 
paths and laws’ – a definition which describes most accurately the gradual shedding of 
identity that Solnit’s mother experiences throughout the narrative.66 
 In the very closing lines of ‘The Bodily Encounter’, Irigaray offers the following 
observation:  
Humanity might begin to wash itself clean of a sin. A woman celebrating the 
Eucharist with her mother, sharing with her the fruits of the earth she/they have 
blessed, could be delivered of all hatred or ingratitude towards her maternal 
genealogy, could be consecrated in her identity and her female genealogy.67  
 
                                                          
64 Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, trans. by Barbara Johnson (London: Athlone Press, 1981), p. 70. 
65 Dissemination, p. 70. 
66 Dissemination, p. 70. 
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It is in these lines that we find perhaps the most compelling parallel between the two texts. 
For having remarked in the closing line of the penultimate ‘Mirrors’ chapter, ‘[w]hat I have 
to say could count as a sutra or another sin’, Solnit’s final chapter turns our attention once 
more to that mound of apricots whose ‘faint sweet perfume’ lingers throughout her narrative 
(236). Now ‘two pints of those apricots from a summer long ago’ (240) are all that remains of 
that ‘human-size entity with a life of its own’ from the opening pages (12). Over the years, 
‘that unstable heap […] went onward as gifts’ to Solnit’s loved ones who helped her through 
‘that era of emergency’ (240). Reflecting on just what it was that those apricots ultimately 
represented for her, Solnit describes them as ‘a gift from my mother, or her tree, […] an 
invitation to examine the business of making and changing stories and locate the silences in 
between’ (240). The resonances here are clear, for in this act of sharing the fruits of her 
maternal family tree, not only literally in the form of ‘jams, preserves and liqueur’ but also in 
writing the story for which they were the catalyst, Solnit both works through her own fraught 
female genealogy and positions herself within a cultural genealogy of women who seek to 
redress the systematic silencings of women through history.  
 ‘If I had written about this earlier’, Solnit muses, ‘the story would have the aura of the 
courtroom, for I had been raised on the logic of argument and fact and being right, rather than 
the leap beyond that might be love’ (19). Developing Solnit’s line of thought here alongside 
themes introduced in the previous chapter, the close readings below go on to explore just this 
connection between teleological modes of thought that succumb to ‘the temptation of a neat 
ending […] in which everything is tied up, a sealed parcel, the end’, and the capacity of love 
to move us between and beyond these limiting narratives. For, as Solnit asks, ‘[w]hat if we 
only want openings, the immortality of the unfinished, the uncut thread, the incomplete, the 
open door and the open sea?’ (249). 
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MODELLING INTERSUBJECTIVITY I: JESSICA BENJAMIN’S ‘POTENTIAL SPACE OF 
THIRDNESS’ 
Drawing on the work of D. W. Winnicott and Margaret Mahler, the latter half of Benjamin’s 
‘Outline of Intersubjectivity’ draws out the fruitfulness of her intersubjective model for 
examining the mother-child relationship in particular. She recognises how the shifting power 
dynamics of this formative relationship bear out the Hegelian dialectic, and posits that ‘from 
the standpoint of intersubjective theory, the ideal resolution of the paradox of recognition is 
for it to continue as a constant tension between recognizing the other and asserting the self’ 
(40).  Extending Winnicott’s notion of ‘play’, Benjamin contends that the ability to 
differentiate between fantasy and fact, the ability to recognise that ‘it is in contrast to the 
fantasy of destruction that the reality of survival is so satisfying and authentic’ is integral to 
the intersubjective dynamic (42). The trajectory of intersubjective relatedness, Benjamin 
contends, ‘begins with “[w]e are feeling this feeling,” and then moves to “I know that you, 
who are an other mind, share this same feeling”’, before finally being able to recognise that 
‘“[w]e can share feelings without my fearing that my feelings are simply your feelings”’ (42-
3). 
If ‘An Outline of Intersubjectivity’ recognises the importance of this ‘field of 
intersection between two subjectivities’, Benjamin’s 2004 essay, ‘Beyond Doer and Done 
To’, sees her conceptualise this ‘field of intersection’, by developing ‘an intersubjective view 
of thirdness’.68 Intersubjectivity is here described as the process by which we ‘come to the 
felt experience of the other as a separate yet connected being with whom we are acting 
reciprocally’ (6). Following Emmanuel Ghent, Benjamin identifies a crucial distinction 
                                                          
68 Jessica Benjamin, ‘Beyond Doer and Done to: An intersubjective view of thirdness’, Psychoanalytic 
Quarterly, 73 (2004), 5-46. 
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between passive submission, whereby an individual ‘gives in’ or ‘gives over’ to another 
person, and active surrender to the other, whereby one accedes to ‘a letting go into being with 
them’ (8). The latter, Benjamin asserts, ‘requires […] that we follow some principle or 
process that mediates between self and other’ (8). By foregrounding this distinction, 
Benjamin again seeks to move beyond ‘the twoness of complementarity’, which, she argues, 
exacerbates the inevitable division between two subjectivities in such a way that emphasises, 
even perpetuates, their opposition. Instead, she identifies this mediating process as the means 
by which we create ‘the potential space of thirdness’ (11), effecting a space within the dyad 
that enables two distinct yet connected subjectivities to ‘shape a co-created reality’ (9). As 
Benjamin suggests, ‘in a world without shared thirds, without a space of collaboration or 
sharing, everything is mine or yours, including the perception of reality’ (21). 
Benjamin recognises the origin of the third in Lacan (himself influenced by Hegel), 
who, she says, understood the third ‘as that which keeps the relationship between two persons 
from collapsing’, a collapse that could manifest itself as either ‘merger (oneness), eliminating 
difference, or a twoness that splits the differences’ (11-12). Where Lacan’s argument falls 
down, Benjamin argues, is in its suggestion that this third is created by the father, whose 
‘prohibition […] constitutes the symbolic third’ (12). She argues that ‘thirdness […] cannot 
originate in the Freudian oedipal relation’, and is in fact ‘not literally instituted by a father (or 
other) as the third person’ (13), but must be created by the mother’s ability to ‘hold in tension 
her subjectivity […] and the needs of the child’ (13). In recognising a space that lies both 
within and beyond the dyad, then, the potential space of thirdness affords us a ‘vantage point 
outside the two’ which doesn’t require the intervening subjectivity of the father, thus opening 
an intersubjective space that enables difference and any resulting conflict to be ‘observed, 
held, mediated, or played with’ (7-8). As such, Benjamin concludes, ‘intersubjective 
thirdness can orient us toward responsibility and more rigorous thinking, even as our practice 
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of psychoanalysis becomes more emotionally authentic, more spontaneous and inventive, 
more compassionate and liberating’ (42).  
Drawing back to the Transcendentalist mode of liminality that underpins this project, 
Benjamin’s suggestion of a potential space of thirdness that lies betwixt and between 
interacting subjectivities clearly has strong resonances with Turner’s theories of liminality, 
and particularly his notion of communitas, through which – in its most immediate, 
‘spontaneous’ form – individuals ‘feel that all problems (not just their problems), whether 
emotional or cognitive, could be resolved, if only the group […] could sustain its inter-
subjective illumination’.69 Turner’s concept of liminoid phenomena also draws heavily on the 
concept of play. Similarly to Benjamin, Turner understands play as ‘being “subjective”, […] 
free from external constraints, where any and every combination of variables can be “played” 
with’, and thus as a space ‘in which new symbols, models, and paradigms arise – as the 
seedbeds of cultural creativity in fact’.70 The following section explores how this notion of 
play, as well as other aspects of Benjamin’s intersubjective model, are borne out within 
Marilynne Robinson’s debut novel, Housekeeping (1980).  
 
‘IT WAS AS IF I WAS HER SHADOW’: MARILYNNE ROBINSON’S HOUSEKEEPING (1980) 
Housekeeping centres on Ruth Foster, a young girl who, as a result of her mother’s 
unexplained suicide, spends her childhood alongside her sister, Lucille, in the small Midwest 
town of Fingerbone, under the care of their grandmother. Following their grandmother’s 
death, and the arrival and swift departure of their great-aunts, the girls are left under the care 
of their mother’s sister, Sylvie, a ‘drifter’ who returns to the town after many years of 
absence. Throughout the novel, Robinson positions Ruth as a liminal character oscillating 
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between her sister and her aunt, between Lucille’s increasing need to uphold social 
conventions and the apparent freedom of Sylvie’s transient lifestyle. The novel presents 
almost exclusively female characters, organised most often into female dyads: not only Ruth 
and Lucille / Ruth and Sylvie; but also Sylvie and Helen (Ruth’s mother) who, as we shall 
see, are also often conflated throughout the novel; and Nona and Lily, the two great-aunts 
who briefly look after Ruth and Lucille at the beginning. Indeed, the novel’s only significant 
male character is the grandfather who dies within the opening pages, and the only other male 
character is a cameo from the town sheriff who appears very briefly towards the close of the 
novel. Sarah Hartshorne is one of a number of critics who read the grandfather’s death as the 
moment at which Robinson ‘sends [American] culture’s patriarchal tradition to the bottom of 
Lake Fingerbone’, with the grandfather representing variously and simultaneously ‘the 
Creator, Noah, Adam, the American Adam, the American frontiersman, and primitive man’.71 
Hartshorne thus presents Housekeeping as a novel in which ‘Robinson has quietly and 
brilliantly revised, reinvented, and feminized the “traditional” canon of American literature. 
[…] She has made this tradition contemporary and has made it female.’72 Extending this 
reading within the context of my own discussion, we might say that, like Benjamin, Robinson 
challenges the need for an intervening masculine subjectivity, creating a world in which 
women relate to one another on their own terms. Indeed, the fact that Robinson projects these 
various interacting female subjectivities onto landscapes (both literal and literary) which have 
so long been colonized by the lone male subject renders his absence all the more 
conspicuous.  
Developing the relevance of Benjamin’s intersubjective model further, the discussion 
below applies her notion of thirdness across two overarching strands. The first considers 
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Ruth’s trajectory within the world of the novel, arguing that her inability to hold fantasy and 
reality in productive tension (evidenced, as will be shown, by the development of one stylistic 
trope in particular) and her tendency to define herself in relation to others rather than 
autonomously may be read in terms of an exploration of the intersubjective third. The second 
strand considers Ruth’s broader ideological function, arguing that, as a literary construct, she 
may be understood as representing the ‘potential space of thirdness’ itself, offering a 
mediating third perspective between the seemingly either/or trajectories represented by 
Lucille and Sylvie; between the typically feminine domestic stereotype and a ‘female hero, of 
sorts’ who I argue ultimately reads as a mirroring rather than a reimagining of the archetypal 
(and typically masculine) self-reliant figure. 73  In doing so, the discussion positions 
Housekeeping at the intersection between the New England Transcendentalist tradition and 
feminist models of psychoanalysis, recognising how liminal experiences in nature akin to 
those outlined in the previous chapter become a catalyst for Robinson’s exploration of the 
intersubjective dynamic and its implications for female experience. 
Many critics have drawn a parallel between the opening line of Housekeeping, ‘My 
name is Ruth’, and the much-quoted first sentence of Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick, ‘Call 
me Ishmael’.74 As Amy Hungerford asserts, the two statements set up different relationships 
between protagonist and reader: ‘Ishmael wants to enter into dialog with you, wants you to 
reach out towards him. Ruth offers you herself as something like the objective contemplation 
of a stranger.’ 75  Laura Barrett also identifies a number of shared narrative techniques 
including ‘philosophical ruminations, narrative digressions, poetic gestures, and disembodied 
voices’, proposing that ‘[like] Ishmael, Ruth is an orphan for whom flesh is merely an 
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illusion of stability and permanence which distracts us from the more vivid life of memory 
and dreams’.76 Setting these readings alongside the models outlined above, such narrative 
techniques align with the notion of ‘play’ as the process by which we negotiate between 
fantasy and reality. For Ruth, this process is most readily apparent in her favouring right from 
the opening pages of the narrative of one stylistic trope: 
One day my grandmother must have carried out a basket of sheets to hang in the spring 
sunlight, wearing her widow’s black, performing the rituals of the ordinary as an act of 
faith. Say that there were two or three inches of hard old snow on the ground […] and 
say she stooped breathlessly in her corset […] and say that when she had pinned three 
corners to the line it began to billow and leap in her hands. (16; emphases added) 
 
Here, in direct contrast to the passivity that several critics have observed within the novel’s 
opening lines, Ruth’s narrative voice becomes increasingly assertive, due to the repeated use 
of the imperative, ‘say that’, a device through which Robinson conspicuously foregrounds the 
process of shared imagination between the reader and her protagonist. 77  Indeed, these 
passages are so real to Ruth that they become blurred into a memory; they become spaces 
with their own dimensions and sensory landscapes: ‘the wind would be sour with stale snow 
and death and pine pitch and wildflowers’ (16). For Ruth, as we shall see, these passages 
invariably serve to reconnect her to the family members she has lost and particularly her 
mother, becoming a means by which she manages her grief by creating a holding space 
between her objective reality and the recurring memories of the departed. My analysis 
identifies the recurrence of this stylistic device at key moments in the narrative, examining 
their significance in relation to Ruth’s increasingly fragile sense of her own subjectivity. 
In ‘Beyond Doer and Done to’, Benjamin acknowledges that her approach is 
influenced by Winnicott’s idea of ‘potential or transitional space’ (7). Derived from the 
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primary sense of the mother who is able to ‘bear the other within, […] without fusing 
together’, Winnicott argues that the concept of holding may be expanded to encompass those 
more abstract processes by which, as we grow older, we take on ‘responsibility for the other’, 
in such a way that enables each person to ‘remain connected without being compromised’.78 
Much like Turner’s elaboration of van Gennep’s rites of passage framework, Benjamin’s 
intersubjective model places particular emphasis on this transitional space. Where 
Winnicott’s model presents it as a function of two subjectivities, borne out of their real-world 
interactions, Benjamin theorises the potential space of thirdness as a mediating third entity in 
its own right: an intervening space to which, as has been outlined above, both subjectivities 
surrender themselves willingly and productively, rather than submitting themselves to ‘an 
idealized person or thing’.79  
Throughout the first half of the novel, Lucille plays the role of Ruth’s significant 
other. As they become more accustomed to Sylvie’s erratic behaviour, however, a divide 
begins to develop between the two girls. At the beginning of Chapter Six, Ruth remarks: ‘In 
spring I had begun to sense that Lucille’s loyalties were with the other world. With fall began 
her tense and passionate campaign to naturalize herself to it. The months that intervened were 
certainly the last and perhaps the first true summer of my life’ (95). She recalls the days 
during that ‘very long’ summer when she and Lucille would ‘run off into the woods’, 
exploring the liminal spaces at the edge of the town, ‘the little clearings, the burned-off 
places where wild strawberries grew’ (95-6). It is often within these liminal spaces that 
Ruth’s imperative voice returns. Here, she imagines those who perished during the train 
wreck being resurrected: ‘Say that this resurrection was enough to include my grandmother, 
and Helen, my mother. Say that Helen lifted our hair from our napes with her cold hands and 
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gave us strawberries from her purse.’ Say that my grandmother pecked our brows with her 
whiskery lips, and then all of them went down the road to our house’ (96). At this point in the 
narrative, while pure fantasy, this moment retains its coherence. At the same time, Ruth 
remarks: ‘in recollection I feel no reluctance to speak of Lucille and myself almost as a single 
consciousness even through the course of that summer’ (98). Reading this passage in light of 
Benjamin’s notion of thirdness, Ruth’s lack of any reluctance and also this use of ‘almost’ are 
significant, for in this willing surrender to her bond with her sister, she maintains an 
awareness of their distinct perspectives. She continues:  
It was not the pleasures at home at suppertime that lured us back to Sylvie’s house. 
Say rather that the cold forced me home, and that the dark allowed Lucille to pass 
through the tattered peripheries of Fingerbone unobserved. It is accurate to say that 
Lucille went to the woods with me to escape observation. I myself felt the gaze of the 
world as a distorting mirror that squashed her plump and stretched me narrow. […] I 
went to the woods for the woods’ own sake, while, increasingly, Lucille seemed to be 
enduring a banishment there. (99) 
 
Here, Ruth and Lucille’s relationship is presented as an exemplar of the functioning 
intersubjective dynamic, whereby ‘each person experiences the other as a “like subject”, 
another mind who can be “felt with”, yet has a distinct, separate center of feeling and 
perception’.80 Pages later, we enter a pivotal scene in the novel, when Lucille and Ruth find 
themselves stranded in the woods at night.  
Convinced by Lucille to stay, the two girls build themselves a shelter: ‘We pulled 
down fir limbs and made a roof and floor. It was a low and slovenly structure, to all 
appearances random and accidental’ (114). The description of this place recalls both 
Emerson’s beauty and Thoreau’s horror: ‘The two arms of the land that enclosed the bay 
were like floes of darkness, pouring into the lake from mountains brimming with darkness, 
but stopped and turned to stone in the brilliant ether’ (115). It is this ambivalence that 
characterises Ruth’s experience. This liminal landscape elicits simultaneously ‘sounds in a 
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dream’ and ‘sounds of stealthy approach – the sense of disturbed intention’; it is a space 
where ‘all [their] human boundaries were overrun’ (115). Despite this implication of 
existential jeopardy, it is notable that by recognising that ‘Lucille would tell this story 
differently’, Ruth again conspicuously recognises herself and her sister as two distinct 
subjectivities (116). Moreover, this liminal experience in nature encourages Ruth to raise her 
imperative voice once more: ‘Say that my mother was as tall as a man and that she sometimes 
set me on her shoulders so that I could splash my hands in the cold leaves above our heads. 
Say that my grandmother sang in her throat while she sat on her bed and we laced up her big 
black boots’ (116). As before, the fantasy holds its structure, holds its referents and remains 
within the realms of coherence. As the sun begins to rise, the ambivalent tone intensifies; 
Ruth describes how ‘half a dozen daubs of cloud, dull powder pink, sailed high in a pale-
green sky, rust-red at the horizon. Venus shone a heatless planetary white among these parrot 
colors, and earth lay unregenerate so long that it seemed to me for once all these 
blandishments might fail. The birds of our world were black motes in that tropic’ (117). This 
experience eludes a definitive response; Robinson’s description (and implicitly Ruth’s 
consciousness) is able to maintain these ambivalent aspects in tension, allowing both the 
beauty and the hostility of nature to co-exist. The sun rises: ‘[a]t last it became an ordinary 
day’ (117). This episode marks a critical point in the narrative, providing the final catalyst for 
Lucille’s departure. 
 When they return to the house, Lucille is appalled by Sylvie’s apparent lack of 
concern, and, waking the next morning, recounts ‘a terrible dream’: ‘I was a baby, lying on 
my back, yelling, and then someone came and started wrapping me up in blankets. She put 
them all over my face, so I couldn’t breathe. She was singing and holding me, and it was sort 
of nice, but I could tell she was trying to smother me’ (120). When Ruth pushes Lucille as to 
the identity of the smothering mother-figure, Lucille replies: ‘She reminded me of Sylvie, I 
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guess’ (120). In a skewing of Winnicott’s notion of the mother’s self-affirming embrace, this 
image of the mother-figure’s attempts to care for the child becoming (or perhaps more 
importantly perceived as becoming) a threat of smothering acknowledges Lucille’s 
recognition of the threat Sylvie poses to both her and Ruth’s subjective autonomy. It is this 
dream that sets in motion the chain of events that sees Lucille leave Ruth, Sylvie and the 
family home. Even as she is recounting her dream to Ruth, Lucille is encouraging her to 
‘change her clothes’ and ‘fix her hair’ (119). Ruth initially succumbs, accepting the pin curls 
and conservative outfit that Lucille imposes upon her. Once out in public, however, Lucille 
notices Ruth’s discomfort, exclaiming: ‘We have to improve ourselves! Starting right now!’ 
(123). Unconvinced, Ruth turns away from her sister. Leaving Lucille standing in the street, 
Ruth finds herself alone for the first time in the novel: 
I was left alone, in the gentle afternoon, indifferent to my clothes and comfortable in 
my skin, unimproved and without the prospect of improvement. It seemed to me that 
Lucille would busy herself forever, nudging, pushing, coaxing, as if she could supply 
the will I lacked, to pull myself into some seemly shape and slip across the wide 
frontiers into that other world, where it seemed to me that I could never wish to go. 
For it seemed to me that nothing I had lost, or might lose, could be found there, or to 
put it another way, it seemed that something I had lost might be found in Sylvie’s 
house. (123-4) 
 
Here, while the passage initially presents itself as a moment of liberating self-affirmation in 
which Ruth is at last able to identify her own autonomy, the final line undercuts the self-
affirming rhetoric of the passage, for, in the space of a sentence, Ruth has reinterpreted the 
movement away from Lucille as inevitably a movement towards Sylvie. Yet in the liminal 
state between walking away from Lucille, and arriving back with Sylvie, another ambivalent 
revelation ensues. The passage continues: 
As I walked toward it, and the street became more and more familiar, […] each 
particular tree, and its season, and its shadow, were utterly known to me. […] I had 
seen two of the apple trees in my grandmother’s orchard die where they stood. […] It 
seemed to me that what perished need not also be lost. […] And yet as I approached 
the house I was newly aware of the changes that had overtaken it. The lawn was knee 
high, an oily, dank green, and the wind sent ripples across it. It had swamped the 
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smaller bushes and the walk and the first step of the front porch and had risen to the 
height of the foundation. (124-5) 
 
Here, Ruth again recognises her own subjective and self-affirming relationship with the 
landscape. Moreover, in this moment of detachment from either Lucille or Sylvie, and despite 
having convinced herself that ‘what perished need not also be lost’, Ruth’s more objective 
clarity allows her to recognise the cycle of decline that is taking hold of her family home. 
That Ruth frames this movement from Lucille to Sylvie as a potential reconciliation of loss is 
also significant. For if this passage serves to reiterate Ruth’s affinity with the natural 
landscape, it also symbolises the increasingly toxic environment that the family home and the 
relationships forged there – cycles of trauma mirrored down the generations – have created. 
While Ruth-as-narrator seems to retrospectively recognise this as a moment of potentiality, 
however, Ruth’s younger self fails to do, returning home in the belief that Sylvie can fulfil 
whatever void may be created by Lucille’s departure. By the end of the chapter, Lucille has 
left to live with Miss Royce, the home economics teacher. 
The very next morning, Sylvie decides to take Ruth out across the lake, ostensibly in 
search of ‘the children in the woods’ (148). As they head out into the landscape, Ruth 
remarks:  
Sylvie was in front of me, and I put my hands in my pockets, and tilted my head, and 
strode, as she did, and it was as if I were her shadow, and moved after her only 
because she moved and not because I willed this pace. […] I walked after Sylvie 
down the shore, […] and I thought, We are the same. She could as well be my mother. 
I crouched and slept in her very shape like an unborn child. (144-5) 
 
In contrast to the scenes with Lucille, in which Ruth is able to maintain the space between 
herself and her sister, Ruth’s assertions here that it was ‘as if I were her shadow’ and ‘[w]e 
are the same’ indicate the loss of the mediating transitional space between herself and Sylvie. 
Moreover, the fact that Ruth recognises that she follows Sylvie ‘because she moved and not 
because I willed this pace, this pocketing of the hands, this tilt of the head’ and that 
‘following her required no will nor effort’ presents this as a scene not of willing surrender to 
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an intersubjective third but of passive submission to the other. Indeed, that this moment refers 
directly to the relationship between a mother and her unborn child gestures towards the 
psychoanalytic resonances of this scene, and supports my reading of this passage as 
indicating the collapse of the intersubjective third. Once arrived in the woods, Ruth suddenly 
finds herself alone: 
Sylvie was gone. She had left without a word, or a sound. […] I pretended not to 
know I was alone. I could see why Sylvie thought children might come here. Any 
child who saw once how the gleaming water spilled to the tips of branches, and 
rounded and dropped and pocked the softening shadows of frost at the foot of each 
tree, would come to see it again. […] I knew why Sylvie felt there were children in 
the woods. I felt so, too, though I did not think so. (153-4)  
 
Here, while the movement of the narrative once again traces an underlying affinity between 
Ruth with the natural landscape around her, we see that this innate connection is 
overshadowed by her tendency to frame her own experience through Sylvie’s perspective. 
Where before Ruth still differentiated between her own subjectivity and Lucille’s, here she 
seems to experience the scene vicariously through Sylvie’s eyes. This is demonstrated within 
the sentence ‘I could see why Sylvie thought children might come here’: even in 
acknowledging her own awareness of the beauty of the place in which she finds herself, she 
distances herself two-fold from that experience by articulating it from the perspective of an 
imagined character in someone else’s mind. This dynamic is reiterated within the final 
sentence: ‘I knew why Sylvie felt there were children in the woods. I felt so, too, though I did 
not think so.’ 
 As would be the small child left without its mother, Ruth is initially calm. Indeed, she 
frames the experience as a game, as literally ‘playing’: ‘I thought she must be teasing, 
perhaps watching me from the woods. I pretended not to know I was alone’ (153). When 
Sylvie doesn’t return, however, the moment swiftly descends into one of existential crisis:  
I let the numbing grass touch my ankles. I thought, Sylvie is nowhere, and sometime it 
will be dark. Let them come unhouse me of this flesh, and pry this house apart. It has 
no shelter now, it only kept me here alone and I would rather be with them. […] If I 
157 
 
could see my mother, it would not have to be her eyes, her hair, […] The lake had taken 
that, I knew. […] She was a music I no longer heard, […], lost to all sense, but not 
perished, not perished. (159-60) 
 
This episode, then, very closely bears out Winnicott and Benjamin’s thinking. In Playing and 
Reality, Winnicott posits: ‘[i]t is only a matter of days or hours or minute [that the child can 
bear the mother’s absence]. Before the limit is reached the mother is still alive; after this limit 
has been overstepped she is dead. In between is a precious moment of anger but this is 
quickly lost, or perhaps never experienced, always potential and carrying fear of violence.’81 
The fact that Sylvie’s disappearance provokes not only the memory of her mother’s 
abandonment, but also the fear of her own death and disembodiment, demonstrates the extent 
to which the boundaries between herself, her mother and Sylvie have collapsed. Sylvie 
returns and we are once again presented with an image of mother-child holding. She opens 
her coat and wraps it around Ruth, in such a way that ‘prevented even the seep of light 
through [Ruth’s] eyelids’, rocking her to some unsung rhythm and simply repeating ‘I know, 
I know, I know’ (160-1). This moment clearly echoes Lucille’s dream cited earlier in the 
novel. While Lucille recognised this for the threat to her identity that it was, however, Ruth 
wears Sylvie’s coat ‘like beatitude’ (161). This is not to say, of course, that Ruth does not 
acknowledge the power dynamics at play here. She recognises ‘the pleasure she took in my 
dependency’, and the fact that ‘her expression was intent and absorbed. There was nothing of 
distance or civility in it. It was as if she was studying my face in a mirror’ (161). What is 
more, she acknowledges that: ‘I was angry that she had left me for so long, […] that by 
abandoning me she had assumed the power to bestow such a richness of grace, [yet] I would 
say nothing that might make her loosen her grasp or take one step away’ (161).  
This moment is a clear example of Ghent’s definition of submission as ‘an agonizing, 
though at times temporarily exciting masquerade […]: a self-negating submissive experience 
                                                          
81 D. W. Winnicott, Playing and Reality (London and New York: 1990), p. 22. 
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in which the person is enthralled by the other’. 82  It is notable, therefore, that as her 
connection with Sylvie intensifies, the strength of agency found in those striking narrative 
digressions wanes. As they row back to Fingerbone, Ruth muses: ‘Say that water lapped over 
the gunwales, and I swelled and swelled until I burst Sylvie’s coat. Say that the water and I 
bore the rowboat down to the bottom, and I, miraculously, monstrously, drank water into all 
my pores until the last black cranny of my brain was a trickle, a spillet’ (162). Unlike those 
earlier instances of this patterning that draw the reader into Ruth’s subjectivity, I would argue 
that this is precluded in this passage in that the moment has become so detached from 
external reality that it offers no frame of shared reference. Sylvie and Ruth return to the town 
and the final chapter of the novel sees them attempt to burn down the family home before 
embarking on a life together as drifters. As they depart from Fingerbone, Ruth remarks: ‘I 
think that night we were almost a single person’ (209). In her reading of the novel’s ending, 
Karen Walker asserts that 
Robinson achieves a more positive ending for her women characters […] At last, Sylvie 
and Ruthie can revel in being “cast out to wander,” can rejoice in the “end to 
housekeeping,” together and alone. […] Sylvie and Ruthie become able not only to 
self-define what female or domestic community means, but also to claim autonomy.83  
 
In light of the reading ventured here, however, I would argue that Walker’s sense of a 
positive ending for Ruth and Sylvie is highly problematic, particularly when we consider the 
closing passages of the novel: 
Imagine Lucille in Boston […] Sylvie and I do not flounce in through the door […] My 
mother, likewise, is not there, and my grandmother […] and my grandfather […] does 
not examine the menu with studious interest. We are nowhere in Boston. However 
Lucille may look, she will never find us there, or any trace or sign. We pause nowhere 
in Boston, even to admire a store window, and the perimeters of our wandering are 
nowhere. […] She does not watch, does not listen, does not wait, does not hope, and 
always for me and Sylvie. (218-19)  
 
                                                          
82 Emmanuel Ghent, ‘Masochism, Submission, Surrender: Masochism as a Perversion of Surrender’, 
Contemporary Psychology, 26 (1990), 108-36 (p. 112). 
83 Karen Walker, ‘Autonomous but not Alone: The Reappropriation of Female Community in The Women of 
Brewster Place and Housekeeping’, Contemporary Women’s Writing, 6 (2012), 56-73 (p. 72). 
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Here we find a complete reversal from that imperative voice employed elsewhere in the 
novel. Where before these passages served to draw Ruth’s lost ancestors into her real-world 
experience, here the same technique sees Ruth herself draw into their ghostly world. As such, 
this recurring stylistic trope reads as a narrative marker for Ruth’s progressive detachment 
from her everyday reality or, more specifically, her gradual transition towards inhabiting 
liminality – a skewed echo of Emerson’s notion that ‘power resides in the moment of 
transition’.84 Rather than being able to ‘claim autonomy’, the repeated negation within these 
final pages enacts, to recall Ghent, the ‘self-negating submissive [nature of Ruth’s] 
experience’ (112). Thinking back, there is a distinct irony in Ruth’s earlier fear of being 
forced by Lucille to ‘slip across the wide frontiers into that other world [where she] could 
never wish to go’ (123) – is her fate by the end of the novel a more hopeful trajectory for a 
female character? It is hard to see how it could be argued so and I would thus contest 
Walker’s suggestion that Ruth and Sylvie are somehow able to ‘self-define what female or 
domestic community means’. 
 In When I Was a Child I Read Books, Robinson discusses Sylvie’s function within the 
novel. She begins by acknowledging that her ‘one great objection to the American hero was 
that he was inevitably male – in decayed forms egregiously male’.85 Robinson here evokes 
that ubiquitous image of the self-reliant patriarch exemplified, as we will see in the following 
chapter, in both Transcendentalist philosophy and (in increasingly decayed forms) in the 
ideology of the American West. Robinson herself traces this trajectory of the American hero 
from Whitman (‘the outsider’) and Thoreau (‘the critic’) to ‘the vernacular tradition of the 
Western myth [in which] he is a rescuer and avenger’, recognising that ‘in every version, he 
expresses discontent with society’ (92). For Robinson, however, ‘there is no inevitable 
                                                          
84 Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘Self-Reliance’, in Selected Prose and Poetry, pp. 72-93 (p. 84). 
85 Marilynne Robinson, When I Was a Child (London: Virago, 2012), p. 92. 
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conflict between individualism as an ideal and a very positive interest in the good of society’ 
(92). This is borne out within her characterisation of Sylvie, in which Robinson contends that 
her aim was to envision ‘a female hero, of sorts, also an outsider and a stranger’ (92). She 
continues: ‘while Sylvie obviously has her own history, to the degree that she has not taken 
the impress of society she expresses the fact that human nature is replete with nameless 
possibilities, and, by implication, that the world is accessible to new ways of understanding’ 
(92)  
 In light of my reading above, however, can we really say that Sylvie’s mode of living 
reflects a world ‘replete with nameless possibilities’, or that Ruth and Sylvie’s trajectory 
suggests a world open ‘to new ways of understanding’? Several critics have argued as such, 
positioning Sylvie and her way of life as the novel’s liberating force and as the non-
conformist solution to the conventional way of life signified by Lucille. Often this is drawn 
out in terms of Sylvie’s apparent affinity with the natural world: Galehouse, for instance, 
makes reference to her ‘hobo habits, which are informed, more than anything, by the 
unpredictability of Mother Nature’.86 She later aligns Sylvie more explicitly with Emersonian 
principles, in her assertion that ‘Robinson revises Emerson's notions of the dominion of man 
in her presentation of Sylvie, who is conducted by nature as often as she conducts it’.87 I 
would argue, however, that Sylvie is actually more closely aligned with man-made, urban 
imagery rather than the natural. For example, Ruth remarks that ‘Sylvie had no awareness of 
time’ and while this may initially be aligned with a Transcendentalist sense of living in the 
rhythms of nature, she goes on to clarify that ‘for [Sylvie], hours and minutes were the names 
of trains’ (165-6). Indeed, the railroad comes to be intrinsically linked to Sylvie throughout 
the narrative and she is located less in the natural landscape and more often on bridges, park 
                                                          
86  Maggie Galehouse, ‘Their Own Private Idaho: Transience in Marilynne Robinson’s Housekeeping’, 
Contemporary Literature, 41 (2000), 117-37 (pp. 122-3) 
87 ‘Their Own Private Idaho’, p. 131. 
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benches, or in a boat. Moreover, it is striking that in the novel’s closing pages Ruth and 
Sylvie are depicted not in fields, or woods, or by a lake, but in the city, window shopping and 
supporting themselves by waitressing. As such, I would argue that Housekeeping precludes 
any privileging of either of the two potential futures presented within the novel, and that both 
are bound by those teleological principles that Emerson and his fellow Transcendentalists 
sought to undermine. Thus I would suggest that the ending may be read as ultimately 
upholding as opposed to subverting dominant ideals of female experience in their suggestion 
that the space for those unwilling to conform is … nowhere. 
 Such a reading is borne out by Robinson’s own remarks when asked to respond to 
readings of Housekeeping which foreground the numerous oppositions within the novel – and 
particularly the assumption that Sylvie’s way of life is privileged over that of Lucille and the 
other townspeople: ‘When I write in general I try not to create oppositions. What I’ve tried to 
do whenever there are conflicts is to make both sides as equal as possible.’88 In this context, 
given Ruth’s position as a mediating perspective between the seemingly binary options 
represented by Lucille and Sylvie – indeed, her position as the potential space of thirdness 
from which Robinson examines these opposing trajectories – I conclude here by suggesting 
that it is ultimately Ruth rather than Sylvie who most readily embodies the New 
Transcendentalist perspective ventured throughout this thesis. The previous chapter has 
already established how Robinson understands her tendency to open dialogical space in her 
writings as one of the most significant ways in which she has been influenced by the 
nineteenth-century New England (and particularly Emersonian) tradition. Ruth exemplifies 
this sensibility in her capacity to hold contradictory elements in tension. We have already 
seen this in her tendency (as a narrative voice) to experience the world at the intersection 
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between fantasy and reality, and also within her capacity to recognise the simultaneity of 
beauty and hostility in the natural environment. Elsewhere, Robinson draws attention to 
Ruth’s ability to conceive of a mode of living in which stasis and transience are not mutually 
exclusive: ‘It seemed to me that if [Sylvie] could remain transient here, she would not have to 
leave’ (103). Robinson encapsulates the anti-teleological perspective that is so integral to 
Transcendentalist writings. For Ruth, however, as I suggest is integral to the New 
Transcendentalist perspective, this recognition of productive ambivalence is not simply an 
abstract sense of ‘poetic creativeness’, but a mode which is itself prefigured by and thus 
borne out of her intersectional lived experience.  
 
MODELLING INTERSUBJECTIVITY II: DIOTIMA'S DIALECTIC 
Irigaray opens An Ethics of Sexual Difference with a reading of Plato’s Symposium, the first 
in a series of dialogues between herself and – similarly to Emerson’s Representative Men – 
six significant men of Western philosophy: Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Merleau-
Ponty and Levinas (5). Irigaray focuses her attention on Diotima, the woman to whom Plato 
‘gives the floor’ in his dialogue on love (20). Yet, as Irigaray recognises, ‘[s]he does not take 
part in these exchanges or in this meal among men. She is not there. She herself does not 
speak. Socrates reports or recounts her words’ (20). What Diotima presents in absentia and 
proleptically, however, is, Irigaray contends, an alternative to the Hegelian dialectic, one 
which ‘doesn't use opposition to make the first term pass into the second in order to achieve a 
synthesis of the two’ (20). Rather, Diotima's voice 
establishes an intermediary that will never be abandoned as a means or a path [but 
instead] unveils the instance of a third term that is already there and that permits 
progression [and represents] the existence or the in-stance of that which stands 
between, that which makes possible the passage between ignorance and knowledge. 
[…] The mediator is never abolished in an infallible knowledge. Everything is always 
in movement, in a state of becoming. (20-1) 
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The backwards shift Irigaray identifies here from a Hegelian dialectic of thesis-antithesis-
synthesis to a Diotimian dialectic that proposes ‘at least four terms: the here, the two poles of 
the encounter, and the beyond – but a beyond that never abolishes the here’, coupled with the 
notion of ‘an intermediary that will never be abandoned as a means or a path’, has clear 
resonances with the Transcendentalist mode of liminality explored throughout this thesis, 
particularly as articulated in Emerson’s notion of ‘[residing] in the moment of transition from 
a past to a new state’, and, by extension, the resultant shift identified in the previous chapter 
from understanding Emerson’s poetics as one of transition towards one of liminality (20-
21). 89  Building on that earlier analysis, here we explore the implications of Diotima’s 
dialectic across three texts: Diotima’s speech in Plato’s Symposium, Irigaray’s response to 
that speech in An Ethics of Sexual Difference, and Emerson’s 1844 essay, ‘The Poet’. I argue 
that while they place their emphasis on different elements of the dialectic – Emerson on its 
implications for art and the artist, and Irigaray on its implications for love and the lover – 
both texts are underpinned by the logic (or, we might say, the liminal poetics) of Diotima’s 
dialectic. 
Throughout Diotima’s speech we see, again, the close interrelation of model and 
mode that characterises the work of the various writers considered throughout this thesis – 
New England Transcendentalists, recent and current theorists, and Solnit, Dillard, Adnan and 
Robinson alike. Indeed, Irigaray identifies this as an integral aspect of Diotima’s method, 
remarking that ‘this mediating role is indicated as part of the theme, but is also perpetually at 
issue, on stage, in the exposition of the theme’ as Diotima ‘ceaselessly examines Socrates on 
his positions but without positing authoritative, already constituted truths’ (21-2). Here, much 
like Dillard’s method exemplified throughout Pilgrim at Tinker Creek and discussed at length 
in the previous chapter, Diotima demonstrates a knowing self-assurance whilst 
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simultaneously calling into question, quite literally, received notions of power and wisdom. 
Diotima – by extension, Irigaray too – presents love as ‘a mediator par excellence’ between 
all oppositions, and particularly between ‘reality and already established knowledge’ (21). 
Irigaray goes on to describe love as that which is ‘never fulfilled, always becoming’ and 
which ‘both leads the way and is the path’ (21). Despite the biblical overtones of this latter 
description, however, both Diotima and Irigaray refute the notion of Love 
(anthropomorphised interchangeably as Love/Eros throughout Irigaray’s essay) as a god, but 
instead emphasise its daemonic qualities: ‘He is neither mortal nor immortal. He is between 
the one and the other’ (21-2).90 ‘His function’, Irigaray contends, ‘is to transmit to the gods 
what comes from men and to men what comes from the gods’ (23). She goes on to describe 
love as that which ‘puts everything in touch with itself’, and asserts that ‘a being of middle 
nature is needed so that men and gods can enter into relations, into conversation while awake 
or asleep’ (23). Recognising Eros as the offspring of Plenty and Poverty (translated in the 
original Plato text used throughout this section as Resource and Need respectively), Irigaray 
follows Diotima in characterising Eros as a philosopher, and thus as ‘a seeker after wisdom 
[who is] midway between wise and ignorant’ and forever existing in a state between having 
and lacking.91 Diotima also asserts the inevitability of Eros’s love of and perpetual quest for 
beauty, having been conceived ‘on the day of Aphrodite’s birth [when] the gods were making 
merry’.92 Clearly, both characterisations resonate strongly with Emerson’s idealised figure of 
the poet, whose liminal perspective has been discussed within the previous chapter. 
                                                          
90 For an example of the ‘biblical overtones’ I allude to here, see Proverbs 3 and 4, New American Standard 
Bible, and particularly lines 10-12 of the latter: ‘Hear, my son, and accept my sayings, And the years of your life 
will be many. / I have directed you in the way of wisdom; I have led you in upright paths. / […] Take hold of 
instruction; do not let go. / Guard her, for she is your life.’ While it is outside the scope of this discussion, much 
could be made here of the resonances between themes of father-son genealogies, wisdom and love, ‘teleological 
quests’, and the mother as patriarchally-determined object. 
91 Plato, ‘Symposium, or The Drinking Party’, in Symposium and other Dialogues, intro. by John Warrington 
(Letchworth: Aldine Press, 1964), p. 37.  
92 ‘Symposium’, p. 37. 
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As we have seen, Emerson’s ideal poet ‘stands between partial men for the complete 
man’, much like the figure Diotima describes who ‘puts everything in touch with itself’. 
Emerson positions his ideal poet as one who appears to the common man as ‘more himself 
than he is’, and stresses that, much like Diotima’s philosopher (the offspring of Plenty and 
Poverty who is ‘never altogether in or out of need’), ‘so the poet's habit of living should be 
set on a key so low and plain, that the common influences should delight him’.93 The essay 
goes on to posit that ‘the man is only half himself, the other half is his expression’, and thus 
that ‘we need an interpreter’.94 He contends that this duty – much like Diotima’s notion of a 
being through whom ‘men and gods can enter into relations, into conversation while awake 
or asleep’ – falls to the poet, ‘the person in whom these powers are in balance, the man 
without impediment, who sees and handles that which others dream of, traverses the whole 
scale of experience, and is representative of man, in virtue of being the largest power to 
receive and to impart’.95 Indeed, in keeping with his ‘middle nature’, Emerson’s poet is a 
‘liberating god […] who shall sing of gods and their descent unto men’, who ‘unlocks our 
chains, and admits us to a new scene’.96  
The daemonic nature of both art and love and the relationship between these two 
interrelated concepts is central to both Diotima’s speech and Irigaray’s essay. For Diotima, 
the term poet itself reflects ‘just the same mistake’ as is made when we ‘give the name of 
Love to what is only one single aspect of it’.97 She continues:  
every kind of artistic creation is poetry, and every artist is a poet. […] But all the same, 
we don’t call them all poets do we? […] And that’s how it is with Love. For Love […] 
includes every kind of longing for happiness and for the good […] the man who 
                                                          
93 Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘The Poet’, in Selected Prose and Poetry, pp. 121-40 (p. 133). The use of masculine 
pronouns throughout this section and elsewhere when discussing Emerson’s image of the idealised poet is not 
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refers to ‘The Poet’ as male. 
94 ‘The Poet’, p. 122. 
95 ‘The Poet’, p. 123. 
96 ‘The Poet’, p. 136. 
97 ‘Symposium’, p. 39. 
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devotes himself to what is only one of Love’s many activities is given the name that 
should apply to all the rest as well.98 
 
In her response, Irigaray is more closely concerned with exploring Diotima’s suggestion that 
‘like love, the philosopher would be […] sort of a barefoot waif who goes out under the stars 
seeking an encounter with reality’ as opposed to ‘a learned person who […] knows 
everything, and pedantically instructs us in the corpus of things already coded’ (24). ‘How 
does it happen’, she asks, ‘that love and the philosopher are generally represented otherwise?’ 
(24). This misrepresentation, Irigaray posits, is borne out of the fact that ‘they are imagined 
as beloveds and not as lovers. As a beloved, Love, both like and unlike the philosopher, is 
imagined to be of unparalleled beauty […] Yet the lover is of an entirely different nature. He 
goes toward what is kind, beautiful, perfect, and so on. He doesn’t possess it’ (24-5). While 
Emerson never cites Diotima’s dialogue directly here (despite Plato’s relevance being 
acknowledged at the outset of his essay and gestured towards throughout), ‘The Poet’ unites 
aspects of both perspectives, as we see within the following passage: 
the Universe has three children, born at one time, which reappear, under different 
names, in every system of thought […] but which we will call here, the Knower, the 
Doer, and the Sayer. These stand respectively for the love of truth, for the love of 
good, and for the love of beauty. These three are equal. Each is that which he is 
essentially, so that he cannot be surmounted or analyzed, and each of these three has 
the power of the others latent in him, and his own patent.  
The poet is the sayer, the namer, and represents beauty. He is a sovereign, and 
stands on the centre.99 
 
Anticipating both the ‘transitional surfaces’ of his 1850 essay on Plato and the tripartite 
structures found within the intersubjective models considered throughout this chapter, this 
passage also allows us to combine a consideration of Diotima’s perspective with an 
anticipation of Irigaray’s focus. For the double meaning of represents here positions the poet 
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ambivalently as equally one who strives to articulate (goes toward) beauty through his words 
and as one who embodies (possesses) beauty in his own right. 
If this relationship between the daemonic nature of love and art is an aspect of 
Diotima’s speech that Irigaray finds particularly compelling, however, the majority of her 
essay sees her take issue with Diotima’s apparent inconsistency. Elaborating on the analogy 
she draws between the philosopher and knowledge, the poet and beauty, and the lover and the 
beloved, she argues that, as her speech progresses, ‘[Diotima] seeks a case for love in the 
animal world: procreation. […] From this point on, she leads love into a split between 
mortality and immortality, and love loses its daemonic character’ (27). Irigaray sees this 
tendency to understand the child as ‘a beloved who is an end [which] is substituted for love 
between men and women’ as one which pervades Western culture more generally (27). She 
argues that through this conflation of love with the act of procreation,   
the pair of lovers cannot safeguard the place for love as a third term between them, [so] 
they can neither remain lovers nor give birth to lovers. Something becomes frozen in 
space-time, with the loss of a vital intermediary and of an accessible transcendental 
that remains alive. A sort of teleological triangle is put into place instead of a perpetual 
journey, a perpetual transvaluation, a permanent becoming. For this, love was the 
vehicle (27; emphasis added).  
 
The final pages of her response see Irigaray developing this notion of ‘an accessible 
transcendental that remains alive’ (27). Recognising, like Diotima, that a ‘perpetual renewal 
takes place […] here and now in everyone, male and female, as far as corporeal and spiritual 
realities are concerned’, Irigaray calls for a conception of love that is ‘at once physical and 
spiritual, between the lovers, and not already codified duty, will, desire’ (28). Irigaray 
contends that this is only possible once we recognise the divine nature of the corporeal, and 
that to do so we must start by recognising the beauty of all bodies and not just that of the 
beloved: ‘from the attraction to a single beautiful body, he passes then to many; and from 
there to the beauty residing in souls’ (31). Quoting Diotima, Irigaray continues: ‘He will then 
have the vision of beauty “which is eternal, not growing up or perishing, increasing or 
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decreasing […] never waxing, never waning, never impaired”’ (32; italics in original, ellipsis 
mine). The ability to recognise this co-existence between the physical and spiritual is integral 
to Irigaray’s notion of a ‘sensible transcendental’, a state which recognises ‘the material 
texture of beauty’, and understands it as ‘that which confounds the opposition between 
immanence and transcendence [and provides] an already sensible horizon on the basis of 
which everything else would appear’ (32-3).  
Exploring the concept of the sensible transcendental in relation to Irigaray’s wider 
writings on phallogocentrism, Carolyn M. Tilghman describes it as a philosophical approach 
which ‘paradoxically fuses mind with body while, at the same time, it maintains the tension 
of adjacent but separate concepts, thereby providing a fruitful locus for changes to the 
symbolic order’. 100  Tilghman’s reading posits that in order to achieve a sensible 
transcendental, men must relinquish their claims to both language and women, and women 
must in turn reclaim their bodies and thus their subject position as those ‘who always reflect 
the divine’ (40). ‘The result of this relinquishment by men and this reclamation by women’, 
Tilghman contends, ‘will be a more ethical and satisfying relationship between the sexes. As 
such, the expression of the sensible transcendental can render substantive benefits to the lived 
realities of both men and women’ (46). This chapter has already problematised the efficacy of 
Irigaray’s suggestion that such a shift requires the complete overhaul of our current semiotic 
system, and Tilghman likewise acknowledges ‘the sheer improbability of its happening in the 
discernible future’ (46). However, she argues that Irigaray’s deployment of terms including 
the sensible transcendental may be able to achieve ‘slow, but discernible, change in how we 
think and construct reality […] by persistently and consistently troubling received ideas 
through the use of language that disrupts the binary oppositions underpinning key power 
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relations that structure the way things are’ (46-7). This concept of the sensible transcendental, 
then, recalls Benoit’s contention that Emerson privileges ‘neither spirit nor matter’, and also 
draws together the intersecting themes of love, art, philosophy and nature that inform the 
writings of Plato, Emerson and Irigaray. If those writings go some way towards elucidating 
these ideas in abstraction, the following section reads Dillard’s The Maytrees (2007) as a 
novel in which the ideas coalesce whilst still retaining their tensions. 
 
‘A WOMAN AND A MAN, BOTH SIMPLIFIED AND ENLARGED’: ANNIE DILLARD’S THE 
MAYTREES (2007) 
In 2007, Annie Dillard added a short second afterword to Pilgrim at Tinker Creek in which 
she briefly addresses two related points. The first, discussed in the previous chapter, 
acknowledges a fond regret at her use of the first person throughout Pilgrim, through which, 
by her own admission, she tried ‘to be – in Emerson’s ever-ludicrous phrase – a transparent 
eyeball’ (283). The second recognises ‘how a writer’s style matures into spareness’, and 
posits that such an evolution may be traced through a comparison between her first book’s 
‘excited eloquence and its metaphysical boldness’ and the pared-down prose of her then just 
published novel, The Maytrees. Yet the shift between these two narratives goes beyond the 
stylistic. Where Pilgrim is, as Dillard asserts, ‘a young writer’s book’, an intricate and 
introspective account of a solitary sojourn into nature, The Maytrees spans the lifetime of two 
people’s love: for one another, for literature, and for the landscape around them. As such, 
while Pilgrim may indeed be read as a young writer’s book – produced by someone feeling 
she must omit the domestic, suburban, marital contexts in which she was writing for fear such 
exposition would preclude her from the male-dominated tradition in which she is attempting 
to position herself – the more recent novel inverts this dynamic, projecting the ebbs and flows 
of marital intimacy onto a landscape that is suffused with America’s patriarchal history. 
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 The narrative follows the lives of Lou and Toby Maytree, a couple living in 
Provincetown at ‘the tip of Cape Cod’, Massachusetts.101 The liminal nature of the town is 
foregrounded within the novel’s opening lines: Provincetown is described as ‘what still seems 
antiquity’s very surface’, a ‘peninsula [which] was narrow between waters’, and ‘a naked 
strand between two immensities’ (3). And if Provincetown may be considered a liminal place 
on account of its geology, its history renders it equally so, as it marks the very spot where The 
Mayflower and the Pilgrim Fathers dropped anchor in 1620 – a fact which adds a rather 
intriguing dimension to the novel’s title. Equally inviting is the parallel that may be drawn 
here to the liminal context Victor Turner found himself in as he began his first work on 
liminality. Recalling the period during which they were awaiting their visas ahead of Victor 
taking up a post at Cornell University, Edith Turner writes: ‘We were in a state of suspense. 
The place of our waiting was on the margin of the sea, roughly at the spot where William the 
Conqueror first penetrated Britain […] while Hastings itself was felt to be a threshold, a 
gateway.’ 102  Robert Daly draws his own connection between this liminal period in the 
Turners’ lives, during which they were ‘no longer quite British, not yet quite American’, and 
the experience of those first Pilgrims who struck out for the New World. 103 He recognises the 
liminal status of those early settlers, and – drawing on the work of Andrew Delbanco – 
asserts that the American experience ‘[has] been so intermittently ever since’, founded as it is 
upon the American Dream of radical self-renewal.104 
 Just as Dillard’s style has ‘matured into spareness’, so too has the landscape that her 
narrative depicts, shifting from the fecund abundance of Tinker Creek to the rolling dunes of 
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this ‘exposed and mineral sandspit’ (3). It is in this light that the novel’s setting takes on an 
even greater significance, for here we may draw a direct parallel to the trajectory of 
Thoreau’s writings. If many have acknowledged the similarities between Tinker Creek and 
Walden Pond, the setting of this last novel may be even more clearly paralleled with that of 
Thoreau’s Cape Cod (1865), for The Maytrees is located in the very spaces that Thoreau 
describes in that text. Indeed, the last chapter of Thoreau’s book is entitled ‘Provincetown’; 
its closing lines describe the town’s shoreline as a place where ‘a man may stand […] and put 
all America behind him’.105 Thoreau’s Cape Cod is a text in which the sea and the sand are 
all pervasive, a text which reflects, Leila Hatch contends, Thoreau’s belief that ‘it is those 
who recognize themselves as a part of the ocean’s infinite cycling who live in the greatest 
balance between culture and nature, matter and spirit’.106  
  In her review of The Maytrees for The Washington Post, Marilynne Robinson 
recognises Dillard as a writer whose work articulates just such a balance, contending that ‘the 
beauty and obsession of her work are always the integration of being, at the grandest scales of 
our knowledge of it, with the intimate and momentary sense of life lived’.107 Given the 
premise of this thesis and the rarity with which Robinson comments on the work of her 
contemporaries, her deep admiration for Dillard as evidenced throughout this review is 
striking, as is the level of engagement with her wider writings that her comments indicate. 
Speaking of The Maytrees specifically, Robinson describes the novel as ‘vast and elusive and 
inexhaustible’ but equally one which evokes ‘a resolute this-worldliness that startles the 
reader again and again’.108 It is in this sense, I argue, that The Maytrees – and, indeed, 
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Dillard’s wider body of work – posits a vision of a sensible transcendental, that Irigarayan 
concept which articulates ‘the material texture of beauty’, in such a way that ‘confounds the 
opposition between immanence and transcendence [and provides] an already sensible horizon 
on the basis of which everything else would appear’.109 If a pervasive sense of the ‘ocean’s 
infinite cycling’ is one ‘already sensible horizon’ of this narrative, another is the shifting tide 
of the Maytrees’ enduring intimacy. A novel in which, as Robinson notes, ‘nothing especially 
remarkable happens’, it is these two constants that hold this shifting narrative together and by 
which it is borne along. As such, similarly to the other texts considered throughout this 
chapter, Dillard’s Transcendentalist perspective – and the liminal poetics that is borne out of 
that perspective – becomes the backdrop against which she explores the complexities and 
ambivalences of the dialogical relationship between self and other; a means by which she sets 
the often contradictory Romantic and romantic ideals of Western culture into dialogue with 
one another. 
  Dillard herself describes the novel as a ‘human tale’ of ‘a woman and a man, both 
simplified and enlarged’, in which ‘everyone and everything represents itself alone’.110 In line 
with Emerson’s notion that ‘the poet's habit of living should be set on a key so low and 
plain’, the couple’s lifestyle reflects many Transcendentalist ideals: they ‘lived often outside’ 
and spend summers in their ‘one-room shack in the parabolic sand dunes’; neither is willing 
to ‘sacrifice their free time for a job’ and they have ‘no car, no television […], no insurance, 
no savings’; ‘their city friends envied their peace’ and ‘nothing about them was rich except 
their days swollen with time’ (3-5). Like Thoreau, the Maytrees are certainly a couple who 
‘recognize themselves as a part of the ocean's infinite cycling’. As the narrative asserts: 
‘Clams lived like this but without so much reading’ (4). Moreover, in much the same way as 
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Irigaray describes Diotima’s mode in the Symposium, The Maytrees is a novel in which 
love’s ‘mediating role is indicated as part of the theme, but is also perpetually at issue, on 
stage, in the exposition of the theme’.111 The couple’s first meeting reads as a scene straight 
out of an all-American romance novel: a young army veteran (who, to reiterate his male-lead 
credentials, has also spent time as a cowboy out West) arrives back in town after the war and 
is dazzled by a young Ingrid Bergman lookalike, who cycles past wearing ‘a red scarf, white 
shirt, skin clean as eggshell, wide eyes and mouth, shorts’: ‘her loveliness caught his breath’ 
(7). An idealised courtship ensues: walks in the ‘otherworldly’ dunes at sunrise (11), Maytree 
tentative ‘lest he injure her trust’ (8), Lou ‘afraid of […] his over real eyes, of her breathing, 
everything’ (19). Their relationship is consistently described as equally transcendent and 
visceral: ‘After they married [Lou] learned to feel their skin as double-sided. They felt a 
pause. Theirs was too much feeling to push through the crack that led down to the dim world 
of time and stuff. That world was gone. They held themselves alert only in those few million 
cells where they touched’ (27). In these opening chapters, the Maytrees’ love reflects just that 
sense of ‘perpetual becoming’ that Diotima, Irigaray and Emerson aspire to: Maytree ‘[falls] 
in love with Lou again and again’, and Lou ‘wanted only a lifelong look at his face and his 
long-legged shambly self, broken by intervals of kissing’ (19). Given the intensity with which 
their love plays out in the novel’s prologue, it is all the more surprising that the catalyst for 
the novel proper is in fact their separation, when Maytree departs for Maine to embark on a 
twenty-year affair with their mutual friend, Deary. We may draw an analogy, then, between 
the structure and trajectory of this novel and the Irigarayan notion of a sensible transcendental 
which ‘paradoxically fuses mind with body while, at the same time, it maintains a tension of 
adjacent but separate concepts’.112 I would argue that, as a literary construct, Lou and Toby’s 
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relationship plays out just such an ‘adjacent but separate’ tension, and that it is in this sense 
that love functions throughout the novel as that which ‘both leads the way and is the path’ for 
the novel’s interrelated meditations on wisdom and knowledge, the role of literature and of 
the poet. In what follows, I offer a comparative reading of the ‘separate yet connected’ 
narrative trajectories of the Maytrees, positing that while it is their enduring love for one 
another that sets the parameters of the narrative, it is in the dialogue that is set up between 
Lou and Toby’s separate outlooks that the novel most readily bears out the paradoxes of the 
Diotiman dialectic outlined in the previous section. 
  We learn in the novel’s opening pages that ‘after the war, Maytree became a poet of 
the forties and fifties and sixties’, and that alongside his published projects he dedicates 
innumerable ‘red-speckled notebooks […] not to marriage, but to love’ (9). The narrative is 
punctuated throughout with the questions posed within these notebooks, many of which are 
themselves taken from other literary works: ‘Do women in love feel as men do? Do men love 
as women love?’, and ‘Keats’s […] possibly unrelated but similarly unanswerable question: 
Who enjoyed lovemaking more – the man or the woman?’ (31). Years later, however, these 
innumerable notebooks have ‘expanded, without clarifying, this theme’ (9). As lover, poet 
and philosopher, Maytree’s narrative trajectory bears out the numerous paradoxes Irigaray 
recognises between these elements of Diotima’s speech. On the one hand, at the level of 
narrative, Maytree is an exemplar of that ‘barefoot waif who goes out under the stars seeking 
an encounter with reality’.113 Quite literally, in fact: Lou is struck when she first meets him 
and he arrives ‘barefoot at daybreak [asking] if she would like to see his dune shack’ (11), 
and he can often be found stargazing: ‘he stood on the foredune’s lip and looked at the stars 
over the ocean. A wider life breathed in him, and things’ rims stirred and reared back’ (30). 
On the other hand, within the world of the narrative he is consistently presented – from the 
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perspective of the other characters, at least (including himself) – as the ‘learned person who 
[…] knows everything, and pedantically instructs us in the corpus of things already coded’.114 
Lou describes Maytree at the outset of the narrative as a man who ‘knew everything, 
including, and perhaps specializing in, love’ (16). Of his published works, we are told of one 
project in particular, a book-length, three-part poem, entitled Wood End Light and Race 
Point, in which two Provincetown lighthouses represent ‘Aristotelean thought on the one 
hand and Platonic thought on the other’ (19). Maytree asks Lou to read a couple of sections, 
to which she responds: ‘Now all you have to do is reconcile them’ (20). ‘Right you are’, he 
accepts, ‘[a]ll I have to do is propose a metaphysic to cap Western thought. That year, 
Maytree was ready’ (20). As we have seen, integral to Irigaray’s response to Diotima’s 
speech is her sense that ‘Love, both like and unlike the philosopher is imagined to be of 
unparalleled beauty […] Yet the lover […] goes toward what is kind, beautiful, perfect, and 
so on. He doesn’t possess it.’115 Maytree’s failure to differentiate between the unparalleled 
beauty of Love and the unparalleled beauty of the beloved, coupled with his desire to possess 
the latter is a constant theme running throughout the narrative. When he first introduces 
himself to Lou the narrative notes his sense that ‘her wide eyes, apertures opening, seemed 
preposterously to tell him, I and these my arms are for you’: ‘I know, he thought back at the 
stranger, this long-limbed girl. I know and I am right with you’ (7). Dillard draws attention to 
Maytree’s desire to claim ownership over Lou on a number of occasions: ‘the two ignored 
parity’, we are told at the end of the opening chapter, ‘He slept with a long leg flung over her, 
as a dog claims a stick’ (6). We are also told that while ‘Maytree wanted [Lou’s] heart. […] 
She was outside his reach’ (9), and later that the fact ‘he did not possess her childhood drove 
him wild’ (38). Maytree’s narrative trajectory is thus constantly characterised by the 
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‘teleological quest’ he sets himself, forever striving to possess not only love (via the beloved) 
but also wisdom.  
  Years later, Maytree looks back on his Provincetown life with Lou from the 
perspective of his life in Maine with Deary, musing upon numerous explanations ventured as 
to the possibility of lasting love. Is it the case that the ‘beloved is love’s hat rack’ for ‘an 
enormous sack of love [the lover] hands whole from one beloved to another’ (110)? Is love 
ultimately delusional given that ‘the heart never learns and keeps leaping the length of its 
life’ (110)? Had ‘he never really loved Lou [and] found in Deary his true mate at last’ (110)? 
All such explanations that dismiss love as ‘imaginary or theatre, or inertia, or convenience’ 
are ultimately ‘apostasized’. For, in retrospect, Maytree is now able to recognise that ‘he had 
truly loved Lou for years and still did’ (110). Thus does he also reject Lucretius’s suggestion 
that ‘love was only a shudder mammals used to procreate’ – he ponders the notion that 
‘lasting love makes no sense after the kids can hunt and gather’: ‘Screw that. […] That it was 
outside science’s lens did not mean it did not exist’ (110-11). While no satisfactory 
explanation presents itself, it is at this juncture that Maytree recognises that his enduring love 
for Lou is undeniable, and that while he had once loved Deary, this was now ‘a while he had 
been prolonging’ (112). Obliged to love Deary, Maytree had ‘wrapped his hands around oars, 
iced them fast, and kept rowing’ (112).  
  If the narrative ostensibly presents Maytree as the representative poet-philosopher-
lover of this text, however, I would suggest that Dillard’s characterisation of Lou presents 
another philosophical mode that is more in keeping with the liminal, anti-teleological 
perspective so integral to both the Diotiman dialectic outlined above and the New 
Transcendentalism proposed throughout this thesis. In stark contrast to Maytree’s 
effusiveness, Lou is altogether more enigmatic, embodying a number of seemingly 
contradictory impulses. The narrative asserts that ‘her height and stillness made her look like 
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a statue’ and that ‘her courtesy, her compliance, and especially her silence dated from a time 
otherwise gone’ (5). At the same time, however, we are told that ‘intimacy came easily to her, 
but strangers could not see it’ (5). Her silence is a recurring theme ‘[making] her complicit, 
innocent as beasts, oracular’; while she ‘barely said a word’ in their early days of courting, 
she leaves Maytree ‘tongue-tied’ (8). We are told that her ‘candid glance […] contained 
neither answer nor question, only a spreading pleasure’ (8).  
  ‘When we see through Lou’s eyes’, Robinson’s review asserts, ‘it is as if the objects 
of her attention lift off the page. Her awareness invests the world with a dimensionality and 
presence, […] she is always brilliantly attentive’. 116  And it is no surprise that such a 
protagonist should appeal to Robinson, for there are many parallels that may be drawn 
between Lou and Housekeeping’s Ruth. Indeed, the similarities are all the more intriguing 
given Dillard’s own acknowledgement of her admiration for Robinson’s debut novel – in 
Encounters with Chinese Writers (1984), Dillard muses on her favourite American novels 
and Robinson’s Housekeeping is one of the two books she explicitly mentions.117 In this light, 
let us consider the following passage from Housekeeping: ‘[m]y life seemed composed 
entirely of expectation. […] That most moments were the same did not detract at all from the 
possibility that the next moment might be utterly different. And so the ordinary demanded 
unblinking attention. Any tedious hour might be the last of its kind’ (166). Compare this with 
the strikingly similar outlook acknowledged by Lou within her assertion that ‘Child Lou had 
no inkling […] that this was her final glimpse of her wonderful father. She could not 
remember what he ate, said, or read. She began to suspect that many moments were possibly 
last ones. She strove to impress what she could on her memory’ (75). As these passages 
indicate, both Ruth and Lou live their lives teetering on the edge of a perpetual present – an 
                                                          
116 ‘The Nature of Love’, para. 8. 
117 Annie Dillard, Encounters with Chinese Writers (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1984), p. 24. 
178 
 
outlook which, for both women, is borne out of childhood abandonment. Yet where for Ruth 
abandonment results in existential crisis, for Lou it becomes an opportunity to embrace that 
solitude that she has always felt so keenly. Indeed, even at the height of their romance Lou 
senses that ‘[e]very day she failed to tell him about herself and her solitude she led him 
further astray’ (18). Thrown back on her own resources when Maytree departs, Lou ‘enjoyed 
benefits. […] At last she had time to think. […] Here it was, all she ever wanted: a free mind. 
She wanted to figure out. With which unknown should she begin?’ (73). If her grief at having 
lost Maytree is ‘an edge from which she could only slip’, then, it is this deep attentiveness to 
the present to which she clings: ‘[t]his was the out-of-earshot life she cobbled from her 
freedom’ (164). Lou’s outlook on life is summed up late in the novel: 
Books must know something. She dug from every direction. The bravest foray would 
be to try it, to hold all human consciousness, past or present, etc., in awareness…. Or 
just stay aware that… or just stay aware. She was wary. Conceding that there could be a 
point – merely granting it as a long shot – might lead to a mess. Both time’s back wall 
and front wall fell open. […] She felt she had gained, oh, half a millimeter on these 
questions over her lifetime. That is, her sense of the vastness of each aspect multiplied, 
and the more it expanded, the denser the questions grew. (163-4) 
 
To draw this reading together, let us turn back to Tilghman’s assertion that in order to 
achieve a sensible transcendental, men must relinquish their claims to both language and 
women, and women must in turn reclaim their bodies and thus their subject position as those 
‘who always reflect the divine’ (40). ‘The result of this relinquishment by men and this 
reclamation by women’, Tilghman contends, ‘will be a more ethical and satisfying 
relationship between the sexes. As such, the expression of the sensible transcendental can 
render substantive benefits to the lived realities of both men and women’ (46). It may be said 
that it’s just such a resolution we find in the closing chapters of The Maytrees. With nowhere 
else to turn and faced with both Deary’s and his own mortality, Maytree returns to Lou. Gone 
is Maytree’s obsessive and futile writings: ‘he had an idea, a structure, for a long poem all 
these last many years. But not so much as a phrase for it’ (162). Gone too is his claim over 
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Lou: ‘[s]he crept up and put her arms around his waist from behind. Instantly, one of his 
hands […] covered hers. […] His touch was with her. He was exactly with her but not 
holding, not pressing. Neither he nor she crossed the line beyond fond’ (165). ‘Intimacy with 
Lou’, Maytree realises, ‘knew no bounds. Half his life he had sounded her and never struck 
bottom. Perimeters edged Deary, and the girls of his youth, and for that matter himself and 
everyone he knew. Lou held nothing back, but he knew he never reached it all’ (171-2). Thus 
relinquishing his claims on language and on Lou, the couple do indeed uncover a relationship 
more ethical and satisfying, as they are able to hold love as a third term between them: ‘they 
cradled the world between them like a mortally sick child, loving it and not telling it all they 
knew. Now in compassion they bore, between them, their solitudes each the size of a raveled 
globe’ (171).  
  And with this renewed balance comes new perspective. ‘Tomorrow’, the final chapter 
begins, ‘is another day only up to a point. One summer five years later Maytree began to die 
all over the place’ (179). Looking back on his life in the face of his imminent death, Maytree 
turns to Keats once more, recognising that he has ultimately fallen short of his desire to 
acquire ‘knowledge enormous’, instead settling for ‘knowledge slim’ (176). It is only now 
that Maytree is able to meet Lou on the brink of the present:  
Lou lay beside him, silent as bandages, her immense solitude so gloriously […] 
broached. I wither slowly in thine arms, here at the quiet limit of the world. […] He 
thought he witnessed, and was now witnessing, the cutting edge of things. Had he 
helped cut? I scarcely knew how pleasantly the moments were falling. […] Only now 
did he reckon beauty itself was the great thing. As a deathbed revelation this required – 
like most, he suspected, more thought. (183) 
 
Having spent much of the previous section unpacking how Emerson’s figure of the poet 
relates to Diotima’s dialectic, in these final pages of Dillard’s novel we find an exemplar of 
Emerson’s marital ideal as characterised by George Kateb. In ‘Love’ (1837), Emerson muses 
upon what may realistically be expected when ‘two persons, a man and a woman, so 
variously and correlatively gifted, are shut up in one house to spend the nuptial society forty 
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or fifty years.’ In line with the above reading, he suggests that ‘nature, and intellect, and art 
emulate each other in the gifts and the melody they bring to the epithalamium.’118 Kateb’s 
study devotes considerable space to unpacking Emerson’s thinking regarding marital love, 
and concludes that ‘whatever sexual love may mean to Emerson, […] it does not have a lot to 
do with mental self-reliance understood as the desire to think one’s own thoughts and think 
them through. Love seems off to the side. Most people may not care that love appears 
unconnected to a poetical or philosophical reception of the world. But Emerson does’.119 As 
this reading shows, so too does Dillard. For the resonances between this sentiment and Lou’s 
recognition, expressed variously throughout the novel, that ‘all she ever wanted [was] a free 
mind. She wanted to figure out’ are palpable. Following Kateb’s line of argument, we find 
further similarities. For Kateb states that the logical extension of Emerson’s thinking on 
marital love asserts that ‘to gain relevance to mental self-reliance, sexual love must surpass 
itself and become friendship.’120 This sentiment is borne out in the closing lines of ‘Love’: 
Thus are we put in training for a love which knows not sex, nor person, nor partiality, 
but which seeks virtue and wisdom everywhere, to the end of increasing virtue and 
wisdom. […] Though slowly and with pain, the objects of the affections change, as the 
objects of thought do. There are moments when the affections rule and absorb the man, 
and make his happiness dependent on a person or persons. But in health the mind is 
presently seen again, — its overarching vault, bright with galaxies of immutable lights, 
and the warm loves and fears that swept over us as clouds, must lose their finite 
character and blend with God, to attain their own perfection. But we need not fear that 
we can lose any thing by the progress of the soul. The soul may be trusted to the end. 
That which is so beautiful and attractive as these relations must be succeeded and 
supplanted only by what is more beautiful, and so on for ever.121 
 
Of marital love, then, as Kateb recognises, Emerson suggests 
that we ‘make something really fine out of it – finer even than the early days of 
infatuation. Let it grow into the worthiest friendship, which is partly defined by 
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distance. [For even] if infatuation could last, it exists to be superseded. Let distance 
come, and with effort it will not be the distance of dissatisfaction, but the proper 
distance, the distance of sympathetic detachment.122 
 
‘Mental self-reliance reliance’, Kateb concludes, ‘begins and may well end in solitude, but its 
point, which is love of the world, gathers indispensable help from the friendship in sexual 
love as well as the love in unsexual friendship.’123 In this final image, as Lou and Maytree 
‘[bear], between them, their solitudes each the size of a raveled globe’, we find the 
embodiment of Emerson’s ideal.  
  And it is within these final pages that the novel draws back to that ‘love of the world’, 
by coming full circle to that Thoreauvian notion of ‘the ocean’s infinite cycling’. For all they 
have pondered, all they have reconciled, the novel’s closing passages pit the infinitesimal 
nature of their lifelong love and their literature, and their combined wisdom – what little of it 
they’d gained – against the beautiful and terrible perpetuity of the landscape:  
Lou wondered where his information would go when he died. Would filaments of 
learning plant patterns on earth? […] Her brain would deliquesce too, and with it all 
she had learned topside. Which was not much, she considered, nor anywhere near 
worked out. Bacteria would unhook her painstakingly linked neurons and fling them 
over their shoulders and carry them home to chew up for their horrific babies. (184) 
 
As much as any considered in the previous chapter, this passage represents an exemplar of 
the Transcendentalist liminal experience in nature. This time, however, the experience is not 
actively sought, but rather an unavoidable fact of our ever mundane, ever unfathomable 
existence in the margins of the much broader rhythms of the world. In The Maytrees, 
Dillard’s Transcendentalist liminal poetics – her ability to hold in tension nature’s beauty and 
its horror, her desire to articulate the experience of absolute presence in the moment – is 
turned to an exploration of not simply the self in the world, but of the competing demands of 
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world and the other. As such, the liminal experience is placed not in the margins of the 
landscape but at the centre of human existence.  
  Let us here return to Arsić’s question cited earlier in this chapter: ‘What kind of love 
relationship or friendship is predicated on the necessity of leaving?’ 124  The three texts 
considered above may be read as staging the implications of this imperative, in ways which 
corroborate my proposition of a New Transcendentalism which challenges the Emersonian 
imperative to leave in favour of seeking a balanced middle ground between conflicting 
positions. In The Faraway Nearby, Solnit’s working through of her mother’s battle with 
Alzheimer’s and its implications for their fraught relationship presents a poignant and 
tangible notion of perpetually throwing off the past. Without attempting to definitively 
reconcile the ambivalences of either the relationship or her mother’s condition, Solnit’s 
recognition of ‘the capacity of love to move us between and beyond these limiting narratives’ 
situates love – much like the Diotiman dialectic discussed elsewhere in this chapter – as a 
balanced middle ground that allows these contradictions to coexist, and which effects just that 
sense of a simultaneous turning toward and turning away that is so integral to the 
Transcendentalist mode of liminality examined throughout this thesis. The readings of 
Housekeeping and The Maytrees foreground a more explicit consideration of the implications 
of leaving. While both novels are structured around a choice between staying or leaving, I 
argue that in their respective characterisations of Ruth and Lou, both Robinson and Dillard 
consider the possibility of a third choice: a way of living in which one – to return to Ruth’s 
phrase – ‘could remain transient here [such that one] would not have to leave.’125 Indeed, if 
Sylvie and Toby Maytree represent the imperative to leave, neither novel ultimately presents 
their leaving as productive. Where both Robinson and Dillard do place their positive 
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emphasis, however, is on Lou and Ruth’s awareness that ‘the ordinary demanded unblinking 
attention.’126 It is this tension between actual leaving (which, I argue, ultimately becomes 
itself conformity to custom) and the ability to think one’s thoughts that constitutes a 
fundamental element of the New Transcendentalism proposed throughout this thesis. Yet, as 
we shall see, this tension is central to Emersonian Transcendentalism. Indeed, it is the 
underlying distinction between mental self-reliance and active self-reliance as understood by 
George Kateb. Within the texts considered here, however, the imperative to leave is 
interrogated in terms of its implications for everyday interactions and its tensions serve to 
highlight the irreconcilable ambivalences of lived human relationships. Having considered 
the textual and interpersonal implications of this aversive principle and the tensions that arise 
from it, the final chapter builds upon these analyses in order to explore how the 
Transcendentalist mode of liminality explored throughout this thesis impacts upon both old 
and new representations of the American West. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
‘WE GO WESTWARD AS INTO THE FUTURE’: THE SHIFTING GEOGRAPHIES OF NEW 
TRANSCENDENTALISM 
In one of the most compelling images of his 1841 essay, ‘Self-Reliance’, Ralph Waldo 
Emerson directs our gaze towards a bed of roses beneath his window. These flowers, he 
asserts, 
make no reference to former roses or to better ones; they are for what they are; they 
exist with God to-day. There is no time to them. There is simply the rose; it is perfect 
in every moment of its existence. Before a leaf-bud has burst, its whole life acts; in 
the full-blown flower there is no more; in the leafless root there is no less. Its nature is 
satisfied, and it satisfies nature, in all moments alike. But man postpones or 
remembers; he does not live in the present, but with reverted eye laments the past, or, 
heedless of the riches that surround him, stands on tiptoe to foresee the future. He 
cannot be happy and strong until he too lives with nature in the present, above time.1 
 
Here we find another exemplar of that anti-teleological Transcendentalist perspective which 
has informed the preceding two parts. Yet despite his advocacy of a mode of living that 
somehow exists ‘above time’, it is striking how often Emerson is himself caught ‘tiptoeing’. 
Indeed, the final line here reflects this contradiction, in that it simultaneously acknowledges 
both the anti-teleological ideal of existing ‘above time’ and the teleological process by which 
an individual (or wider culture) must move toward such an existence. 
If the example cited above is somewhat oblique, we find a similar tension running 
throughout Emerson’s 1844 essay, ‘Experience’, which opens with the following poetic 
epigraph:  
They marched from east to west: 
Little man, least of all, 
Among the legs of his guardians tall, 
Walked about with a puzzled look: -- 
Him by the hand dear nature took; 
Dearest nature, strong and kind,  
Whispered, ‘Darling, never mind! 
                                                          
1 Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘Self-Reliance’, in Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Prose and Poetry, ed. by Reginald 
L. Cook (Cambridge, MA: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), pp. 72-93 (pp. 82-3).  
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Tomorrow they will wear another face, 
The founder thou! these are thy race!’2  
 
Seeking to distance his nation from its cultural forebears whilst reaching towards a not-yet-
realised future of American dominance, these lines reflect the rhetoric of Manifest Destiny so 
prevalent at this time, which understood the United States as the nation in which humankind 
would reach its apotheosis. New England in the 1840s is thus categorised here as a liminal 
time and space between the rich cultural traditions back East and the untamed potential of the 
yet-to-be-settled American continent to the West. The ‘little man, least of all’, presumably 
having made the journey across the Atlantic, is given the opportunity to make a new life for 
himself, and, moreover, to shape the intellectual future of this new continent, out from under 
the ‘legs of his guardians’ behind him in Europe. The opening lines of the essay reiterate the 
liminal status of this time and place: 
Where do we find ourselves? In a series of which we do not know the extremes, and 
believe that it has none. We wake and find ourselves on a stair; there are stairs below 
us, which we seem to have ascended; there are stairs above us, many a one, which go 
upward and out of sight. But the Genius which, according to the old belief, stands at 
the door by which we enter, and gives us the lethe to drink.3 
 
The analogy between the nation’s westward momentum and Emerson’s own intellectual 
endeavour underpins the wider essay, as exemplified by his later assertion that he is ‘ready to 
die out of nature, and be born again into this new yet unapproachable America I have found 
in the West’.4 Yet Emerson’s use of ‘unapproachable’ here is telling, connoting as it does 
both unrivalled potential and a certain distance and inaccessibility. Thus, we are reminded 
again of the simultaneity of potentiality and jeopardy that the liminal condition effects. 
 Expanding the ever-widening circles of this thesis, this final part develops the liminal 
and dialogical themes of the previous chapters in order to explore American 
Transcendentalism’s relationship with both the real and imagined American West. Having 
                                                          
2 Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘Experience’, in Selected Prose and Poetry, pp. 141-61 (p. 141). 
3 ‘Experience’, p. 141.  
4 ‘Experience’, p. 154. 
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discussed in the second chapter how teleological perspectives perpetuate structures of cultural 
hegemony, the present discussion begins by examining the tension identified above between 
the professed resistance to teleological modes and the rhetoric of Manifest Destiny that 
pervades many New England Transcendentalist writings. However, the analysis also notes an 
underlying recognition within New England Transcendentalism that it is only once the 
nation’s westward expansion is complete that these anti-teleological Transcendentalist 
principles may be realised. To use Emerson’s own phrase: ‘So many things are unsettled 
which it is of the first importance to settle, – and, pending their settlement, we will do as we 
do.’5 
 A decade later, Henry David Thoreau would draw these themes together once more in 
his 1851 essay, ‘Walking’. Described by Susan J. Rosowski as ‘the most sustained, fevered 
call to the West in [American] literature’, the essay is only ostensibly focused on walking as a 
practice in and of itself.6  Instead, having established his own walking habits within the 
essay’s opening pages, Thoreau goes on to take us on a journey of a different kind, tracing 
the trajectory of the United States as a nation. Throughout the essay, he sets up a clear 
analogy between the literal westward momentum of the U.S. and its opportunity for cultural 
innovation, demonstrated most clearly within the following passage:  
When I go out of the house for a walk, uncertain as yet whither I will bend my steps, and 
submit myself to my instinct to decide for me, I find, strange and whimsical as it may 
seem, that I finally and inevitably settle […] between west and south-southwest. The 
future lies that way to me, and the earth seems more unexhausted and richer on that side. 
[…] I must walk toward Oregon, and not toward Europe. And that way the nation is 
moving. And I may say that mankind progresses from east to west.7 
 
Like Emerson, then, Thoreau faces West from his New England locale, which is again 
positioned as the midpoint between Europe behind him to the east and the apparently 
                                                          
5 ‘Experience’, p. 151. 
6 Susan J. Rosowski, Birthing a Nation: Gender, Creativity, and the West in American Literature (Lincoln and 
London: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), p. 4. 
7 Henry David Thoreau, ‘Walking’, in Collected Essays and Poems (New York: The Library of America, 2001), 
pp. 225-55 (p. 234). 
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untamed abundance before him to the west. Later in the essay, Thoreau – just as Emerson had 
before him – draws an analogy from Greek myth, describing the Atlantic as ‘a Lethean 
stream, in our passage over which we have had an opportunity to forget the Old World and its 
institutions’.8  Here, much in the same way as Emerson’s epigraph to ‘Experience’, this 
allusion to the mythical river of forgetting presents America as a slate wiped clean on which 
an entirely new history may be written. Following a similar trajectory to Emerson’s earlier 
essay, ‘Walking’ veers towards the exceptionalism that is so often considered a particularly 
American trait. Thoreau endorses the words of Arnold Henry Guyot, a European-born 
geographer whose work, he acknowledges, goes ‘farther than I am ready to follow him; yet 
not when he says “[…] America is made for the man of the Old World. […] Each of his steps 
is marked by a new civilization superior to the preceding, by a greater power of 
development.”’ 9  As with Emerson, here Thoreau clearly engages with the rhetoric of 
Manifest Destiny. Where Emerson’s figure stands on a staircase ‘of which we do not know 
the extremes, and believe that it has none’, however, Thoreau has a more objective measure 
of humanity’s timeline: 
The Atlantic is a Lethean stream, in our passage over which we have had an 
opportunity to forget the Old World and its institutions. If we do not succeed this time 
[i.e. in the settlement of the United States], there is perhaps one more chance for the 
race left before it arrives on the banks of the Styx; and that is in the Lethe of the 
Pacific.10   
 
Here, Thoreau draws a direct correlation between unchartered geographical space and the 
potential for intellectual and creative originality. This belief is reiterated throughout the 
essay, particularly within his assertion that ‘The West of which I speak is but another name 
for the Wild, and […] in Wildness is the preservation of the world.’11 As such, Thoreau 
implies that the westward settlement of the United States, and the cultural practices that are 
                                                          
8 ‘Walking’, p. 235. 
9 ‘Walking’, p. 236. 
10 ‘Walking’, p. 235. 
11 ‘Walking’, p. 239. 
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established during this journey, are integral to the success of humanity, given that the West 
represents the last area of terra incognita before humanity comes full circle on itself. 
A century and a half after ‘Walking’, and with the colonising journey across the 
continent long complete, this chapter explores how Dillard, Solnit, Adnan and Robinson 
engage with both the myth and the reality of the American West, in such a way that we might 
read our contemporary moment as the not-yet-realised cultural context that Emerson and 
Thoreau so often allude to. The discussion draws on New West and Post-West criticism 
which – similarly to the idea of ‘redemptive critique’ identified in the previous chapter – 
reconsiders the cultural significance of the American West in our increasingly 
deterritorialized age, presenting it not as a terminus at the end of the map and at the end of 
history but, as Neil Campbell asserts, ‘a more routed and complex rendition, a traveling 
concept whose meanings move between cultures, crossing, bridging and intruding 
simultaneously’. 12  The discussion recognises how these critics draw on very similar 
theoretical concepts to those considered in the previous chapters, a connection that is 
particularly apparent within Campbell’s exploration of the West’s rhizomatic qualities, and 
the related reading of the region as a thirdspace where multiple intersecting histories and 
identities productively coexist. The readings below examine how my four writers bring their 
various liminal poetics to bear on this shifting region. The first sections analyse Annie 
Dillard’s The Living (1992) and Marilynne Robinson’s Lila (2014), exploring how both these 
novels engage with the myth of the American West through a subversion of the generic 
expectations of the Western, in such a way that calls into question the hegemonic principles 
with which that genre has come to be associated within the popular imagination. The second 
part of the discussion goes on to explore how Rebecca Solnit and Etel Adnan present their 
                                                          
12 Neil Campbell, The Rhizomatic West: Representing the American West in a Transnational, Global, Media 
Age (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), p. 4. 
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own lived experiences of the American West, exploring the (often problematic) interplay 
between the personal and political histories of the region.  
 
‘VAGUE AND IMPERSONAL’: NEW ENGLAND TRANSCENDENTALISM IN THE AMERICAN 
WEST  
For all its appropriation of the westward metaphor, it is notable that the nineteenth-century 
Transcendentalist movement was destined to remain wedded to its East Coast origins. While, 
as Ernest Marchand details, Emerson would frequently embark on lecture tours of the western 
states from 1850 onwards, the movement never developed a self-sustaining Western hub.13 
As journalist and writer Rebecca Harding Davis would acknowledge when later recounting 
her 1862 trip to Boston, ‘[i]n the West and South there was no definite idea as to what truth 
this Concord man had brought into the world. But in any case it was American truth and not 
English. Emerson's popularity, therefore, outside of New England was wide, but vague and 
impersonal.’14 Indeed, several decades earlier in the 1830s, a small group of Harvard Divinity 
School graduates had ventured to the Ohio Valley in an attempt to take the movement 
westward. In The Western Experiment (1973), Elizabeth R. McKinsey documents both the 
successes of the project – primarily the founding of The Western Messenger, which she 
identifies as ‘the first of all Transcendentalist periodicals’ – and the factors that ultimately led 
to its failure.15 While little critical attention has been paid to this short-lived project, to recall 
it now is to gain insights into the connections and tensions between Transcendentalist 
philosophy and the American West. 
                                                          
13 Ernest Marchand, ‘Emerson and the Frontier’, American Literature, 3 (1931), 149-74. 
14 Rebecca Harding Davis, Bits of Gossip (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1904), pp. 
45-7. Reproduced at Jordan Davis, Jill Kuhn and Natalia Smith, ‘Bits of Gossip: Electronic Edition’, in 
Documenting the American South <http://docsouth.unc.edu/fpn/davisr/davis.html> [accessed 4 August 2014]. 
15 Elizabeth R. McKinsey, The Western Experiment: New England Transcendentalists in the Ohio Valley 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), p. 7. 
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In her opening pages, McKinsey asks: ‘[w]hy did these three men retreat from the 
land which, by logical extension of their own ideals, should have been the most congenial 
setting for Transcendentalism?’16 She contends that the project’s demise was due in large part 
to ‘a gap between their expectations and the reality they encountered which they simply could 
not bridge. So free in spirit, actively seeking freedom in fact, they were only threatened when 
they found it; their self-reliance failed them when put to the test.’17 More specifically, as 
McKinsey’s wider discussion acknowledges, the New Englanders were ultimately unable to 
reconcile the transition from ‘the theorizing Concord-Cambridge fold, […] into the world of 
action’.18 Put into this unfamiliar context, the cracks began to show. James Freeman Clarke, 
the first of three men to head westward, became disillusioned due to a perceived lack of 
renown. Fixated on power and status, he was unable to cope outside of the hierarchical social 
structure that had afforded him the esteem of his peers back East. Christopher Pearse Cranch, 
a self-confessed compulsive wanderer, was unable to find the stability he’d hoped for when 
he set out West, an issue which was exacerbated by his uncompromising individualism. 
Perhaps too successful in his adherence to the Transcendentalist credo, Cranch became 
(paradoxically) ‘too self-reliant to relinquish his identity to any group, cause, or creed’, and 
eventually headed back east, to an isolated life of aimless drifting and wasted talent.19 Third 
to arrive in the Ohio Valley was William Henry Channing, nephew of William Ellery 
Channing. Despite being some years older than the other two when he embarked on his trip 
westward, Channing remained torn between an ‘unrealistic idealism […] and his concern that 
Transcendentalism apply itself to the needs of the “real world”’.20 As its editor, Channing 
                                                          
16 The Western Experiment, p. 7. 
17 The Western Experiment, pp. 7-8. 
18 The Western Experiment, p. 18. 
19 The Western Experiment, p. 40. 
20 The Western Experiment, p. 43. 
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ploughed his energies into The Western Messenger.21 Ostensibly, the aim of the periodical 
was to provide a platform for the dissemination of western literature. In reality, though, as 
McKinsey acknowledges, the journal ultimately became a mouthpiece for East Coast ideals. 
Channing attributed the dearth of local contributions to the fact that the westerners were 
‘busy living, doing, growing. The age of reflection and imaginative reproduction [had] not 
yet arrived.’22 Believing the West to be a haven for free speech (at least for those ideals 
corroborated back in New England), his faith was rocked in the wake of a scandal which saw 
him publicly vilified when the Messenger defended Orestes Brownson’s controversial article, 
‘The Labouring Classes’ (1840). Channing was unable to resolve his crisis of faith, and by 
1841, all three men had returned to New England. 
The failed westward mission of these three men presents in microcosm a number of 
the issues raised throughout this chapter in relation to the wider representation of the West in 
nineteenth-century U.S. Transcendentalism. First, and perhaps most important of all, is the 
fundamental discrepancy between Transcendentalist idealism and lived experience, and the 
gulf that lay between the idealised West of their imaginations and the actual West that 
awaited them. Moreover, Clarke’s difficulty in adapting to the West’s less hierarchical social 
structure is indicative of an apparent Transcendentalist preoccupation with (at least 
intellectual) power and dominion. Cranch’s perpetual restlessness alludes to the problematic 
nature of a Transcendentalist philosophy which contends that ‘to find the journey’s end in 
every step of the road […] is wisdom’, but equally that ‘everything good is on the 
highway’.23 Lastly, in the fate of The Western Messenger we find an analogy for Davis’s 
claim that New England Transcendentalism’s relevance to the lived experience of the western 
states was ‘vague and impersonal’. The journal’s trajectory suggests that their cross-
                                                          
21 The Western Experiment, p. 43. 
22 The Western Experiment, p. 51. 
23 ‘Experience’, pp. 148, 150. 
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continental ventures inevitably projected – and sought to impose – Eastern (or, more 
specifically, Bostonian) values, principles and perspectives onto a highly diverse range of 
cultures out west under the homogenising premise of developing an inherently ‘American’ 
culture. Less than five years after the demise of the Ohio Valley project, Thoreau would 
embark on his own adventure ‘into the wilderness’. As we have seen, however, he felt it 
unnecessary to venture as far as Ohio, instead heading just a few miles outside of Concord to 
the banks of Walden Pond. Despite the differing distances involved, McKinsey’s text often 
draws a parallel between the two projects, in that both sought to put the somewhat abstract 
Transcendentalist principles into living practice.  
As Gay Wilson Allen acknowledges, both Emerson and Thoreau had considerable 
reservations regarding the westward expansion of the nation.24 Allen contends that despite the 
expansionist rhetoric of ‘Walking’, Thoreau was ultimately opposed to Manifest Destiny, 
positing that he was primarily concerned with metaphysical rather than actual frontiers. As 
evidence, Allen cites an 1853 letter from Thoreau to Harrison Blake, in which he remarks: 
‘[t]he whole enterprise of this nation, which is not an upward one, but a westward one, 
toward Oregon [,] California, Japan &c, is totally devoid of interest to me, whether performed 
on foot or by a Pacific railroad.’25 Allen also acknowledges Thoreau’s remark in A Week on 
the Concord and Merrimack Rivers (1849) that ‘the frontiers are not east or west, north or 
south; but wherever a man fronts a fact, though that fact be his neighbor’.26 In Birthing the 
Nation: Gender, Creativity, and the West in American Literature, Susan J. Rosowski also 
underplays the relevance of this expansionist rhetoric. In a discussion of Walden (1854), she 
                                                          
24 Gay Wilson Allen, ‘How Emerson, Thoreau and Whitman Viewed the Frontier’, in Toward a New American 
Literary History: Essays in Honor of Arlin Turner, ed. by Louis J. Budd, Edwin H. Cady and Carl L. Anderson 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1980), pp. 111-28 (p. 116). 
25 Henry David Thoreau, ‘Concord, February 27, 1853’, in Great Short Works of Henry David Thoreau, ed. by 
Wendell Glick (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), pp. 67-73 (p. 68). 
26 Henry David Thoreau, A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers, in The Writings of Henry David 
Thoreau, ed. by Carl F. Hovde and others (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 304. 
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claims that Thoreau ‘casts off a conventional male stance of explorer or discoverer and 
assumes a female one of gestation or birth’. 27  While Rosowski presents a compelling 
argument – noting that the main section of the narrative spans nine months, and highlighting 
the language of gestation within the closing pages – I would be reluctant to entirely dismiss 
the significance of the expansionist rhetoric here. Indeed, in the very same letter to Blake that 
Allen cites as evidence, Thoreau goes on to recognise this contradiction in himself: ‘[t]hus I 
declaim against them; but I in my folly am the world I condemn.’28 
To draw this out further, let us look to the closing pages of Thoreau’s most famous 
work, in which he reflects on his two years spent at Walden Pond. The narrative recounts 
how Thoreau mastered his environment and provides a template by which readers may 
themselves become comfortably self-sufficient. What is more, and significantly given my 
premise here, he has painstakingly mapped the geography of the pond having found it 
‘remarkable how long men will believe in the bottomlessness of a pond without taking the 
trouble to sound it’.29 Within these closing paragraphs, Thoreau encourages the reader to  
[b]e rather the Mungo Park, the Lewis and Clark and Frobisher, of your own streams 
and oceans; explore your own higher altitudes – with shiploads of preserved meats to 
support you, if they be necessary […] Nay, be a Columbus to whole new continents 
and worlds within you, opening new channels, not of trade, but of thought. Every man 
is the lord of a realm beside which the earthly empire of the Czar is but a petty state.30  
 
While this passage may constitute a reimagining of that colonising impulse, directed inward 
rather than out into the landscape, its hegemonic principles of control and mastery foreclose 
any real sense of progressive intention. Indeed, in his reference here to ‘the earthly empire of 
the Czar’, Thoreau suggests that this reorientation of perspective has the potential to offer 
power the like of which has not yet been seen. Within these same passages, Thoreau declares 
                                                          
27 Birthing a Nation, p. 5.  
28 ‘Concord, February 27, 1853’, p. 69. 
29 Henry David Thoreau, Walden and Civil Disobedience (New York and Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983), p. 
333. 
30 Walden, p. 369. 
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‘I do not wish to take a cabin passage, but rather to go before the mast and on the deck of the 
world, for there I could best see the moonlight amid the mountains. I do not wish to go below 
now.’31 In both this excerpt and the passage cited above, it is telling that his allusions to 
journeying into these unnavigable waterscapes invariably depict the traveller aboard a ship 
(as opposed to immersed in the water itself) – in itself an image of human mastery.32  
It is in this sense, I suggest, that while Emerson and Thoreau may have denounced the 
potential ecological consequences of western settlement, and – in the ways identified in the 
preceding chapters – problematised the hegemonic imperatives of their time, both writers 
remain simultaneously bound by the hegemonic discourses of ownership and dominion. In 
particular, they show commitment to the cartographic practice of ‘mapping’ (and implicitly 
mastering) the terra incognita – be that of the land or of ourselves. Drawing together my 
analysis so far, then, while both writers may, as Gay Wilson Allen suggests, be more 
concerned with metaphysical than actual frontiers, this is not to say that the overarching 
frameworks by which they understand their intellectual endeavour escape complicity with the 
discourse of Manifest Destiny. This section goes on to examine how my four writers call into 
question these models of territorial expansion, exploring how the West takes on new 
significance in their writings. I argue that while they engage with the myth of the American 
West as a space of unrealised potential, much like their nineteenth-century predecessors, they 
also recognise it as a space in which received notions of hegemony and hierarchy are to be 
renegotiated rather than perpetuated. 
 
                                                          
31 Walden, p. 372. 
32 Of course, this is not to suggest that all who sail aboard a ship are in a position of dominance. It is simply to 
acknowledge that the very fact man has harnessed natural resources in order to engineer vessels able to traverse 
oceans is evidence of mastery in itself. 
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FROM NEW ENGLAND TO THE NEW WEST 
Of course, it is important to acknowledge that the West has long since been considered 
‘settled’. Indeed, as early as 1893, Frederick Jackson Turner famously declared that ‘at the 
end of a hundred years of life under the Constitution, the frontier has gone, and its going has 
closed the first period of American history’.33 Nevertheless, in the century that followed his 
seminal lecture, despite his suggestion that ‘there can no longer be said to be a frontier line’, 
the United States continued to expand. 34  In 1910, Turner published ‘Social Forces in 
American History’, an essay in which he acknowledges how, at the turn of the century, the 
United States began to ‘engage in […] world-politics’.35 He goes on to suggest that by 
connecting its Atlantic and Pacific coasts [the United States] became an imperial republic 
with dependencies and protectorates – admittedly a new world-power, with a potential 
voice in the problems of Europe, Asia, and Africa. This extension of power, […] was no 
isolated event. It was, indeed, in some respects, the logical outcome of the nation’s 
march to the Pacific, the sequence to the era in which it was engaged in occupying the 
free lands and exploiting the resources of the West.36 
 
Within this essay, Turner also details the systematic and unprecedented exploitation of 
natural resources that occurred across the United States during these two decades. He issues a 
stark warning that ‘at the present rate it is estimated that the supply of coal would be 
exhausted at a date no farther in the future than the formation of the constitution in the 
past’.37 Now, less than twenty years from Turner’s estimation (which, by my calculation, 
gives us until 2033 at the outside), the consequences of such unregulated industrialism are, as 
predicted, coming home to roost.38  
                                                          
33 Frederick Jackson Turner ‘The Significance of the Frontier in American History’, in The Significance of the 
Frontier in American History (London: Penguin, 2008), pp. 1-38 (p. 38). 
34 ‘The Significance of the Frontier’, p. 8. 
35 Frederick Jackson Turner, ‘Social Forces in American History’, in The Significance of the Frontier in 
American History, pp. 89-115 (p. 93). 
36 ‘Social Forces in American History’, p. 94. 
37 ‘Social Forces in American History’, p. 91. 
38 For more on this debate see Ian Sample, ‘Anthropocene: Is This the New Epoch of Humans?’, 16 October 
2014, in The Guardian <http://www.theguardian.com/science/2014/oct/16/-sp-scientists-gather-talks-rename-
human-age-anthropocene-holocene> [accessed 14 November 2014]. 
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Perhaps triggered by the centenary of Turner’s frontier thesis, the late 1980s and 1990s 
saw a marked shift in critical approaches to the American West, with many critics keen to 
problematise prevailing cultural representations of the region. As Anne M. Butler and 
Michael J. Lansing explain: 
these scholars questioned a history that mourned the death of George Armstrong Custer 
but cheered the murder of Sitting Bull […] In addition, the new wave of history took 
issue with the earlier invisibility of women in the story of the West [and] changed the 
discussion about the environment, questioning the long-term abuse of western eco-
systems for short-term corporate gain. Thus, these scholars debated the very essence of 
the discipline, reconfiguring the definitions of place and language, people and 
experience.39  
 
Within the field of New West criticism (as the discipline came to be known), the re-visioning 
process has fought its battle on two frontiers. The first concerns the ecological and 
environmental consequences of the region’s rapid expansion, calling into question the real-
world implications of its increasing industrialisation. The second concerns the all-pervasive 
cultural iconography that has come to represent and often ideologically delimit the region in 
the popular imagination. 
 Enter the cowboy, that ubiquitous all-American figure who, it may be said, straddles 
these two critical strands. Having discussed at some length the apparent incompatibility 
between the American West and New England Transcendentalism, what is this self-reliant 
übermensch if not the Transcendentalist spirit par excellence? This thought is borne out in 
Sharman Apt Russell’s Kill the Cowboy: A Battle of Mythology in the New West, in which 
Russell acknowledges that  
Here in the West, the dominant myth – of course – is the cowboy. Our love for 
cowboys, in the strict definition of the word, has little to do with reality […] Cowboys 
are the icon of the rural West. They have much to do with how all Americans think 
about the West. They have much to do with our cultural dreams of freedom and 
                                                          
39 Anne M. Butler and Michael J. Lansing, The American West: A Concise History (Malden, MA and Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2008), p. 7. 
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solitude […] In these dreams, we test ourselves on the anvil of self-sufficiency. In 
these dreams, we know the grandeur of an untrammeled continent.40  
 
It is easy to see, then, as Rosowski acknowledges, how ‘Transcendental ideals of 
independence, self-reliance and nature readily translated into the myth of the West’, and how, 
in many ways, the cowboy may be read as the logical extension of Transcendentalism’s 
central imperatives.41 Or, that is to say, as one logical extension of this most complex of 
philosophies. In the closing passages of her study, however, Russell calls forth a new figure, 
in whom, she believes, lies the future for the West: ‘[l]et’s call her the green woman, an 
elusive dryad hidden in our hardened modern selves. A powerful green force. A generous 
spirit. Let’s call her the green woman and let’s call her out […] in all of us who live here and 
make this our home. Let’s call her out. Let’s see what she has to say about the West.’42 In 
calling out this new figure – notably in a final chapter which takes a quotation from Dillard as 
its epigraph – Russell seeks to collapse the dualisms upon which the Western myth has been 
founded: between urban and rural, religious and secular, male and female, white and non-
white. It is within this renegotiated West that the following analysis positions key works by 
my four writers, examining how they bring their New Transcendentalist perspectives to bear 
on this vision of the American West. In recognising a reflexivity of purpose between New 
West criticism and New Transcendentalism similar to that identified in the previous chapter 
between my four writers and Luce Irigaray and Jessica Benjamin, this chapter explores how 
the American West, both the physical space and its wider ideological function, remains 
integral to the reimagined Transcendentalist perspectives of Dillard, Robinson, Solnit and 
Adnan. 
 
                                                          
40 Sharman Apt Russell, Kill the Cowboy: A Battle of Mythology in the New West (Cambridge, MA: Perseus 
Publishing, 1993), p. 2. 
41 Birthing a Nation, p. 3. 
42 Kill the Cowboy, p. 193. 
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‘SOMETIMES AROUND HERE IT GETS ALMIGHTY WESTERN’: ANNIE DILLARD’S THE LIVING 
(1992) 
In 1992, New West critic Jane Tompkins published West of Everything: The Inner Life of 
Westerns, in which she identifies the factors that influenced the rise of the Western in the 
early twentieth century. Resisting popular explanations that emphasise ‘“the conflict between 
industrial and agricultural America and the resultant nostalgia for the past”’, Tompkins 
considers the ideological function of the Western, particularly in relation to gender, through 
an exploration of themes including religion, death, language and landscape.43 She asserts that 
the genre ‘doesn't have anything to do with the West as such. It isn't about the encounter 
between civilization and the frontier. It is about men's fear of losing their mastery, and hence 
their identity, both of which the Western tirelessly reinvents.’44 In order to illustrate this 
argument, Tompkins draws a distinction between the twentieth-century Western and the 
dominant strain of sentimental fiction popularised in the mid-nineteenth century by authors 
such as Harriet Beecher Stowe, Susan Warner and Maria Cummins. For Tompkins, it is this 
form of sentimental literature that provided ‘the real antagonist of the Western’.45  
 In what follows, Tompkins offers a ‘point-for-point contrast’ between the main 
narrative features of these two genres: female- versus male-authored; and a ‘young orphan 
girl’ protagonist and predominantly female characters who form ‘close relationships verging 
on what today we would identify as homosocial and homoerotic’ versus ‘full-grown adult 
male’ and an almost exclusively male cast who engage in, well, close relationships verging 
on what today we would define as homosocial and homoerotic’.46 If sentimental novels tend 
to locate themselves in ‘private spaces, at home, indoors, in kitchens, parlors and upstairs 
                                                          
43 Jane Tompkins, West of Everything: The Inner Life of Westerns (New York and Oxford: Oxford University 
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44 West of Everything, p. 45. 
45 West of Everything, p. 38. 
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chambers’, Westerns are often set ‘outdoors – on the prairie, on the main street – or in public 
places – the saloon, the sheriff’s office, the barber shop, the livery stable’.47 In the Western, 
‘the hero is a man of few words who expresses himself through physical action’, while in 
sentimental literature, ‘emotions other than anger are expressed very freely and openly’.48 
Ultimately, while the one requires the heroine to ‘to live up to an ideal of Christian virtue – 
usually involving uncomplaining submission to difficult or painful circumstances, learning to 
quell rebellious instincts, and dedicating her life to the service of God through serving 
others’, the other reveres the potent physicality of the male protagonist, as he takes the law 
into his own hands, exacting revenge as he sees fit.49 ‘Finally’, Tompkins concludes, ‘nature, 
which has played only a small role in the domestic novel, where it is always pastoral and 
benign, dominates the Western, dwarfing the human figure with its majesty, the only divinity 
worshipped in this genre other than manhood itself.’50 Taking Tompkins’s juxtaposition of 
these two genres as its point of departure, this section offers a comparative reading of 
Dillard’s The Living and Robinson’s Lila, exploring how they subvert this rigid dichotomy 
between these two generic templates. It argues that in doing so they open a critical space 
between the two genres in which the hegemonic imperatives with which they are commonly 
associated within the cultural imagination may be renegotiated. 
Published in the same year as Tompkins’ critical text, Dillard’s debut novel The 
Living presents four decades, from 1855 to 1897, in the history of the area surrounding the 
towns of Whatcom, Goshen and Bellingham, in Washington State on the West Coast of the 
United States. The narrative is divided into seven books following the booms and busts of 
this pioneering generation, which see the white population grow from just two families (the 
Rushes and the Fishburns, who figure throughout) to a thriving community of thousands in 
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the wake of several gold rushes – with the once thriving and diverse Indian communities 
becoming ever more marginalised. Through its multiple narrators and multi-generational 
scope, The Living incorporates all seven of Frank Gruber’s basic Western plot lines: The 
Union Pacific Story, The Ranch Story, The Empire Story, The Revenge Story, Custer’s Last 
Stand, The Outlaw Story and The Marshal Story.51 This in itself is indicative of the extent to 
which The Living engages with the cultural iconography of the genre. However, as Gruber 
himself acknowledges, ‘it is not the plot that is important, it is what you do with the 
characters, the incidental material, the conflicts, the emotions that are plumbed’.52 As we 
shall see, then, despite bearing signatures of the Western, Dillard’s approach to these various 
plotlines subverts many of the key tropes of the genre. 
For Tompkins, perhaps the most significant way in which these ideological 
imperatives are codified is within the genre’s representation of death: 
To go west, as far west as you can go, west of everything, is to die. Death is everywhere 
in this genre.  […]  Often, death makes a sudden, momentary appearance early in the 
story, as if to put us on notice that life is what is at stake here, and nothing less. The 
imminence of death underwrites the plot […] The ritualization of the moment of death 
that climaxes most Western novels and films hovers over the whole story and gives its 
typical scenes a faintly sacramental aura.53 
 
Throughout the novel, Dillard pits these interconnected communities against the unforgiving 
natural landscape around them, with key characters dying arbitrary deaths within the space of 
a few lines. This is particularly prevalent within the opening book of the novel, as many of 
the characters we assume will be integral to the narrative die unexpectedly and 
unceremoniously. We learn within the opening pages that Rooney and Ada Fishburn’s son, 
Charley, died on their journey west: ‘Charley fell out of the wagon and their own wheels ran 
him over, one big wooden wheel after the other, and he burst inwardly and died.’54 While 
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Ada prays that with Charley's death ‘God […] was finished with the worst of it’, the opening 
line of the sixth chapter tells us that their daughter, ‘Nettie died when she was four, of an 
earache that leaked into her brain. Lura Rush bade Rooney blow pipe smoke into Nettie’s ear, 
[…] but it failed. Ada dressed the child to meet her Maker in a dress cut out of her own 
wedding shawl’ (56). Pages later, we find out that ‘Lura Rush died in a carriage accident 
when a bear startled the horses on the Nooksack River bridge’, and within the same 
paragraph that ‘the oldest Rush boy, Derwent, […] died the next spring of the putrid sore 
throat’ (69). In fact, within this final paragraph of Book I’s penultimate chapter, no fewer 
than five characters are killed off. As the narrative acknowledges, ‘Death mowed the 
generations raggedly and out of order’ (69-70). Despite its title, then, Dillard foregrounds 
early on that her novel is as much concerned with death as it is with the living. 
In the fleeting and indiscriminate nature of these deaths and in their positioning very 
early on in the narrative, the novel’s attitude towards death shows clear parallels with the 
Western genre, as formulated by Tompkins. While Tompkins contends that death is 
ultimately the moment in which a (male) character’s ‘perfection is sealed’, though, Dillard 
precludes such reverence in death for her male protagonists. We see this in the final chapter 
of Book I, when Rooney Fishburn dies while digging a well: 
Back of the house near the smoking slash pile, Rooney's well hole was ten feet deep. He 
picked up his spade, sat on the edge, and jumped in. Ada watched and thanked God for 
the well water, though she was premature, after all. Rooney whacked a slice of direct at 
one side of the hole. "It's right here," he said. He made a deeper cut, and Ada heard a hiss 
when he pried it off. No water came out, just the hiss. 
Then Rooney fell over on his spade. He lay in the hole. He gone down like a tree, 
head last. (74) 
 
Minutes later, George Judd jumps in after him despite Ada's protestations and meets the same 
fate, succumbing almost instantly to the poison gas as he tries to lift Rooney from the well. 
Here, far from venerating the death of the white man, as Tompkins suggests is so 
characteristic of the western genre, Dillard positions death as the most democratic of forces; 
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Rooney and George's deaths are just two in a long line of women and children, Indian and 
white, central and peripheral characters that have died abruptly within this opening book. As 
Dillard goes on to establish at length later in the narrative: ‘[n]one died prematurely, for death 
battened on only the living, and all of those, at any age. […] Death was ready to take people 
of any size, always, and so was the broad earth ready to receive them’ (245).  
 Midway through the novel, however, this theme of death as indiscriminate and above 
human control is complicated when Dillard introduces a new narrative strand. Book IV – 
entitled ‘Obenchain and Clare’ – opens on the scene of Beal Obenchain standing on the mud 
flats of Bellingham Bay, with  
a knife, a lantern, and a coil of rope in one hand and, as he put it to himself, a 
Chinaman in the other. […] Obenchain had chosen to tell the Chinaman his purpose, 
and he did so now: it was to “lash you to a . . . wharf piling and leave you to drown 
when the tide . . . comes in six hours . . . hence”. (273)55  
 
A peripheral character until this point, Obenchain has already been established as a troubled 
character with an evil strain. In Book II, his adopted brother, John Ireland witnesses 
Obenchain torture and kill a young calf. The morning after this incident, Obenchain is 
uncharacteristically buoyant, believing that ‘he had escaped again, and gloriously, with his 
life, when he had believed lately that only death could relieve him. […] Did his accusers 
know […] how courageous he was, in fact, and how wilfully in control, to muster out of his 
paralysis the vitality to save himself?’ (133).  
By attempting to usurp the omnipotent death that surrounds him, then, Obenchain 
perversely finds meaning in his own life. In the choosing of his victims, Obenchain is as 
indiscriminate as the death that claims others in the community: the calf is just ‘one stubborn 
calf, in a world of calves’ (133), and Lee Chin, the man whom he ties to the piling on the 
mud flats, was ‘found […] just five minutes earlier […] hurrying north up the beach towards 
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town’ (273). In the final passage of Book IV's opening chapter, as he leaves Lee Chin lashed 
to the pilings with a lantern to watch the rising tide below, Obenchain distinguishes himself 
from the townspeople who 
never left the life of sensation but only refined its objects: when they had a little land, 
or a ten-year-old name, they switched their boots from beer to sherry, and got them a 
Lummi Indian to cut their wood. Respectable people were those who avoided outcry. 
Obenchain was more than respectable; he was a natural aristocrat, self-made, whose 
high skull scraped the sky. (278)  
 
By way of immediate contrast, we are then reintroduced to Clare Fishburn. The son of Ada 
and Rooney, Clare is, like Obenchain, ‘one of the few persons in the state of Washington who 
had been born there’ (310). Described here as ‘ordinarily careless of appearance’, it is this 
most ordinary of men who is to ‘represent his city - represent even his country’, as Whatcom 
welcomes the first overland train from Canada, in a bid to secure the contract for the Great 
Northern Railway terminus (278). As he gathers himself for the day's events, Clare peruses a 
set of ‘no frills’ maps, with ‘only a black grid of squares the surveyor has inked on top of the 
brown, irregular coastline of Bellingham Bay’ (278). As he does so, the narrative declares: 
‘these were stirring times in Whatcom, and the map showed the changes’ (279). Not only do 
Clare’s maps show the changes in the town, but his perusing of them shows the change in 
him. In earlier books, Clare had been a man of the land, the man to ask if you needed to 
‘[saw] down cedars eight or ten foot across’, and one of those first-generation settlers ‘who 
had passed their infancies cutting cordwood and paddling canoes’ (178-80). In this shift from 
a life of physical exertion to one spent ‘[sitting] tight […] while the lot’s price swelled’, the 
development of Clare’s character, and the various roles he embodies throughout the novel, 
reflect the changing face of social power during the period.  
In Obenchain and Clare, then, Dillard offers two alternative representations of 
patriarchal power. What is striking, however, is how the development of these two men 
throughout the novel undercuts many of the ideological imperatives we would typically 
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associate with the Western genre. This is brought to the fore in Book IV when, standing once 
again on the mudflats of Bellingham Bay, Obenchain hatches his next plan: 
Now he knew what he would do. […] He would repair to his stump and draw from the 
bucket the name of the man he would not kill. The way in which he had resolved not 
to kill him was by threatening to kill him and doing nothing. Obenchain would let the 
victim live as best he could inside the radius of his power, in the knowledge that he 
was at any moment to die. (303-4) 
 
Soon after, Obenchain plucks a name from his bucket – Clare Fishburn. Here, then, Dillard 
simultaneously sets up and undercuts our expectations of the iconic Western showdown. On 
the one hand, this is the archetypal match-up between two physically imposing men, both 
standing at ‘six feet, three inches’ and so, literally, ‘a head above’ the other townspeople; 
between the amoral outlaw and, essentially, the town marshal (310). What is more, to return 
to Tompkins’s framework, this thread instils into the narrative ‘the imminence of death’, in 
which we anticipate the ‘ritualization of the moment of death that climaxes most Western 
novels and films’.56 And yet we are wrong-footed, for this is the imminence of non-death; an 
exertion of mental rather than physical dominion. As Obenchain himself remarks, ‘Life is 
mind […] and mind, in some spectral way, operates in words. In his every breath was power’ 
(311).  
More intriguing still is the connection Dillard draws within the same pages between 
Obenchain and the New England Transcendentalists. Described as ‘a hermit’, we learn that 
‘when he was seven [Obenchain] built himself a room in a cedar stump near the railroad 
right-of-way in the woods south of town’ (303). Although his name is never explicitly 
mentioned, I would suggest that this is a direct allusion by Dillard to Thoreau – Obenchain’s 
abode is unavoidably reminiscent of Thoreau’s own simple, self-built home positioned by the 
railroad in the woods just south of Concord. Looking to Walden itself, yet more evidence to 
suggest the connection is offered by Thoreau’s remark within its closing pages that: ‘[t]here 
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was a man in my neighbourhood who lived in a hollow tree. His manners were truly regal. I 
should have done better had I called on him’ (i.e. as opposed to the townspeople he has 
previously been obliged to call upon).57 Most compelling of all, however, is the scrap of 
paper nailed to Obenchain’s wall that simply reads: ‘Do the thing and you will have the 
power – R. W. Emerson’ (308). 
If Obenchain may be understood as the novel’s somewhat skewed representation of 
the Transcendentalist spirit, then Clare may be read as its symbol of Christianity, and as a 
conduit for the profoundly theological element that permeates Dillard’s work. In this vein, a 
number of critics have been keen to highlight the significance of Clare’s name. ‘Fishburn’, 
Sandra Humble Johnson acknowledges, ‘is associated with Christ in the symbol of the fish. 
[…] Fishburn is literally “Christ-aflame”, while “Clare” represents “clear”, the full name 
becoming “clear Christ aflame”, suggestive of abundant life and increased knowledge 
springing out of sacrificial death.’58 While the connection drawn here and elsewhere between 
Clare and Christ is in some ways compelling, however, it fails to account for many elements 
of his character. As such, I would argue that, like Obenchain in relation to 
Transcendentalism, Clare’s benevolent (to the verge of vapidity) everyman persona 
represents an intentionally reductive embodiment of Christian ideals. In this most 
idiosyncratic of Westerns, then, what is at stake is not individual honour and glory, or even 
life and death, at least not literally. Instead, to employ an Emersonian analogy, Obenchain 
and Clare stand as representative men, and their respective fates have much to tell us about 
Dillard’s own philosophy. 
 Initially, Obenchain’s scheme unfolds as expected. Having been told of his imminent 
death, ‘every day [becomes] a day in which Clare expected to die’ (344). Trapped in this 
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liminal state between life and death, Clare constantly contemplates the moment of reckoning, 
which he imagines (and we with him) will play out in typically Western style: ‘[w]ith a 
Bowie knife, a fighter could rip a man up close before either one of them could draw a 
revolver, he could throw a knife faster than Obenchain could raise and aim a gun – if he were 
a knife fighter, instead of a partner in a land company’ (359). Elsewhere, we learn, through 
the thoughts of Clare, that ‘the rule of law thinned and petered out south of town’, and the 
narrative alludes to such incidents as when ‘two masked men robbed trains’, ‘an old Indian 
fighter shot a three-card monte dealer’, and ‘the “True Love” bandit […] shot two blanket 
stiffs with his characteristic split bullets’ (364). Yet ‘these old stories’ are as fantastical for 
Clare as they are for the reader, and mere digressions from the main narrative in which, as we 
have been warned to expect, no such showdown occurs. Thus, in the midst of this existential 
limbo, Clare begins to find new meaning in his life, dedicating more time to his wife and 
children and reengaging with the physical landscape around him that had become merely 
incidental in comparison to the dollar-marked maps of his day job.  
And so when Clare accidentally stumbles upon Obenchain as he walks alone along 
the mudflats we are, with him, expectant and anxious to find out how this tale of fluctuating 
power will resolve itself. And yet – nothing. Instead, after several paragraphs in which they 
approach one another and Clare debates whether or not to draw his fishing knife, the long-
awaited confrontation occurs in the blank space between two paragraphs. We are simply told 
that ‘when Obenchain stood and stopped him […] and told him he was not going to kill him, 
he was not going to die, Clare looked out over the trestle and down to the water, where gulls 
flew without bending their wings’ (618). What follows is an extended meditation on the 
shoreline landscape, in which the image of a ‘distant figure […] turning pea rows over in 
perfect silence’ leads Clare to contemplate the nature of death once more: ‘The earth was 
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plowing the men under, and the horses, and the plows. […] No generation sees it happen, and 
the damp new fields grow up forgetting’ (619).  
By thus undercutting the idealised, glorified moment of death that so often 
accompanies the Western showdown, Dillard subverts the traditional trajectory of the 
Western as we come full circle – it is ultimately Clare’s non-death that reiterates the 
democratising and indiscriminate nature of death that is set up at the outset of the novel. 
Moreover, it is notable that it is in not sacrificing himself (in the logical extension of the 
Christ-like analogy) that Clare is able to understand his existence as simply one insignificant 
element within the ever-renewing cycle of nature – a decidedly more pantheistic outlook than 
an Orthodox Christian perspective would allow. But what argument is being made here in 
relation to Transcendentalist philosophy? 
In the closing pages of the novel proper, Obenchain recognises that Clare has 
reconciled himself with death and has thus usurped the power he once held over him. In this 
realisation, Obenchain loses all self-conviction:  
His life he considered vile. The memory of his own fitful enthusiasms rebuked him. 
Nothing had come of them, and he could never believe in himself again; everything was 
draining away into a basin of loathing. […] If he was not, as he did not now feel 
himself to be, the exceptional and superior man, then he was no man. (656) 
 
In Obenchain, then, Dillard emphasises those aspects of Transcendentalist philosophy that, as 
we saw in the opening sections of this chapter, preoccupy themselves with hegemonic 
concerns of intellectual dominion and uncompromising individualism. In his ‘experimental 
interest’ in death, Obenchain believes he is moving beyond the intellectual impotency of his 
generation, an accusation levelled by Emerson in ‘Experience’ when he asserts that, ‘[t]here 
is no power of expansion in men. […] They stand on the brink of the ocean of thought and 
power, but they never take the single step that would bring them there.’59 Yet Dillard’s novel 
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suggests that it is not in exerting dominion over others that we find intellectual, spiritual, or 
cultural superiority. Indeed, in her characterisation of Obenchain, Dillard conspicuously 
foregrounds that same tension between thought and action so often levelled at 
Transcendentalist thinkers. 
In the final image of the novel’s penultimate section, descendants of two of the first 
white families to arrive in the bay, Hugh Honer and Vinnie Fishburn, walk across the 
mudflats towards Bellingham’s harbour. Now sweethearts, they are preparing for Hugh’s 
departure, as he returns to Seattle to start a new college term: 
Hugh watched a black eagle descend on the wing; its path took it towards them down 
and down. He glanced at the mud flat and looked again. The crabs were at something 
on the mud by a piling. […] Suddenly he saw that what they were on was a hand 
underwater, a neck leading to a torso in a jacket, a damaged face, a man. (663) 
 
Within this image of Beal Obenchain not standing but buried alive in the mudflats (and it is 
notable that nearly every key moment in Obenchain’s narrative is located at this littoral brink 
between land and water), Dillard’s novel precludes the potential for human mastery over this 
space. In this way, I would suggest that the demise of Obenchain articulates Dillard’s 
rejection of that mode of Transcendentalist thinking which privileges patriarchal notions of 
power, dominion and knowledge. And yet, I would argue, Obenchain is perhaps not the 
enduring Transcendentalist spirit of this novel.  
Within the last section of the narrative, entitled 'Afterwards' (and so foregrounding 
ideas of legacy), Hugh Honer returns home from college once more. A sailing trip is arranged 
amongst the families and they head out to the islands off Bellingham Bay. As night falls, the 
younger members of the group decide to go bathing in a nearby pond leaving, significantly, 
the other adults behind – Clare Fishburn included. Initially reluctant, as he's ‘not fond of 
bathing’, Hugh decides to join them: ‘He loaded his pipe and looked over the water 
westward. […] He took a lantern, and set off alone on the path through the woods’ (691-2). It 
is no mistake, I would suggest, that Dillard evokes this particularly Thoreauvian image of the 
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lone male venturing out westward to the pond through the woods. In the closing passage of 
the novel, Hugh arrives at the edge of the pond. Leaving the ‘soft and familiar’ forest floor 
beneath him, he ‘emerges on a high platform’ (692). Here, in an immediate contrast to the 
known space below him, Hugh enters a space surrounded by ‘unrecognizable people’ and 
‘unfamiliar voices’ (692). At first, he cannot make out his surroundings: ‘he saw nothing: no 
pond, no ocean, no forest, sky, nor any horizon, only unmixed blackness’ (692). Heeding ‘the 
voices in the darkness’ below him, and, to allude to Emerson’s analogy once more, he takes 
that decisive step over the brink (693). Suddenly, his view is illuminated, and the narrative 
ends as he ‘flings himself loose into the stars’ (693). 
Despite the Thoreauvian allusions throughout the passage, this closing image stands 
in stark contrast to the image cited earlier of Thoreau ‘standing before the masthead, on the 
deck of the world’. Rather than an image of masculine dominion, this closing passage depicts 
Hugh as ‘trembling’ and ‘hopeful’ rather than masterful. It is here that we may consider the 
following remark made by James Freeman Clarke (that young Ohio-bound Transcendentalist, 
obsessed with power and status) in an 1835 letter to Margaret Fuller: ‘I wish I could shake 
myself free of New England and give myself heart and hand to the West. I am like a swimmer 
who dares not yet to let go of the rope and swim alone.’60 What Clarke fails to recognise here, 
as these final passages of The Living imply, is that one need not ‘swim alone’. Quite the 
reverse in fact, for here Hugh (and, implicitly, we) must embrace the dark unknown and trust 
the ‘unrecognizable people [with] unfamiliar voices’ that surround him. Indeed, while 
Thoreau ‘does not wish to go below’, these closing passages are, quite literally, a call to 
descending from one’s pedestal, and immersing oneself in the myriad of creative and spiritual 
possibilities – elsewhere. I would argue, then, that this transition from the image of jaded 
intellectual Beal Obenchain being found submerged on the mudflats to that of young scholar 
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Hugh Honer swinging out over the brink and ‘loose into the stars’ may be read as an analogy 
for the shift from a nineteenth-century New England Transcendentalist perspective to a New 
Transcendentalist perspective that seeks to challenge patriarchal dominion, embrace 
otherness, and provide a less exclusive platform for opening new lines of enquiry in 
Transcendentalist thought. 
 
‘THE ORPHAN CHILD OF A BRILLIANT CENTURY’: MARILYNNE ROBINSON’S LILA (2014) 
If The Living positions itself quite clearly within the Western genre, Marilynne Robinson’s 
Lila is much more readily aligned with the sentimental novel. It tells the backstory of Lila, 
the young wife of John Ames, who has been a peripheral character in the two earlier Gilead 
novels. We soon learn that this third novel predates Gilead and Home, written from Lila’s 
perspective while she is pregnant with Robert – the young son to whom Ames writes his 
letter in Gilead. From this perspective, the narrative unfolds in two parallel strands. The main 
narrative takes place in the same setting as the previous two novels, depicting Lila’s arrival in 
Gilead and the budding relationship that she develops with Ames, and, in turn, with the 
Christian faith. The second offers an insight into her life before Gilead, and the years she 
spends as a young orphan alongside her surrogate mother, Doll, drifting aimlessly across the 
country. And it is upon this pre-Gilead life that the novel opens, with an image of ‘the child 
[…] just there on the stoop in the dark, hugging herself against the cold, all cried out and 
nearly sleeping’.61 That night, Doll, who also lives in this house, takes Lila up from her 
hiding place under a table and away, and so begins their life on the road, until Lila arrives by 
chance in Gilead and ‘[wanders] into the church dripping rain’ (11).  
Clearly, then, this story of the bedraggled orphan who, years later, steps into a church 
for shelter and so embarks on an education in Christianity, marries a preacher and bears his 
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son, transposes very readily onto Tompkins’s outline of the sentimental novel. This is clearer 
still given that, as context for her discussion, Tompkins makes reference to In His Steps, a 
religious novel that was written in 1896 by Kansas preacher, Charles M. Sheldon. In His 
Steps is the story of a preacher who is interrupted when writing his sermon by a young 
downtrodden man who comes to his door requesting work in order to support his daughter, 
whom he has had to leave with friends due to his wife’s recent death. With nothing to offer, 
the preacher turns the man away. The following Sunday, as the preacher finishes delivering 
his sermon, the same man enters and delivers his own sermon of sorts, announcing that his 
own plight is shared by many others who have been put out of work due to increased 
industrialisation. He suggests the great social changes that could be effected if the 
congregation were to go out and live by the sentiment of those hymns whose words they sing 
so ardently. The man then collapses. The preacher takes the man back to his house, but he 
dies soon after. Sheldon’s novel became ‘by far and away the most popular book of its time’, 
reigniting a reformative zeal throughout America’s Christian population.62 In his foreword to 
the 1935 edition, Sheldon notes that he was ‘informed by Publisher’s Weekly that the book 
has had more circulation that any other book except the Bible’.63  
The legacy of In Her Steps is readily apparent within Lila. It may be gleaned within 
not only the image of Lila entering the church as she does but also within the apparently 
unquestioning ease with which she is accepted into the community. Indeed, the unwaveringly 
charitable Christian sensibility that Sheldon’s novel inspired within many of its readers is 
reflected in the attitudes of the women of Gilead. At times, Robinson takes this to the point of 
parody, as in the following example, when Lila asks one of the local women whether she 
needs any help: 
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There are women who take pride in how kind they are and jump at every chance, their 
eyes all shining with it so you can’t help but notice. You keep clear of them if you can, 
but they do come in handy. She said, “Why, yes, dear, I am!” Yes, I am looking for 
help!” Just like that. She didn’t give herself a minute to decide. Lila thought, I should 
mention the knife in my garter and see what she says then. (220) 
 
And yet for all these resonances, as this passage indicates, there are a number of fundamental 
ways in which Robinson’s novel subverts our expectations of the domestic novel. While the 
narrative undoubtedly foregrounds ‘the interior struggles of the heroine to live up to an ideal 
of Christian virtue [and] to quell rebellious instincts’, Lila’s increasingly ambivalent and 
unconventional interpretation of Christian values precludes the neatly sentimental trajectory 
from which the genre takes its name. 64  As such, I will argue, Robinson’s novel, and 
particularly its enigmatic protagonist, may be more fruitfully aligned with the Western. Given 
the Midwest setting of the novel, my suggestion here is perhaps somewhat counterintuitive. 
Yet by drawing out the parallels between this latest novel and Robinson’s Housekeeping, we 
find compelling evidence to support such a reading. 
 Like Ruth, Lila struggles to find her place in the world; she is similarly at home in the 
natural landscape but equally drawn to the security of a loving home. Moreover, as in the 
earlier novel, the working through of this tension is set within the context of Lila’s history as 
a young orphan who embarks on a life of aimless wandering with her aunt and surrogate 
mother-figure, Doll. Rather than the conclusion that the narrative works towards, however, 
Lila’s drifting life is the novel’s point of departure, a back story that is unveiled 
retrospectively from Lila’s perspective as a woman now married and pregnant. It is 
significant, therefore, that Lila’s trajectory is not presented as the unthinkable fate from 
which Ruth felt she must escape. Thinking back to the premise of the first chapter, the 
connections that may be drawn between Lila and not only Robinson’s debut novel but also 
the other Gilead novels presents yet another example of the dialogical relationships Robinson 
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sets up between her writings. Indeed, if we do fail to draw these connections, Robinson offers 
us a few subtle allusions to trigger our memories. Late in the narrative, for instance, Lila 
imagines a future conversation with her newborn son in which he asks where they’re going to 
be buried when they die, given that ‘the plots [alongside Ames and his late wife and child] 
are all taken up’ (251). Lila replies: ‘[i]t don’t matter. We’ll just wander a while. We’ll be 
nowhere, and it will be all right. I have friends there’ (251). This is a telling reversal given 
Ruth’s propensity to talk to her deceased relatives, and the fact that Ames talks to Robert in 
anticipation of his own death and his son’s adulthood. And while within the context of the 
novel this could easily be assumed to refer to Doll and others she has met throughout her life, 
I would suggest that the thematic significance and the symmetry of phrasing between this 
moment and Ruth’s memorable assertion that ‘the perimeters of our wandering are nowhere’ 
in the closing passage of Housekeeping point towards this being a subtle nod to that earlier 
novel.65  
Drawing on Robinson’s own comments regarding her characterisation of Sylvie, the 
previous chapter has already ventured that Ruth may be read as a female revisioning of the 
archetypal male American hero; a more realised expression of Robinson’s sense that ‘the fact 
that human nature is replete with nameless possibilities, and, by implication, that the world is 
accessible to new ways of understanding’. Here, having recognised the parallels between her 
two protagonists, I argue that it is in her more recent characterisation of Lila that Robinson’s 
intention is even more fully realised. For, by Tompkins’s framework at least, Lila is as close 
to a female revisioning of that archetypal Western hero as we are likely to find. Consider the 
following description of the exemplary cowboy: 
Perhaps more than anything, nature gives the hero a sense of himself. For he is 
competent in this setting. […] Besides being agonistic and at times ecstatic, the hero’s 
relationship to the environment is steady, knowledgeable, functional, and pleasure-
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giving. Over and over, […] he makes the world answer his primary needs. […] Far 
from town, far from the conveniences in modern life, far from outside help, the solitary 
man, with only nature at his disposal, makes himself comfortable.66 
 
There is perhaps no more accurate a description for the relationship Robinson depicts 
between Lila and the natural landscape that surrounds her. Within the novel’s opening pages, 
we are told that ‘there was a long time when Lila didn’t know that words had letters, or that 
there were other names for seasons than planting and haying. Walk south ahead of the 
weather, walk north in time for the crops’ (10). If ever there existed a mode of living close to 
Emerson’s notion of being ‘above time’, in the rhythms of nature, this is it. And if she can’t 
be ‘out in that great sweet nowhere’, Lila is nowhere more comfortable than when she is 
alone and fending for herself in the small, simple – highly Thoreauvian – abandoned cabin in 
which she initially sets up home a few miles outside of town, with just her bedroll (217). 
 And the uncanny similarities extend beyond this innate connection with the natural 
landscape. In Lila, we find The Woman With No Name – despite the novel’s title we learn 
very early on that her name was chosen randomly by a woman who takes in Doll and the 
young child after their escape – ‘“I been thinking about ‘Lila.’ I had a sister Lila. Give her a 
pretty name, maybe she could turn out pretty.” […] “Maybe”, Doll said. “Don’t matter”’ 
(10). When Ames baptises her as ‘Lila Dahl’ (her teacher’s misspelling of ‘Doll’ – ‘“You’re 
Norwegian!”’ (46)), she remarks: ‘“But that ain’t my name.” When asked what her real name 
is she replies: ‘“Nobody ever said”’ (86). Later, when she arrives at the St. Louis brothel, Lila 
takes ‘another made up name’, Rosie, given to her by the mistress ‘because no one else was 
Rosie’ (192). Further parallels pervade the narrative, including Lila’s pathological distrust of 
others; her reluctance to confide in Ames; even the clipped cadence of her speech: 
[Ames] said, “I suppose you still don’t trust me at all.” 
   “I just don’t go round trusting people. Don’t see the need.”  
They walked on a while. 
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 “The roses are beautiful. On the grave. It’s very kind of you to do that”. 
She shrugged. “I like roses.” (80) 
 
What is more, as may be inferred within the above interaction, Lila and Ames’s relationship 
conspicuously subverts the conventional gender roles associated with this genre. Where Lila 
is time and again associated with the natural landscape, Ames is almost exclusively confined 
(across all three novels) to his house, and in this narrative often appears in the kitchen 
preparing meals for Lila, or in his bedroom as Lila creeps in to lie alongside him. And while 
Lila is depicted as a woman of very few words, Ames is incessantly trying to elicit 
conversation – ‘“[w]ell, if there is ever – anything at all. That you need – If you ever want to 
talk again, I might do better this time. […] I can’t promise, but I’ll try”’ (33)– with such 
earnest appeals recurring throughout the narrative. Thinking back to the previous chapter, 
these aspects of Lila’s character and the subverted dynamic of her relationship with Ames 
become more significant still. For we find here clear parallels between Lila’s characterisation 
and Emerson’s belief that ‘the most self-reliant person manages to combine in himself or 
herself both masculine and feminine intellectual traits and that both sets of traits are equally 
indispensable.’ 67  In this way, Robinson’s characterisation of Lila may be read as both 
highlighting the parallels between the Western myth of the cowboy and the self-reliant 
Transcendentalist, and also reimagining both of these archetypes by subverting the gendered 
imperatives within which both are reductively associated within the popular imagination. 
 Moreover, as we have seen elsewhere in this thesis, this elderly preacher represents 
more than just a benevolent sounding board for Lila’s existential dilemmas, and here we are 
drawn again to considering Ames as a representative of an antiquated Emersonian method 
that appears to foster intellectual authority as represented in essays and lectures at the 
expense of the tangible realisation of those principles in the external world. Like Obenchain 
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and Clare, then (and in an extension of the intersubjective dynamics discussed in the previous 
chapter), the marriage of Lila and Ames represents more than just the coming together of two 
individuals. If Ames is the Transcendentalist spirit devoid of tangible real-world action, then 
Lila is the world-worn Transcendentalist spirit deprived of the abstract knowledge to 
articulate it. Moreover, in aligning Lila with the archetypal Western male, yet tracing her 
tentative (if ambivalent) acceptance of the Christian faith and her precocious desire to learn, 
Robinson both reimagines the existing myth of the West while simultaneously undermining 
its pathological rejection of women, religion and language. 
 Ultimately, in positioning Lila, the novel, at the thematic intersection between the 
other Gilead novels and Housekeeping, Robinson both projects and subverts this intrinsically 
Western and, as we have seen, Transcendentalist sensibility onto the Midwest context of the 
novel. It is important to note, however, that the novel’s overriding message is not one of 
unambiguous resolution, as the above might suggest. In the closing pages, which occur in the 
hours after their son is born, Lila warns Ames that she misses her old life, and that she ‘might 
have to go back to it sometime’ (255). Ames recognises the inevitability that he will be 
leaving them alone relatively soon, and Lila claims that ‘[t]hat’s not really the problem’ 
(256). She thinks to herself: 
The problem is […] that if someday she opened the front door and there, where the 
flower gardens and the fence and the fate ought to be, was that old life, the raggedy 
meadows and pastures and the cornfields and the orchards, she might just set the child 
on her hip and walk out into it, the buzz and the smell and the damp of it, the breath of 
it like her own breath, her own sweat. (256) 
 
Here, like the young Christopher Pearse Cranch who couldn’t find stability in Ohio, Lila 
recognises that same perpetual restlessness that a life of motherhood and matrimony may not 
fully be able to quell. And yet in the life of their unborn son, there lies the hope of a future 
generation that will take the best of both parents, reminiscent perhaps of that ‘happier mixed 
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clay’ that Emerson alludes to in the closing remarks of ‘The Transcendentalist’. 68 
Considering again Robinson’s comments in ‘When I Was a Child’, we find further 
Emersonian resonances that are applicable to these final pages of Lila, within her proposition 
that: ‘[p]erhaps it is a misfortune for us that so many interesting ideas were associated with 
access to a habitable wilderness.’69 For, as she realises, ‘the real frontier need never close. 
Everything, for all purposes, still remains to be done.’70 
 In this analogy of both the historical yearning for the habitable wilderness and the 
frontier that ‘need never close’, Robinson evokes Emerson’s call made a century and half 
earlier in 1842: 
It is droll to see the contentment and incuriosity of man. All take for granted,– the 
learned as well as the unlearned, – that a great deal, nay, almost all, is known and forever 
settled. But in truth all is now to be begun, and every new mind ought to take the attitude 
of Columbus, launch out from the gaping loiterers on the shore, and sail west for a new 
world.71 
 
Yet, clearly, this is not simply a reiteration of Emerson’s sentiment. For Emerson here 
demonstrates just that unfortunate (to paraphrase Robinson) perspective that we see 
demonstrated in so many Transcendentalist writings which equates an appeal for self-
discovery with ‘the ambition to push, as far as fate would permit, the planted garden of man, 
on every hand, into the kingdom of Night’.72 In Robinson’s revisioning of this ever-changing 
cultural frontier, contentment and self-discovery need not be mutually exclusive. 
Furthermore, in this image of Lila striding out into ‘that old life’ not with a pistol holster but 
‘the child on her hip’, Robinson highlights that its exploration need not be isolating – and it 
need certainly not be the privilege of the solitary educated man. And yet, by the same token, 
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in her acknowledgement that ‘in the West “lonesome” is a word with strongly positive 
connotations’ and thus ‘one’s greatest dignity and privilege’, Robinson simultaneously 
validates that radical individualism that is so integral to the established ideology of the 
American West.73 And it is at this juncture that we leave Lila: between an autonomous yet 
maternal, dignified self-definition and the novel’s parting note of contented intimacy: 
‘[s]omeday she would tell him what she knew’ (261). 
 Within her work, and particularly within Lila, Robinson not only deftly articulates 
those ‘new ways of understanding’ that she alludes to within ‘When I Was a Child’, but also 
issues her own call, as posited within her essay’s final passage. Evoking not some hegemonic 
preoccupation with power but a gracious assertion of the region’s cultural richness, she 
concludes that ‘it would be a positively good thing for the West to assert itself in the most 
interesting terms, so that the whole country must hear, and be reanimated by dreams and 
passions it has too casually put aside and too readily forgotten’.74 As such, Robinson’s work 
both reignites and reimagines the ideological function of the West, opening up an inclusive 
critical space which takes us beyond outdated representations of the region as a cartographic 
and cultural terminus at the edge of the world. 
 
‘I HADN’T REALISED THAT THE END OF THE WORLD COULD BE A PLACE AS WELL AS A 
TIME’: REBECCA SOLNIT IN THE NEW TRANSCENDENTALIST WEST 
At the outset of this chapter, a distinction was drawn between two overarching strands of 
New West criticism – that which pertained to the cultural, and that which re-examined the 
ecological and more explicitly political implications of western expansion. If the above 
analyses of Dillard and Robinson’s respective novels have focused primarily on the first of 
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these strands, the following consideration of Rebecca Solnit’s work reintroduces the latter 
and explores its implications for a New Transcendentalism. 
Brought up in Novato, Marin County and now living in the San Francisco Bay Area, 
much of Solnit’s writing is conspicuously located on the West coast of the United States. In 
her 2005 text, A Field Guide to Getting Lost, Solnit discusses the evolving cartography of 
California and the United States more widely. She begins with Martin Waldseemüller’s 1513 
atlas, in which the area since delineated into North, Central and South America ‘is nothing 
but a coastline full of small names and mouths of rivers and, in far bolder letters, across what 
is now Venezuela and Brazil, “Terra Incognita”, unknown land’.75  Like Thoreau before her, 
as we have seen, this terra incognita is a constant theme running throughout her writing, and 
here she traces its evolution. She acknowledges how ‘California was long portrayed as a huge 
island just off the west coast of North America, and the northwest coast of that continent 
remained undrawn, one of the last expanses of Terra Incognita to the Europeans mapping the 
world’.76 For Solnit, this terra incognita is a spatial representation of the limits of human 
knowledge; she contends that even the most comprehensive of maps ‘would be inadequate to 
depict the layers of the place, its many versions. [These terra incognita] spaces on maps say 
that knowledge too is an island surrounded by oceans of the unknown’ (165). Like Thoreau, 
Solnit suggests that this awareness of ‘the unmapped and the unmappable’ is integral to 
human experience and it is with a sense of regret that she recognises ‘our smugness now that 
maps of earth are so unlikely to say “Terra Incognita”’ (164).  
 While these cartographic unknowns would have been all but resolved by 1851 – the 
latest map Solnit refers to here was produced by Pedro Font in 1777 – Thoreau’s ‘Walking’, 
as we have seen, was written at a time when California, and the West more generally, still 
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offered this sense of unexplored, ‘unexhausted’ space. Here, Solnit evokes a nostalgia for that 
time, and a sense that Thoreau was vindicated in his assertion that ‘[t]he West of which I 
speak is but another name for the Wild; and […] in Wildness is the preservation of the 
world.’77  Indeed, a century and a half later, and for Solnit, immersed in the urbanised – and 
increasingly gentrified – San Francisco of our contemporary moment, it has become ‘strange 
[…] to look at the old maps of the world and see my part of the continent as island and a 
void: […] blank, so that the territory of my childhood is terra incognita there’ (167-68; 
emphases added). 
Here, Solnit’s use of such emotive descriptors as ‘my part of the continent’ and ‘the 
territory of my childhood’ is indicative of an interweaving of the public and the private that, 
much like Thoreau, is so characteristic of her work. Given the themes of colonisation and 
dominion that run throughout this chapter, however, Solnit’s apparent claiming of ownership 
here is potentially problematic. Yet Solnit is the first to acknowledge the contentious politics 
of the West, and the American West in particular. In Storming the Gates of Paradise: 
Landscapes for Politics, she tackles this tension within her writing head on. The opening 
essay of the collection, in keeping with that dialectic common to these New Transcendentalist 
texts which sets up the interplay of beauty and horror in nature, depicts the sublime beauty of 
the Western landscape while acknowledging it as an acutely hostile environment for human 
life – ‘What feeds the soul starves the skin’, Solnit recognises.78 Such paradoxes proliferate 
here. Driving around the perimeter of the Nevada Test Site, Solnit gets to thinking about the 
failure of Americans ‘to measure the carnage caused by hundreds of bombs in one city by 
that of two hijacked airplane crashes in another’; about ‘the wars fought for our cheap 
gasoline, the wars that make viable not just my summer jaunts but year-round homes sixty or 
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seventy miles from the grocery story’; and about (much like Sharman Apt Russell) the 
essential contradiction in the ‘cowboy ethos that every man should fend for himself’, despite 
the inordinate federal reserves that underwrite ranch life.79 Yet when asked if she loves her 
country, Solnit will always reply in the affirmative, for ‘easy though all this is to deplore on 
moral grounds, the place is seductive’.80 Not only is it seductive, it is home: ‘There’s a sense 
for me that all this is home, that every hour, every mile, is coming home […] More than most 
nations, the United States has imagined itself as geography, as landscape and territory first, 
and this I too love.’81 By discriminating between the physical geography of the Western 
landscape and the region’s wider geopolitical status, Solnit creates a distance between the 
political and the physical experience of this place. This is not to say that she distances herself 
from political engagement – far from it, Solnit is a leading voice within the Californian 
political sphere, as we have seen elsewhere – but that she understands herself as inhabiting 
two irrevocably connected yet distinct Wests. 
Here we might draw back to Campbell’s 2008 study, The Rhizomatic West, in which 
he considers the direction of western studies in the twenty-first century:  
[r]ather than the assumption that “roots always precede routes” in the definition of 
culture, one might rethink the West, as both roots and routes, both dwelling and 
traveling, which has much to offer western studies, providing an alternative framework 
that deterritorializes established traditions, displacing static myths with complex, 
intersecting strands.82 
 
The resonances here with Solnit’s creative practice are self-evident, and if the idea of 
deterritorialization has ‘much to offer’ western studies it also opens up new possibilities for 
Transcendentalist philosophy. The essential paradox between Emerson’s assertion that ‘to 
find the journey’s end in every step of the road […] is wisdom’ but equally that ‘everything 
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good is on the highway’ has been noted earlier in this chapter. But, as Campbell implies, a 
conception of space in which stability need not inevitably engender stasis, and progression 
need not necessitate perpetual momentum, undermines the contradiction in Emerson’s 
thinking here. Moreover, it undercuts the hegemonic fixation on ‘lighting out for new 
territory’ that has for so long been an ideological mainstay of both Transcendentalist rhetoric 
and representations of the American West. And it is in this vein that Solnit claims the 
Western landscape as her own. For Solnit, the West is not an idealised El Dorado but the 
home she has always known, and her engagement with the Californian landscape confers an 
immediacy and an intimacy borne out of the many years she has spent (and continues to 
spend) living in the region. That Solnit so frequently locates her work within these Western 
settings belies a stable yet continually stimulating engagement with these environments. 
In the opening chapter of Field Guide, Solnit asserts: ‘[f]or me, childhood roaming 
was what developed self-reliance, a sense of direction and adventure, imagination, a will to 
explore, to be able to get a little lost and then figure out the way back’ (7). In the very clear 
allusion to that pillar of Transcendentalism, ‘self-reliance’, Solnit recognises the influence of 
those nineteenth-century thinkers within her work. Yet Solnit suggests here that hers is a 
Transcendentalism borne out of experience, one that was fostered initially via a stimulating 
engagement with the external world, before it provided a philosophical underpinning for her 
writing. As such, Solnit implies a reversal of that Transcendentalist mode to which we keep 
returning that nurtures progressive thinking but so often precludes real-world action. And so 
with these several elements in mind – Solnit’s interweaving of the public and the private, by 
which she negotiates their distinct yet inherently connected nature; her stable yet stimulating 
connection to the Western landscape; the connection between this and a decidedly 
Transcendentalist sensibility; and, in turn, the parallel she draws between external experience 
and interiority – let us consider the last pages of Field Guide.  
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Within these closing passages, Solnit recounts the period in her childhood when her 
father was asked to work on the redevelopment of San Francisco. Having spent five years 
working on the proposal a development project that aimed to ‘[preserve] Marin County’s 
extraordinary landscapes and [prevent] its cities from sprawling together’, and after a lengthy 
redrafting process, her father’s plans were finally adopted in 1973 (205). As Solnit mentions 
in passing, the Marin County Planning Department published the plans in 1971, under the 
title Can the Last Place Last?: Preserving the Environmental Quality of Marin. Both this title 
and the text’s epigraph – ‘This is the last place. / There is nowhere else to go’ – are taken 
from a poem by Beat poet and fellow San Franciscan, Lew Welch (205). The poem, entitled 
‘The Song Mt. Tamalpais Sings’, reiterates a Thoreauvian sense of the American West Coast 
– and specifically the San Francisco Bay Area – as the edge of the world: ‘the last place’ 
before humankind comes full circle on itself:   
This is the last place. There is nowhere else to go. 
 
Human movements, but for a few, 
are Westerly’. […] 
  
Centuries and hordes of us, 
from every quarter of the earth, 
now piling up,  
and each wave going back  
to get some more.83 
 
Despite the ominous nature of this seemingly exponential ‘piling up’ of bodies as expressed 
in the opening stanzas, the poem concludes:  
For we have walked the jeweled beaches 
at the feet of the final cliffs  
of all Man’s wanderings. 
 
This is the last place. 
There is nowhere else we need to go.84   
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Here, a far cry from Thoreau’s proclamation that ‘[o]ne who pressed forward incessantly, and 
never rested from his labors, who grew fast and made infinite demands on life, would always 
find himself in a new country or wilderness, and surrounded by the raw material of life’, 
Welch implies that such unrelenting westward momentum is not only impossible but also 
unnecessary.85 The suggestion seems to be that, as the rhetoric of Manifest Destiny would 
have it, humankind has, indeed, reached its apotheosis in America’s most westerly states. 
 Although the poem is no more than a passing reference here, its premise underpins 
these last sections of Solnit’s text, and the final passage of Field Guide takes up this idea of 
America’s West Coast as ‘the last place’ once more. Solnit describes her childhood home in 
Marin County as ‘a small place inside a larger one, or a small story inside a larger one’ and 
alludes to her father’s violent temper in her assertion that ‘terrible things were happening in 
that house, but they were tied to the redemption happening on the larger scale of the county, 
which was in part a reaction to the violent erasures going on across the country and the 
world’ (206). Despite the traumatic memories that she associates with her childhood home, 
Solnit recognises the area as a place to which she regularly returns. She recalls one visit in 
particular: 
on this return I’d seen the nesting of these stories, as well as some of the animals that 
had come back. […] Most of them live out on the remotest peninsula of this remote 
place, […] a peninsula at whose tip I had realized that the end of the world could be a 
place as well as a time. […] The end of the world was wind-scoured but peaceful, 
black cormorants and red starfish on wave-washed dark rocks below a sandy bluff, 
and beyond them all the sea spreading far and then farther. (206)  
 
Within these last pages, Solnit muses on the interrelation between public acts and private 
consequences, between private actions and ecological effects. In doing so, she poses the 
question once again: can this last place last? Like Welch, for all its apocalyptic connotations, 
these final lines suggest contentment – ‘the end of the world was wind-scoured but peaceful’. 
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More than this, and paradoxically, ‘the end of the world’ is portrayed as a last bastion for ‘the 
animals that had come back’. A few pages previously Solnit recounts this same visit, and 
describes ‘watching a pair of white-tailed kites’ as she is told that ‘they had been thought to 
be extinct, and they were now doing so well that they were expanding their ecological niche 
and range’ (201-2). As she continues to discuss the many species that have been successfully 
reintroduced into the area, she remarks that ‘in the third quarter of the nineteenth century, tule 
elk were hunted into extinction altogether on this coast, and throughout their California 
habitat, only a few survived’ (203). Of course, the period Solnit refers to here is precisely that 
which produced the pioneering generation and industrial innovations that would lay the 
foundations, as Frederick Jackson Turner foresaw, for so many of the twentieth century’s 
ecological catastrophes. Yet it is also the period that saw the publication of Thoreau’s most 
celebrated works, including Walden (1854) and ‘Walking’ (1851). 
 In this image of several critically endangered species not only returning but 
‘expanding their ecological niche and range’ in spite of near extinction, we may read an 
analogy for the creative endeavour of Solnit and my other writers who revisit and re-vision 
Transcendentalist philosophy as a means of recognising the intellectual and creative 
fecundity of the period, but also its ideological shortcomings. Indeed, within these closing 
passages, Solnit calls to mind both the Emersonian analogy of the impotent mind ‘at the brink 
of the ocean of thought and power’, but more intriguingly still given the thematic context, 
Thoreau’s metaphor for America’s most westerly coastline as the last place (and of course the 
Welch allusion underpins this reading) before ‘the human race […] arrives on the banks of 
the Styx’. And yet, as we have seen, Solnit depicts this space as both the cause of and remedy 
for our current ecological situation; as both an ending and a beginning. The image of Solnit 
looking out over ‘all the sea spreading far and then farther’ evokes not the Lethean non-space 
of Thoreau’s imagining, the only practical use for which is to foster forgetting of those 
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unfavourable aspects of the landscape we left behind. On the contrary, both here and 
elsewhere Solnit establishes this as the more liberating (and needless to say liminal) space 
into which, metaphorically speaking, we must venture; not so much a route as an ever-
renewing destination. As she would term it in her ‘Coda’ – ‘The Pacific’ – at the conclusion 
of Storming the Gates of Paradise, this is ‘the sea that always seems like a metaphor, but one 
that is always moving, cannot be fixed […] One thing leads to another, and this is the treasure 
that always runs through your fingers and never runs out.’86 Standing at the supposed ‘end of 
the world’ yet looking out over ‘all the sea spreading far and then farther’, Solnit strikes a 
very similar note to that elicited by Robinson’s evocation of ‘the frontier [that] need never 
close’, and confers that same open-endedness to be found within Dillard’s image of Hugh 
flinging himself ‘loose into the stars’. In this last image, then, Solnit articulates her sense that, 
just like those now thriving species, it is at this time, in this place, that the ideas and values of 
that most pivotal historical period would be able to flourish once more. 
 If the connection Solnit draws between the nineteenth century and her contemporary 
moment are somewhat oblique within Field Guide, the connection is much more transparent 
within her 2003 work Motion Studies: Time, Space and Eadweard Muybridge. Ostensibly the 
biography of the first photographer to capture moving images on film, the text traces the shift 
that has seen California change from ‘a world of places and materials to a world of 
representations and information, a world of vastly greater reach and less solid grounding’.87 
As Edward Rothstein acknowledges, then, this is ‘the biography of an era; not a man’.88 
Indeed, a counterpoint to Robinson’s sense of the West as ‘the orphan child of a brilliant 
century’, Muybridge functions here as ‘the perfect parent for the age […] in which we live’ 
                                                          
86 Rebecca Solnit, ‘Seashell to Ear’, in Storming the Gates of Paradise, pp. 379-83 (p. 383). 
87 Rebecca Solnit, Motion Studies: Time, Space and Eadweard Muybridge (London: Bloomsbury, 2003), p. 6.  
88 Edward Rothstein, ‘The Photographer who Found a Way to Slow Down Time’, The New York Times, 8 March 
2003 <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/08/books/shelf-life-the-photographer-who-found-a-way-to-slow-down-
time.html> [accessed 4 January 2014]. 
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(152). This may be gleaned within Solnit’s description of Muybridge as ‘a doorway, a pivot 
between that old world and ours, and to follow him is to follow the choices that got us here’ 
(24). Described as such (the term liminality of course derived from the Latin term limen, 
meaning literally ‘threshold’), Muybridge thus functions throughout this text as a symbol of 
the liminal status and potentiality of the American West. 
 The text details Muybridge’s working relationship with Leland Stanford, the railroad 
magnate who would go on to found Stanford University, which in turn begat California’s 
multi-corporate empire, Silicon Valley. In tracing the connection between Muybridge and 
Stanford, Solnit traces the beginnings of ‘Hollywood and Silicon Valley [which] became, 
long after these men died, the two industries California is most identified with, the two that 
changed the world’ (6). In doing so, Solnit articulates that tension between personal and 
artistic integrity and the capitalist means to bring those ideas into effect – a tension not 
dissimilar to that we have identified between Transcendentalism and the nation’s Manifest 
Destiny.  
Throughout The Rhizomatic West, Campbell frequently reiterates the importance of 
the ‘outsider perspective’ to a re-visioning of the West, asserting that ‘from within and 
without western studies’ conceptual grid, the “outside” becomes a strategy for opening up 
and scrutinizing established ideologies and languages, canonical practice and texts, resilient 
and official mythologies’.89 While Robinson would later choose to articulate this perspective 
through her fictional protagonists, in Muybridge, Solnit finds a real-life exemplar of the 
outsider perspective on the American West. Born Edward James Muggeridge in Kingston-
upon-Thames on 9 April 1830, Muybridge emigrated from England to America in the early 
1850s, determined to ‘make a name for himself’ (27). As Solnit points out, he went about his 
task quite literally, arriving in San Francisco in 1855 as E. J. Muygridge. Initially working as 
                                                          
89 The Rhizomatic West, p. 14. 
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a bookseller, Muybridge spent the latter half of the 1850s travelling in Europe, a time in his 
life which Solnit refers to as the ‘missing years’ given the lack of historical records 
accounting for his movements throughout this period, other than the fact that he was involved 
in a near fatal station wagon accident in 1860. Muybridge returned to San Francisco in 1867 
to embark on his new career as a photographer, a skill that he had apparently acquired and 
honed during this ‘missing’ decade, and in this act of returning he effected a most intriguing 
layering of liminal person, place and practice. As the first step in this new life he 
simultaneously took on two separate aliases: Edward Muybridge (though he would later 
change the spelling of his first name, this was the final incarnation of his last name) and 
Helios. As Solnit puts it, ‘it was as though he had divided himself: Muybridge took care of 
the business and Helios took the pictures’ (43). 
If Muybridge’s identity is characterised by this ‘betweenness’, then the city in which 
he lives is equally so. Solnit consistently refers to San Francisco as an in-between place, 
‘with its balmy coast and snowbound mountains, and, it seemed, outsized everything’ (30). 
Drawing an analogy with an early process of film exposure, Solnit asserts that ‘the men and 
women scraped clear the glass of their own lives whenever they wanted to make a new image 
there, and San Francisco was a hothouse made out of these lives, incubating fantasies, 
erasures and new beginnings’ (37). Solnit reiterates many times the notion ventured in the 
opening pages that ‘perhaps because California has no past – no past, at least that it is willing 
to remember – it has always been particularly adept at trailblazing the future. We live in the 
future launched there’ (8). And so it was into this place, this moment – teetering between a 
forgotten (or denied) history and a not-yet-realised future (that same not-yet-realised future 
that preoccupies Transcendentalist literature) – that this man of shifting identities began 
experimenting with an artistic medium that would ultimately become ‘a breach in the wall 
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between the past and the present, one that lets the dead return, albeit as images of flickering 
light’ (115). 
Before embarking on the motion studies, Muybridge spent many years travelling 
across the American West as a landscape photographer. As Solnit acknowledges, ‘Muybridge 
made many departures from what had been done before, went to locations that had never 
been photographed, and ended with a wholly new version of the place, and he seems to have 
been reacting against the clichés as well as responding to what else was there’ (85).  In 
Muybridge’s work, then, we can draw many parallels with Solnit’s own artistic practice; this 
preoccupation with ‘responding to what else was there’ is, as we have seen, a key theme 
running throughout Solnit’s own writing. In all of his projects – his photographic studies of 
clouds; his San Francisco panoramas that produced, due to their composition over a period of 
time, ‘a simultaneity that is at once completely plausible and perfectly impossible’ – 
Muybridge experimented with a re-visioning of time and space that would come to its apex 
when in 1872 Leland Stanford asked him to capture the world’s fastest horse on camera. And, 
most fittingly, its name was Occident. 
In a world of ever increasing speeds, Muybridge’s project required a freezing of time. 
As Solnit puts it, Muybridge’s motion studies capture a ‘world […] hidden by time. It was the 
world of everyday things whose motion had always been mysterious’ (83). And in this text 
that is so permeated with metaphor, this project that required Muybridge to capture on 
camera a rampaging beast called ‘The West’ is an irresistible analogy. For such an 
undertaking evokes not only the incessant westward motion of the American continent within 
the period, but also, Muybridge’s attempts to find what was already there within the margins. 
As such, it also stands as a metaphor of Solnit’s own endeavour, in that by tracing how we 
got to where we are, she is also able to recover what has been lost, artistically and culturally, 
in the years that have passed between that time and this. In the final passage of Field Guide’s 
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penultimate chapter, Solnit draws this analogy once more, tracing the thematic 
correspondence between this and her earlier text:  
Movies are made out of darkness as well as light […] If you could add up all the 
darkness, you would find the audience in the theater gazing together at a deep 
imaginative night. It is the terra incognita of the film, the dark continent on every map. 
[…] We fly; we dream in darkness; we devour heaven in bites too small to be 
measured.90 
 
Muybridge and his creative practice, then, are a metaphor for that most pivotal historical 
period, a liminal character in those most liminal of times who, Solnit acknowledges, 
‘demands a mixed reaction’ (152). And Solnit contends that it is ultimately this mixed 
reaction that makes him ‘the perfect parent for the age […] in which we live’ (152). And she 
continues:  
the ‘great man’ version of history has been much attacked in recent years, but Muybridge 
is worth examination not because without him there would have been no movies but 
because with him we can start to understand something about their source. The great 
gifts might have occurred elsewhere, but the peculiar fingerprints on such gifts would 
not. (152)  
 
Thus does Solnit rework that linchpin of Emersonian thought – the Representative Man. In 
‘Emerson and the Inhibitions of Democracy’, Judith Shklar characterises Emerson’s thinking 
regarding the representative man as follows: 
Heroes are relative to their time and place. Great today and gone tomorrow. Only 
humanity goes on. “The genius of humanity” should be the subject of biography. The 
spirit of the genius is absorbed in the flow of humanity’s passage through time. We 
ought to think of great people in social and impersonal terms, as messengers from an 
idea that they represent to us, or really to all humanity. Then, they should get lost as 
fast as possible.91 
 
Clearly, it is in just this sense that Solnit conceives of Muybridge in this text. Lost in the 
margins of history and far from the established historical elite (Plato, Shakespeare, Napoleon, 
as Emerson would have it), this relatively unknown man – ‘an explorer, a murderer, an 
                                                          
90 Field Guide, pp. 175-6. 
91 Judith Shklar, ‘Emerson and the Inhibitions of Democracy’, in The Political Companion to Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, ed. by Alan M. Levine and Daniel S. Malachuk (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 
2011), pp. 53-68 (p. 62). 
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inventor, and the fastest photographer in the West’ (248) – is for Solnit the ideal 
representative for the era that begat the contradictory world we live in today; ‘an age of 
wonders, banalities, degradations, gorgeous spectacles and evils, irreparable losses and 
spectacular gains’ (152). 
And so, as we have seen, Solnit’s West is as seductive as it is problematic. Yet as this 
passage and Motion Studies more generally demonstrate, there is a sense in which it has 
always been so – and that this is a large part of its attraction. In finding much of her creative 
inspiration in this most pivotal moment of the nation’s history, then, Solnit’s work celebrates 
the region’s greatest victories, while opening up the space to consider what the West may still 
achieve, if the cultural pivot were now to tilt in a new direction. 
 
‘MY TWO TRUE HOMES’: ETEL ADNAN’S EASTERN ROOTS AND WESTERN ROUTES 
As an Arab American woman who has lived between Beirut, Paris and California for most of 
her life, Etel Adnan’s experience of the American West is, one might argue, the most 
politically complex of the four writers considered throughout this thesis. When asked in a 
2012 interview about how this transnational perspective informs her concept of home, Adnan 
replied: 
Beirut becomes my home when it has problems. It is not my only home. I have spent 
more time in California than in Beirut. I am pretty much American. And I grew up in 
French schools. But when I read in the newspaper – about the civil war in Lebanon, 
about the war in Syria – the politics do not allow us to forget. […] To be honest, I feel 
alright in the world. There are certain places that I like best, but I cannot be in both 
places at the same time: northern California, near San Francisco, and Beirut. Those 
are my two true homes.92 
 
As will be drawn out within this final section, Adnan, like Solnit, recognises the tension 
between her integral connection with the Californian landscape and the wider significance of 
                                                          
92 Vera Kern, ‘Interview with Etel Adnan: “I React to What is Happening in the World”’, in Qantara.de <http:// 
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American politics. For Adnan, however, as we shall see, this tension is not so easily 
reconcilable.  
On 16th March 2003, the United States declared war on Iraq. As her work bears out, 
this moment was to mark an irrevocable shift in Adnan’s perception of the West – and of her 
position within it. In 1978, Adnan published Sitt Marie Rose, the story of a young Lebanese 
women who was executed by Christian militia during the Lebanese Civil War. Two years 
later, Adnan wrote The Arab Apocalypse (initially in French, but translated into English in 
1989), a poem born out of the same war. She had also been involved in the writers’ 
movement against the Vietnam War. But while she often engaged in the politics of warfare 
within her work, the 2003 declaration of war with Iraq was to challenge Adnan’s very idea of 
home. In response, turning the dialogical tactics identified in the previous chapters to a more 
explicitly political purpose, Adnan published a scathing open letter in American arts 
magazine, Pom². Structured as the imagined correspondence between Moby Dick and 
Captain Ahab, the letter reimagines that most famous of literary battles as one between East 
and West, with America as the archetypal megalomaniac and the Middle East as persecuted 
(yet potent) target. Adnan notes very specifically its being written at ‘fifteen and quarter 
minutes past one o’clock P.M. of this sixteenth day of March 2003’. 93  As such, the 
composition of the letter is set within hours of Dick Cheney’s announcement that the U.S. 
was ‘in the final stages of diplomacy’ with Iraq – and, we may assume, within minutes of a 
lunchtime news bulletin that relayed this news to Adnan.94 Reference is made to Ahab’s 
‘superb arrogance’, and it is noted that ‘the country you attack has open skies, no shields to 
match yours, mud houses, unprotected families […] Unequal battles are tragic, but they are 
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also risible and the bulletins of victories are ridiculous’ (13). The letter implies that 
America’s position is ultimately one of complacent ignorance, asking: ‘Have you, dear 
Captain Ahab, ever bothered to know who I am, what makes me be what I am? […] With the 
power you control you must feel that you don’t need to bother with such knowledge’ (14). 
The letter ends:  
You, Ahab, and me, Moby Dick, we are no more. But our ghosts have returned to 
earth to resume their folly. They are watched as if they were the actors of a bloody 
movie, but in fact the finest people of the East are being slaughtered, and the carnage 
is for real, and the blood is coloring the dual rivers of Paradise, and the makers of this 
apocalypse will be shamed forever. (17) 
 
Far from embracing them as analogies for her own intellectual endeavour, then, Adnan’s 
work treats the rhetorical and real-world implications of hegemony and colonialism with 
derision. Instead, she invites a new conversation, in the hope of a more balanced and 
egalitarian global politics – albeit with an overriding sense in those closing passages of the 
letter of its impossibility:  
I wish you were not a captain and I was not a whale and that we had a conversation on 
some neutral ground, not in the Poles or on the Equator, but in some breezy place, 
with no military attendants, no cunning and fickle advisors, just the two of us, so I can 
empty my pouch and put my cards on the table, and that you will do the same. (14) 
 
And it is a continuation of this conversation that may be read within her 2005 memoir, In the 
Heart of the Heart of Another Country, which picks up where ‘Dear Captain Ahab’ ends, 
drawing an analogy to Melville’s novel once again:  
It’s not about the ocean, it’s not about the whale, it’s not about Ahab, it’s about the 
American psyche. 
 
And it’s not about democracy, it’s not about oil, it’s not about people, it’s about a 
child gone crazy with power. 
 
And it’s not about history, not about suffering, not about the universe, it’s about pure 
motion pushing ahead.95  
 
                                                          
95 In the Heart of the Heart of Another Country, p. 71. 
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Like ‘Dear Captain Ahab’, Another Country is quite literally a text in dialogue, in so far as 
the book takes its title and structure from William H. Gass’s 1968 work, In the Heart of the 
Heart of the Country. Adnan’s introduction to Another Country describes how, in 1971, she 
first came across Gass’s text and was immediately drawn to its structure which develops 
through individually-titled paragraphs, ‘each headed with a recurring word or phrase’.96 In 
returning to Gass’s work a number of years later, Adnan recalls her sense that she ‘entered 
into a silent conversation with [Gass], his story. As I reread it, the paragraphs jumped off of 
the page as if addressed to me, asking for a response’ (xiii). Within Another Country, then, 
Adnan sets about ‘taking over his headings and “answering” them’ (xiv). She elaborates: ‘I 
thought along these lines: So you are in America, and I am here: you may think that you’re in 
trouble, or that there’s trouble in your country, but come here [Beirut] and see for yourself the 
mire into which we’re sinking’ (xiii). If this ‘silent conversation’ with Gass is, on the one 
hand, a much wider cultural dialogue framing Another Country, oscillating between the 
American context of her present and the Middle Eastern context of her past, it is also the very 
personal exploration of her own artistic and political position within these broader cultural 
discourses. Indeed, Adnan herself acknowledges this dynamic in her assertion that ‘personal 
history is involved’ in her attraction to Gass’s narrative strategy (xiv). She recognises that she 
has ‘always felt a particular attraction to paragraphs’ and recounts the writing tasks she was 
set as a young girl at a Catholic elementary school, in which her teacher would give an 
individual word and ask the pupils to write a sentence around it. Adnan recalls that she would 
often write a whole paragraph in ‘a state of trance’, experiencing ‘a kind of “rightness” there, 
like that which sailors feel when they reach the ecstatic moment of their cruising speed, when 
the smooth sailing on a sea merges with desire and becomes pure revelation’ (xiv). It may be 
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said that this last sentence betrays a similar artistic idealism to that acknowledged as running 
throughout Journey. In placing this anecdote into dialogue with her broader political 
intentions, however, Adnan demonstrates how redeploying Gass’s narrative strategy allows 
her to simultaneously articulate a personal artistic continuity alongside an overarching 
cultural division. As we have seen in the work of Dillard, Robinson and Solnit above, 
Another Country negotiates the inevitable convergences and conflicts between the public and 
the private. As such, its title is intriguing in itself. In shifting its location from Gass’s 
Midwest to her Californian surroundings, Adnan reiterates the notion that while California 
may not be the geographical ‘heart’ of the country, its wider national significance allows it to 
function as a cultural bloodline. And yet while positioning herself at the cultural epicentre of 
the nation – and despite later describing herself as ‘pretty much American’ – this shift to 
‘another’ implies her sense that she ultimately still experiences the West from an outsider’s 
perspective.  
This may be gleaned most clearly within the Another Country’s final chapter, ‘To Be 
in a Time of War’. Written entirely in the infinitive, the piece depicts that very same moment 
in which Adnan (purportedly) composed ‘Dear Captain Ahab’. Here, however, as Adnan’s 
introduction to the text acknowledges, we are given a wider focus, as she offers a more 
personal account of that day:  
History was again bringing unbearable tensions. […] In California, very few people 
were really concerned. […] I was numb with apprehension, and it happened that at 
some moment, sitting at my table, detached from my environment, projected to an 
East of my own mind, and alienated from myself, I took paper and ink and started to 
write, ‘To Be in a Time of War’. (xvi) 
 
Here, ‘To Be in a Time of War’ articulates just that notion cited at the outset of this section 
that ‘the politics do not allow us to forget’.97 As we have seen so many times across these 
New Transcendentalist writings, this passage draws conspicuous attention to its liminal 
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context, grounding itself in a specific moment – notably, the moment of artistic conception – 
while simultaneously depicting the subject transcending this moment. Looking to the chapter 
itself, this notion of temporal transcendence is integral, as Adnan considers the personal and 
political implications of her situation, interweaving details of her simply going about her 
everyday existence in a Californian home – ostensibly the most ordinary of days – while, on a 
national scale, the country declares war on the physical and cultural landscapes so near to 
those of her childhood. Whole sections focus on the banalities of everyday living: ‘to go to 
the kitchen, to reopen the fridge, to take out the cheese, to open the drawer, to take out a 
knife, to carry the cheese and enter the dining room, to rest the plate on the table, to lay the 
table for one, to sit down, to cut the cheese into four servings, to take a bite. . .’ (99). In 
several moments, Adnan is able to find solace in nature: ‘To go uphill, peek at Mount 
Tamalpais. […] To enjoy the enormous variety of shades of green on the mountain.’98 Within 
such sections, she comes full circle from the assertion made in the introduction to the text 
that:  
Contrary to what is usually believed, it is not general ideas and a grandiose unfolding 
of great events that most impress the mind in times of heightened historical upheavals 
but, rather, it is the uninterrupted flow of little experiences, observations, 
disturbances, small ecstasies, or barely perceptible discouragements that make up the 
trivialised day-to-day living. (xii) 
 
The ‘uninterrupted flow’ created by Adnan’s use of the infinitive throughout the final chapter 
destabilises the temporality of the piece, in that it creates a shift between the actual happening 
of these moments and the question of their contextual significance. Each action is 
underpinned by the wider context of the declaration of war and, thereby, Adnan’s 
displacement from her immediate surroundings. The use of the infinitive creates the effect of 
a continual gesturing towards what is not being said, including an underlying implication of 
guilt; a sense that simply to be in a time of war, ‘to hear a war from far away, for others’, is to 
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be complicit with its barbaric nature. We see this within its opening lines: ‘[t]o say nothing, 
do nothing, mark time, to bend, to straighten up, to blame oneself’ (99), and later ‘to blame 
oneself for the existence of evil’ (102).99  
In her 1995 essay, ‘Voyage, War and Exile’, Adnan remarks: ‘My memory, as well as 
my daily life, is woven with war.’100 Indeed, if Adnan’s love of the natural world is one 
thread running throughout her work, another which is consistently interwoven with this is her 
dismay at a world in conflict. ‘To Be in a Time of War’ articulates the intersection of these 
two strands of Adnan’s life perfectly; it captures a moment in which while her physical 
reality – her body, her desk, her landscape, her day to day environment – is America (‘To 
[…] peek at Mount Tamalpais […] to enjoy the enormous variety of the shades of green on 
the mountain. . .’), her mind, her memory, her emotional reality as it were, travel back to the 
Middle East (‘. . .To think of the morning news, to be horrified. To despise, to hate. To empty 
one’s head of overflowing emotions’ (102)). Another striking example of this occurs again in 
a later passage, in which the staccato rhythm of the rest of the piece seems to be disrupted. 
Leaving her home at the base of the mountain, the narrative relocates to New York:  
To walk to the Hudson River. […] To see the sun go down and see a band of light 
over the river. To remember the scene as it was, and still is. To wonder subsequently 
at home the mind created the notion of time when the place did not move. To 
understand, suddenly, with the suddenness of this same light, that time came out from 
the triangular confrontation of a place already visited, with the feeling of being 
actually in it. Memory allows that realization, and the interaction of all these elements 
with each other creates in our mind the notion – and therefore the nature – of Time. 
(113-14) 
 
In keeping with the connection recognised in the opening chapter between water imagery and 
her memories of the Middle East, here the ‘band of light over the river’ transports Adnan 
back there ‘with the feeling of being actually in it’; inviting her ‘to remember the scene as it 
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was’. But she must check herself – what she sees as a former reality ‘still is’. This causes her 
to muse on the interplay between time and consciousness, concluding that it is our memory 
alone by which temporality is created. More than an abstract musing on ‘the experience of 
poetic creativeness’, however, the transitional surfaces that Adnan creates here take on a 
much more tangible political significance. For her liminal role as artist is here secondary to 
her liminal status as an Arab American, serving as the medium through which she articulates 
the internal conflict she endures as a consequence. 
 Within the closing lines of ‘Voyage, War and Exile’, Adnan writes: 
I have come to think that our predicament [i.e. the exilic experience] is not our own. 
Amid ecological disaster, economic predatory tactics, and political bankruptcy, a 
human appears to be a fallen angel exiled from the old Paradise as well as from the 
future. Exile is not the sad privilege of only a few individuals: it has become 
synonymous with the human condition. […] As contemporaries of this day and age, 
we are all very close to each other, but very few of us share this knowledge. (318) 
 
Here Adnan comes very close to the ideas expressed by Edward Said in his 1984 essay, 
‘Reflections on Exile’, in which he asserts that ‘we have become accustomed to thinking of 
the modern period itself as spiritually orphaned and alienated, the age of anxiety and 
estrangement’.101 Said’s essay provides a detailed commentary on the concept of exile in 
contemporary culture, describing exile ‘not as a privilege, but as an alternative to the mass 
institutions that dominate modern life’.102 He goes on to suggest that ‘the exile knows that in 
a secular and contingent world, homes are always provisional. Borders and barriers, which 
enclose us with the safety of familiar territory, can also become prisons […] Exiles cross 
borders, break barriers of thought and experience.’103 The final section of his essay concludes 
that: 
for an exile, habits of life, expression or activity in the new environment inevitably 
occur against the memory of these things in another environment. Thus both the new 
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and the old environments are vivid, actual, occurring together contrapuntally. There is 
a unique pleasure in this sort of apprehension, especially if the exile is conscious of 
other contrapuntal juxtapositions that diminish orthodox judgement and elevate 
appreciative sympathy. There is also a particular sense of achievement in acting as if 
one were at home wherever one happens to be.104  
 
In light of the analysis set out in this chapter, the significances of Said’s thoughts here are 
readily evident. The notion here of ‘contrapuntal juxtapositions’ – a musical term meaning 
‘[to employ] combined or contrasting themes, structures’ – applies directly to the series of 
dialectical relationships Adnan sets up throughout her work, not only belonging and exile, but 
also, as we have seen elsewhere in this thesis, mountain and sea, obscurity and clarity, vision 
and language, past and present, and time and space.105 By considering Adnan’s writings in 
the context of Emerson’s less politically charged notion of ‘presenting as much transitional 
surface as possible’, however, we are able to explore Adnan’s experience of exile (and, 
indeed, the experience of exile more generally) as just one aspect of her much wider poetics 
of liminality. In fact, it allows space for those liminal perspectives that Said himself 
acknowledges as the ‘other contrapuntal juxtapositions’ that interact with the experience of 
exile, thus providing a less limiting framework through which to explore the many 
intersecting contexts that inform Adnan’s work, be they artistic, political or otherwise.  
 The significance of endings has been a recurring theme throughout this chapter. 
Looking to the closing pages of Another Country, we find a somewhat different sentiment to 
that which has been identified in the works of Dillard, Robinson and Solnit:  
To pick up the telephone, dial a number in Beirut. To hear the friend say that a 
Palestinian newsman has been cold-bloodedly shot by some earnest monotheist. To 
wonder on the necessity of God. To brush the problem aside. […] To look at the 
narrow and long road that leads the world to the slaughterhouse. (116) 
 
For Adnan, then, the politics of the West are not so easily ‘brushed aside’, as may be read 
within the opposing trajectories of Solnit’s Storming the Gates of Paradise and Adnan’s 
                                                          
104 ‘Reflections on Exile’, p. 148. 
105 Entry for ‘contrapuntal’, in Oxford English Dictionary Online 
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/40437?redirectedFrom=contrapuntal#eid> [accessed 30 April 2013]. 
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Another Country. Where Solnit’s ‘The Red Lands’, as we have seen, seeks to offer what 
many would read as a political disclaimer at the outset of her collection, working towards a 
reconciliation within the natural environment (as evidenced with the collection’s ‘Coda’), 
these final lines of Another Country preclude such hopeful optimism. Yet these final pages do 
not entirely foreclose an alternative future. In questioning monotheism, Adnan questions the 
founding principles of hegemonic culture, and while here this is just an aside (albeit a 
revealing one), it gestures towards her appeals cited elsewhere to a more balanced and 
egalitarian world view. As such, like Solnit – in fact, like all the texts considered in this 
chapter – Adnan invites us to now choose an alternative course. Thinking back to Campbell’s 
acknowledgement that ‘the “outside” becomes a strategy for opening up and scrutinizing 
established ideologies and languages, canonical practice and texts, resilient and official 
mythologies’, I would argue that Adnan’s work excavates the very foundations of U.S. 
mythology (as understood in terms of its Manifest Destiny) which positions the American 
West as a foundational space. In order to draw out this final point, let us turn once again to 
Journey.  
 While its title implies the westward direction of Adnan’s journey, it is striking that the 
text itself resists articulating the journey as a conventional ‘lighting out for the territory’, and, 
as such, undercuts the typical representation of the American West as the superior 
environment. As the opening chapter of this thesis identified, Adnan foregrounds her 
understanding of this new space as the natural (in the literal sense) continuation of her 
previous environment; that this is America at all is, it often seems, incidental. Indeed, we are 
much more likely to find the term ‘America’, if at all, used to evoke that colonial spirit that 
we find increasingly challenged within her later works. Moreover, Adnan aligns herself much 
more closely (as we see when she highlights the etymology of the name ‘Tamalpais’) with 
the indigenous Native American culture, as we see in the following passage from Journey: 
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The Indian called the Mountain Tamal-Pa, “The One close to the Sea”. The Spaniard 
called it Mal-Pais, “Bad Country”! The difference between the native and the conqueror 
is readable in these two different perceptions of the same reality. Let us be the Indian and 
let be! What is close to the sea shall remain close to the sea. (15-16) 
 
In such moments, Adnan implies that the appeal of the region remains in spite of western 
settlement. For many generations, commentators on the American West were keen to employ 
that age-old analogy so often evoked in the justification of Manifest Destiny of the sun that 
rises in the East and sets in the West, an analogy which Thoreau exemplifies within the 
closing lines of Walden: 
I do not say that John or Jonathan will realize all this; but such is the character of that 
morrow which mere lapse of time can never make to dawn. The light which puts out 
our eyes is darkness to us. Only that day dawns to which we are awake. There is more 
day to dawn. The sun is but a morning star.106 
 
Within Journey this analogy is both reimagined and its logic undercut, as Adnan depicts the 
sunset over Mount Tamalpais:  
The large beam comes again. From the West to the East. The beam moves, revealing 
gradually and exclusively, places of its own choice. It goes on, it seems, for hours. I am 
amazed, but, more so, I am fulfilled. I am transported outside my ordinary self and into 
world as it could be when no one watches. The wind rises from the East. It is blowing 
toward the Ocean. The light show reverses itself. (17) 
 
In an image strikingly similar to the graveside vision Robinson presents in Gilead, with this 
figure of the setting sun, Adnan presents a moment not of infinite dawn but of final 
opportunities. But it is in this moment alone, Adnan contends, that a balance is reached in 
which all directions are possible; all possibilities ‘fulfilled’. So it is with the later image of 
the sun ‘revealing gradually’ new places of interest, rather than with figures of incessant 
forward momentum, that Adnan represents her West. A similar image returns later in the text:  
A pink smoke sweeps the sky from the West to the East. It is the evening fire, the one 
which leaves no ashes. Tamalpais is there, pale and fused with the ocean, with the Bay, 
with lakes and reservoirs. We are not apples and oranges to be cut in two: we are binary 
systems yearning to transcend place and time. (51) 
  
                                                          
106 Walden, p. 382. 
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It may be said, then, in line with this last quotation from Journey, that Adnan’s West is, like 
her, ‘yearning to transcend place and time’. For Adnan, it seems that ‘the American West’ is 
but a name written across one small section of the map that represents our interconnected 
planet. If we were to venture into that ‘world as it could be when no one is watching’; if we 
were to move beyond conceptions of space that are contingent on hierarchy and hegemony, 
Adnan suggests that we may yet be able to carve out a new trajectory for ourselves. Yet it 
seems to her that this may be a cost that we are not willing to pay. 
 
CAN THIS LAST PLACE LAST? 
We end this chapter with a consideration of that question that seems to preoccupy the minds 
of so many: can this last place last? On the face of it – probably, for now at least. Yet, as we 
have seen, this is not the question that we ultimately need to be asking. While each may draw 
their respective conclusions, all four of the writers considered here suggest that now is the 
time to move beyond such teleological and cartographic concerns that underpin and 
perpetuate hegemonic culture. That is, now is the time to step across that brink, though not 
into the Emersonian ‘ocean of thought and power’, but rather into a more inclusive critical 
space that challenges the very notion of hierarchy. This is not to suggest that the cultural 
significance of the West is not central to an understanding of the writings of my four 
contemporary writers’ works, however, but that in challenging its position as the nation’s 
(indeed, the world’s) apotheosis, they open new lines of enquiry for the representation of the 
West – and, indeed, America – that transcend its cartographic and ideological limitations. 
Drawing back to the central premise of this thesis, then, the readings within this 
chapter reiterate once more that tension between leaving and the possibility of staying. As we 
have seen, this distinction is explicitly borne out in the disjunction between the idealised 
West of nineteenth-century Transcendentalist writings and the more tangible representations 
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of the actual West found in the works of Dillard, Robinson, Solnit and Adnan. For Emerson, 
Thoreau and other New England Transcendentalists, the West is positioned as one extreme of 
an East coast-West coast dualism from which many other dualisms emanate and as such 
becomes bound in, or even symbolic of the cultural imperatives by which those earlier 
writings remain bound. In the work of my four contemporary writers, however, the actual 
West functions as a space less beholden to its cartographic and historical boundaries, and as 
such becomes a space in which the mutable, ambivalent principles of a Transcendentalist 
mode of liminality can be more fully explored and realised. 
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CONCLUSION 
By setting the writings of Etel Adnan, Annie Dillard, Marilynne Robinson and Rebecca 
Solnit into dialogue with those of the New England Transcendentalists, and particularly 
Ralph Waldo Emerson, this thesis has proposed a New Transcendentalism that both 
reinvigorates and reimagines Transcendentalist thought for our increasingly intersectional 
and deterritorialized contemporary context. In its vision of a female-led New 
Transcendentalism, the project contributes towards the twenty-first-century shift in 
Transcendentalist scholarship which seeks to challenge the popular image of New England 
Transcendentalism as uncompromisingly individualist, abstract and ultimately the preserve of 
white male privilege. Moreover, in its identification and examination of an interrelated 
poetics and politics of liminality across these old and new Transcendentalist writings, the 
project also extends the scope of a more recent strain of Transcendentalist scholarship which 
emphasises the dialogical underpinnings of the nineteenth-century movement.  
 With reference to key studies by Stanley Cavell and Branka Arsić, the thesis develops 
a specifically Transcendentalist mode of liminality which is predicated upon the aversive 
principle that Cavell and Arsić recognise as integral to Emersonian Transcendentalism. 
Framing my understanding of this aversive principle in relation to Arnold van Gennep’s rite 
of passage model, I contended that Emerson’s aversive mode may be understood as the 
perpetual initiation of a rite of passage which never reaches (or intends to reach) reintegration 
and instead prefers to ‘waver between two worlds’. However, I also highlighted a core 
tension in Emerson’s thinking, whereby the progressive potential of the liminal phase that his 
writing so often evokes is, to my mind, limited through being equated with perpetual 
‘onwardness’ and abandonment. The introduction acknowledges Emerson’s awareness of the 
limitations imposed by his historical context and recognises the sense of deferred realisation 
that thus characterises nineteenth-century Transcendentalist thinking. My contention 
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throughout this thesis has been that the paradigm shifts of the mid-to-late twentieth century 
created a cultural space in which Transcendentalism’s underlying progressive modes and 
principles can be more tangibly realised. The readings presented in this thesis propose that 
the alternative trajectory that Transcendentalist ideals take in the writings of Adnan, Dillard, 
Robinson and Solnit constitute a New Transcendentalism. Instead of being bound by an 
imperative to perpetually supplant the past, this New Transcendentalist mode invites us to 
turn back to the founding principles of a seminal strand of U.S. intellectual and literary 
culture in order to recover their progressive potential which has become obscured over the 
intervening century and a half. 
By returning to these first principles, this thesis recognises how the essential 
foundations of New England Transcendentalism – its anti-teleological perspective, its belief 
in the importance of conversation, its willingness to embrace contradiction, and its proclivity 
towards the ‘betwixt and between’ – readily lend themselves to the articulation of marginal or 
peripheral experiences.1 Indeed, as we have seen in the case of anthropological theories of 
liminality and psychoanalytical theories of sexual difference, fundamental aspects of New 
England Transcendentalism may even be said to anticipate the preoccupations (and supposed 
innovations) of several twentieth- and twenty-first-century critical discourses. As such, and in 
keeping with the dialogical analogies that inform this project throughout, the relationship 
examined within this thesis between Adnan, Dillard, Robinson and Solnit and the nineteenth-
century Transcendentalists is presented here as itself reciprocal, in that it not only 
demonstrates how my four contemporary writers may be read productively in the light of 
their New England forebears, but also how those readings in turn invite us to reconsider our 
understanding of those earlier thinkers. 
                                                          
1 Victor W. Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1969), p. 95. 
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 Taking Ralph Waldo Emerson’s notion of ‘[presenting] as much transitional surface 
as possible’ as its point of departure, the opening chapter established the productiveness of 
reading both old and new Transcendentalist writings in light of anthropological theories of 
liminality, given the term’s ability to recognise transition as not only a process implying its 
two extremes, but also a state in and of itself, one which constitutes ‘a realm of pure 
possibility’.2 The chapter’s comparative readings argued that while Adnan, Dillard, Robinson 
and Solnit all reflect a Transcendentalist sense of the restorative, self-affirming potential of 
the liminal experience in nature, such experiences are but one aspect of a much wider 
dialogical perspective that informs their writings. The latter half of the chapter explicitly 
recognised the importance of this broader dialogical mode, tracing its origins back to Mary 
Moody Emerson, before projecting forward to a consideration of how the legacy of this mode 
may be traced within the dialogical tactics employed by Robinson in her Gilead novels. 
While each of my four writers employs her own distinct poetics of liminality to different 
ends, the opening chapter allowed us to establish three overarching (and interrelated) 
elements of a New Transcendentalist literary mode. Firstly, the value they place on 
ambivalence, articulated most succinctly in Adnan’s notion of ‘obscure clarity’ that recurs 
throughout Sea and Fog.3 A second trope of these writings is their ability to hold seemingly 
opposing perspectives in productive tension, as borne out within Dillard’s juxtaposition of the 
via positiva and via negativa, for example, and Robinson’s professed intention ‘to make both 
sides as equal as possible’ within her writings.4 Thirdly, their tendency to create dialogical 
structures both within and across their works, as exemplified by the bilateral symmetry of 
                                                          
2 Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘Plato; Or, The Philosopher’, in Selected Prose and Poetry, ed. by Reginald L. Cook 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), pp. 174-93 (pp. 181-2); Victor W. Turner, ‘Betwixt and 
Between: The Liminal Period of Rites de Passage’, The Proceedings of the American Ethnological Society 
(1964), Symposium on New Approaches to the Study of Religion, pp. 4-20 (p. 6). 
3 Etel Adnan, Sea and Fog (Calicoon, NY: Nightboat Books, 2012), p. 35. 
4 Tace Hedrick, ‘Interviews with Marilynne Robinson: On Influence and Appropriation’, Iowa Review, 22 
(1992), 1-7 (p. 4). 
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Dillard’s Pilgrim, the mediating ‘Blue of Distance’ chapters in Solnit’s Field Guide, the 
intersecting narratives of Robinson’s Gilead and Home, and the ocean/mountain dialectic that 
is constructed across Adnan’s body of work. 
 Having thus identified the central tenets of the New Transcendentalist poetics of 
liminality proposed throughout this thesis, Chapter Two built upon the themes of 
intergenerational dialogue, betweenness and the renegotiation of power dynamics that were 
established as integral to my four writers within the opening chapter. It is within this second 
chapter that we see the clearest evidence of the mutuality of a New Transcendentalist poetics 
and politics of liminality. For the New Transcendentalist texts considered within this chapter 
– Solnit’s The Faraway Nearby, Robinson’s Housekeeping and Dillard’s The Maytrees, most 
particularly – may be understood as constituting ‘the potential space of thirdness’ between 
these two seemingly incompatible perspectives: New England Transcendentalism on the one 
hand and feminist psychoanalytic models on the other, where the former is popularly 
characterised as an exemplar of the patriarchal mode that the latter explicitly seeks to 
challenge.5 Yet by drawing on readings by George Kateb, Johannes Voelz and Branka Arsić, 
the discussion highlighted several striking parallels between Emersonian understandings of 
love and friendship and those ventured by Irigaray and Benjamin. As such, by projecting 
those feminist discourses onto the liminal landscapes that are so steeped in that patriarchal 
tradition, indeed, by reimagining those landscapes from the perspective of those feminist 
discourses and vice versa, the New Transcendentalist texts considered throughout Chapter 
Two uncover a number of intriguing points of contact between these apparently disparate 
modes: their anti-teleological perspective, for example, their dialectic sense of the 
relationship between spirit and matter, their belief in negative capability, their vision of the 
                                                          
5  Jessica Benjamin, ‘Beyond Doer and Done to: An intersubjective view of thirdness’, Psychoanalytic 
Quarterly, 73 (2004), 5-46 (p. 11). 
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role of the artist. The three-way dialogue that is set up within Chapter Two, then, exemplifies 
both the vertical and lateral genealogies that inform the New Transcendentalism proposed 
throughout this thesis. 
 Moving beyond the local implications of the self-other dynamic, the third and final 
chapter of this thesis considered how my four writers renegotiate American 
Transcendentalism’s engagement with both the real and imagined American West. Taking 
Thoreau’s ominous assertion that the colonisation of the American continent – both 
geographically and intellectually – represents ‘one last chance’ for the human race before it 
comes full circle on itself and ‘arrives on the banks of the Styx’, the discussion highlighted a 
fundamental tension between New England Transcendentalism’s professed anti-teleological 
outlook and the rhetoric of Manifest Destiny.6 Yet it also identified Emerson and Thoreau’s 
awareness of the liminal and, in this case, limiting historical context in which they were 
writing, and a sense of deferred hope for the full realisation of a Transcendentalist sensibility. 
As Emerson remarked: ‘[s]o many things are unsettled which it is of the first importance to 
settle, – and, pending their settlement, we will do as we do.’7 Examining the centrality of the 
American West within the texts of my four writers, I argued that our contemporary moment 
may be understood as the not-yet-realised future in which American Transcendentalism 
would find itself ‘in fuller union with the surrounding system’.8 In contrast to the idealised 
imaginary West which is consistently gestured towards in the writings of Emerson and 
Thoreau, however, the West emerges here as an ambiguous and contested space which is as 
problematic as it is seductive. In keeping with the dialogical strategies outlined above, 
however, it is the ambivalent characteristics of the region to which my four writers are 
                                                          
6 ‘Henry David Thoreau, ‘Walking’, in Collected Essays and Poems (New York: The Library of America, 
2001), pp. 225-55 (p. 235). 
7 Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘Experience’, in Selected Prose and Poetry, pp. 141-161 (p. 151). 
8 Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘The Transcendentalist’, in Nature; Address, and Lectures (Boston and Cambridge: 
James Munroe, 1850), pp. 319-48 (p. 319). 
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inevitably drawn, allowing as they do the space to renegotiate the derivative stereotypes with 
which the region is popularly associated. At the end of the chapter, all four writers find 
themselves looking out beyond this liminal space so often presented as the edge of history, 
time and civilization. Rather than a sense of foreboding, however, each writer recognises the 
opportunity for moving beyond the cartographic and ideological limitations that have for so 
long delimited the image of the West and, indeed, America in the cultural imagination. 
As Emerson tells us, ‘[e]very end is a beginning’, and so it is for this project.9 Where 
Chapter Three closes with each of my writers looking out from America’s farthest edge onto 
an uncertain future, we are invited to extend the Emersonian model of ‘ever-expanding 
circles’ further still, and to move ahead to a consideration of the transnational implications of 
the New Transcendentalism proposed here. Indeed, Neil Campbell’s claim that ‘[to] examine 
the [American] West in the twenty-first century is to think of it as always already 
transnational, a more routed and complex rendition, a traveling concept whose meanings 
move between cultures, crossing, bridging and intruding simultaneously’ presents in 
microcosm the wider transnational turn in American Studies, which aims to situate American 
literature within the wider contexts of an increasingly deterritorialized world.10 Of particular 
interest in this vein is Wai Chee Dimock’s 2006 study, Through Other Continents: American 
Literature Across Deep Time. If Campbell presents the American West as already having 
established its transnational significance, Dimock implies that the wider field of American 
Studies still has some way to go in this regard. Dimock draws on thinkers including Benedict 
Anderson and Anthony Giddens, positing that ‘the nation and the clock not only unify time 
but also “dis-embed” it, removing it from local contexts, local irregularities, and abstracting it 
                                                          
9 Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘Circles’, in Selected Prose and Poetry, ed. by Reginald L. Cook (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1969), pp. 110-120 (p. 110). 
10 Neil Campbell, The Rhizomatic West: Representing the American West in a Transnational, Global, Media 
Age (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), p. 4. 
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into a metric, at once “empty and homogenous”’.11 Dimock contends that these notions of 
time and space have been inadequately mapped onto literary criticism, and particularly 
American literary study, which, she asserts, has ‘for too long […] been seen as a world apart, 
sufficient unto itself’ (2). Through Other Continents challenges the notion that there is a 
‘seamless correspondence between the temporal and spatial boundaries of the nation and the 
boundaries of all other expressive domains’, and argues that by uncritically mapping one onto 
the other ‘we limit ourselves, with or without explicit acknowledgement, to an analytic 
domain foreclosed by definition, a kind of scholarly unilateralism’ (3). From such a 
perspective, Dimock contends, ‘literature [becomes] the product of one nation and one nation 
alone, analyzable within its confines’ (3). Her study instead invites us to consider American 
literature as ‘a crisscrossing set of pathways, open-ended and ever multiplying, weaving in 
and out of other geographies, other languages and cultures’ (3). Given the focus of this thesis, 
it is significant that Dimock presents the notion of ‘scholarly unilateralism’ as a particularly 
American phenomenon. For, as we have seen, the desire to establish an American literature 
that positions itself as ‘the product of one nation and one nation alone’ – a self-reliant 
national culture, as it were – can be traced directly back to New England Transcendentalist 
writings. In keeping with the premise of this project, then, it is within this wider context, as 
we renegotiate the role of American literature more generally, and move beyond the 
boundaries of both personal and national self-reliance, that I wish to position my own model 
of New Transcendentalism. 
At the very outset of this thesis, it was acknowledged that any attempt to develop a 
rigid definition of what it means to be a Transcendentalist is as futile as it is problematic 
given the incongruous nature of those associated with the movement. I would argue here that 
                                                          
11  Wai Chee Dimock, Through Other Continents: American Literature Across Deep Time (Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 2. Subsequent references are given in parentheses. 
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the same may said of New Transcendentalism, for while this thesis has recognised many 
affinities between Adnan, Dillard, Robinson and Solnit, it is equally important to recognise 
their key points of divergence. As an Arab American artist, for example, Adnan clearly 
brings a very different range of influences – both artistic and political – to bear on her 
experience of contemporary U.S. culture. Equally, Solnit’s political activism is key to our 
understanding of her writings, just as our understanding of Robinson’s work is shaped at least 
in part by our understanding of her Calvinist faith. Likewise, while we may aim to align 
Dillard with Robinson in light of the theological discourses in which their writings are 
steeped – and, indeed, the mutual admiration they have recognised for one another – their 
differing relationships with their faith are such that we must be wary of drawing too neat an 
affinity between them. As we have seen, however, the ability to recognise and account for 
opposition is a central tenet of the New Transcendentalism I propose here. In positioning 
these ‘separate yet connected’ writers alongside one another, then, this thesis engages in the 
dialogical mode that it has identified as so integral to Transcendentalists old and new.12 In 
doing so, I add my own voice to the series of interconnected conversations considered 
throughout this thesis, in the aim of opening a new line of enquiry in the field of 
Transcendentalist scholarship. 
 
 
 
                                                          
12  Jessica Benjamin, ‘An Outline of Intersubjectivity: The Development of Recognition’, Psychoanalytic 
Psychology, 7 (1990), 33-46 (p. 6). 
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